


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16 February 1984



# East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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16 February 1984

## EAST EUROPE REPORT

### POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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SECRETARY BENO DELINEATES TASKS OF UPCOMING PARTY CONFERENCES

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 5 Jan 84 p 3

[Address by CPCZ Central Committee Secretary Mikulas Beno: "Demanding Tasks Require Corresponding Approaches and Action"]

[Text] The membership meetings of basic organizations in early 1984 have an especially important place in the resolution and realization of the principal social tasks facing us. They will become a significant element in the approach taken by the party and society in the coming struggle to implement the policy of our last party congress. The CPCZ Central Committee has set forth a unified program for them, to discuss the principal problems of the basic organization in the realization in 1984 of the 16th CPCZ Congress resolutions. At its Ninth Plenum, it charged party organs and organizations to intensify the impact and effectiveness of their endeavor and make sure that the basic organizations' membership meetings take place, in line with the CPCZ Presidium resolution of October 1983, in a creative and constructive atmosphere. Their active preparation began late last year in all party components. The aim of these important party deliberations is the adoption of substantive and precisely targeted resolutions on our main tasks, which would create the necessary prerequisites for labor collectives in all sectors to fulfill and, in accord with society's needs, surpass the plan for economic and social progress, in active contribution to the realization of congress tasks in the fourth year of the Seventh 5-Year Plan.

It has become a tradition in party work to begin the year--as all other good managers do--with an assessment of how well tasks have been met in the preceding period. One basic consideration which should never be overlooked is a strict evaluation of the effectiveness of party work, analysis of good and tried experiences, as well as the weak points. Only in this manner can we more emphatically orient the party's influence

on our principal tasks, increase its impact, and delineate concrete ways reflecting the goals we have set for ourselves for this year, to adopt measures to increase the activism of communists and their coordinated approach in all sectors of the work of basic party organizations and labor collectives.

At the threshold of 1984, we must be partially aware of two factors in the CSSR plan for economic and social development. These demand very exacting dynamism of economic growth through the intensification of the entire reproduction process and higher social productivity of labor. The realism of the prescribed goals is backed by a developed production and scientific-technological base and a broad creative potential of human labor aimed, above all, at accelerating scientific and technological programs in production.

The second important feature of the 1984 plan is that implementation of the principal goals of the program of economic and social development in society will be undertaken under more difficult internal, but especially external economic and political conditions. In the dangerously sharpening international situation, where imperialism threatens the world with nuclear catastrophe, we must produce the necessary resources to safeguard our high standard of living and the social security of our people, along with ensuring our country's defense capability to foil the United States' plans to achieve strategic military superiority. Together with the Soviet Union, the socialist community, and the antiwar peace movement around the globe, we have adequate forces, sufficient will power and the determination to deny the implementation of such dangerous plans. For us, this means further developing the strength of our socialist society, especially through a concentrated effort to raise the effectiveness of resources' formation and their utilization, and through the application of economic intensification with more determination. It is a demanding program but one which can be met and which points the way to the future and represents a mobilizing force for conscientious, initiative endeavor.

The CPCZ Central Committee expressed its conviction that not only communists but all the working people of our homeland will, through selfless work, concrete deeds, and creative endeavor, support the aims of the party and the socialist state, a policy of building an advanced socialist society and ensuring the defense capability of the land. In the strength and unity of our country, the entire socialist community, in unbreakable friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, lies the firmness and future guarantee of a peaceful life for our people.

Our party emphasizes the deep internal unity in building and defending our homeland as a pillar of its policy and the most fundamental need of future progress in our society. These vital problems, as stated in this New Year's address by party General Secretary and CSSR President Comrade Gustav Husak, are of daily concern for the highest party and state organs. The Ninth Central Committee Plenum also emphasized that

the consequences of current international development are projected into all our efforts, into the resolution of economic problems, into the sphere of political educational work and other sectors. Our party and the socialist state have never been so urgently confronted with such a vital need to relate the economic tasks of the plan to international developments and to ensuring our defense requirements.

The unprecedented growth of our tasks, given by the character of conditions, higher goals and the exactingness of the road to achieve them, requires a corresponding enhancement of organizational and political educational work of our party, the socialist state and all organs and organizations of the National Front. We must see to it that the broadest strata of our population are currently informed of the situation and what it means for our work and each and every citizen.

With respect to the needs of society as a whole, we plan in first place the strategic tasks of more consistent implementation of a long-term economic policy line of significantly higher quality and effectiveness in everything we undertake, more rationalized utilization of the productive, scientific, technological and human potential, application of savings measures in the use of all resources, improved management, broad development of workers initiatives, and purposeful direction of our economy into the socialist economic integration system. Questions related to the fulfillment of these tasks must permeate more emphatically all political, organizational and ideological education.

The urgent requirement that everyone comprehend the aims of party policy, that everyone be convinced of its correctness and carry it out in practice, raises the exactingness of the general education of an individual toward conscientious, selfless effort on behalf of these goals, toward socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

Such education must provide an incentive for a highly responsible approach in confronting the urgent requirements of our time. In its resolution adopted at the Ninth Plenum, the Central Committee calls on all communists, all party organs and organizations to become an example in labor collectives, to lead others toward creative initiative, high responsibility and discipline in meeting their tasks.

The deliberations of communists at the beginning of this year will focus attention on the realization of the party's economic and social programs, on ensuring the best possible conditions for meeting the tasks of 1984. It is especially important that party organizations approach future tasks after having critically evaluated past performance by communists, management cadres, and entire work collectives. The CPCZ Presidium resolution anticipates that these discussions will fully reflect the continuity of past and future efforts to live up to the conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress, the Central Committee, and regional and district committees, as well as last year's membership meetings.



In these deliberations, communists will assess the extent to which the basic organization committees, party groups, and individual members and candidates have participated in party work, where the causes of nonfulfillment lie, and will adopt resolutions to eliminate shortcomings. There will not always be time at the membership meetings to make a detailed assessment of the work of each communist. This is the mission of the committees, party groups and related organizations. Everyday party practices show that the collective experiences of communists significantly enrich the acquired knowledge, critical comments and recommendations of the working people, innovators and all those who through their activist contribution assist in the achievement of the prescribed goals. We should rely on these in the preparation of the membership meetings and ensuing public party gatherings.

A principle evaluation of fulfilling resolutions, plans and approaches has a much broader significance than a mere listing of action taken. A profound, closely targeted and objective assessment aids in uncovering shortcomings, superficiality and formalism. It publicizes good experiences, effective forms and methods of work which need to be further developed in a creative manner. Practice has frequently confirmed that formalist, superficial and general approaches to past accomplishments usually reproduce shortcomings and dull discipline as well as responsibility.

Party organizations adopt many good and timely resolutions. What we do not always find is their fulfillment. Critical exactingness in evaluating results and drawing appropriate conclusions from nonfulfillment contribute to better discipline, responsibility and party dedication. For this reason, we must at party meetings assess fulfillment responsibility, fulfillment of all the basic tasks set forth by the 16th CPCZ Congress, which were further elaborated and implemented under the guidance of the Central Committee by party and state organs.

In accord with the congress program, the center of attention for the entire party organization are the key problems of further improvement in all sectors of our society which are confronting us today and which we will have to face up to in long-term perspective. This is a line expressing the demand of objective laws of socialist development, the actual needs and interests of our people. Stated briefly, it is a matter of acceleration and more determined realization of profound qualitative changes in the production forces and a corresponding development of social relationships, with the aim of ensuring further general progress in society and each and every one of its members. We must constantly bear in mind the concrete implementation of these long-term, lasting tasks with necessary local adaptation to existing conditions, in harmony with the needs and capabilities of our socialist society, as well as with its security. Toward this goal we must concentrate and mobilize all our forces which represent the tremendous potential our country has at its disposal.



We are all familiar with Lenin's percept that if correct tasks are set forth, along with the delineation of ways toward their realization, then everything hinges on the organization of work in the process of their implementation on the level and performance of the cadres. The development of effective party wisdom and dedicated support of party policy by the working people are decisive for the end results of even the most difficult of tasks.

A binding resolution of the CPCZ Presidium requires that the membership meetings proceed in an atmosphere of high responsibility toward the party and society, in order that they might culminate--after having openly and collectively assessed the basic tasks and problems--in the adoption of specific, closely targeted and controllable resolutions for a mobilization of communists and work collectives toward their fulfillment.

The congress line, valid for all levels of the party structure down to the basic organizations and each individual communist, identifies the mastering of the demanding economic tasks through development of intensification, high quality and effectiveness of all our endeavors as the priority field of struggle in our current revolutionary efforts.

The prescribed goals and the ways to achieve them demand corresponding economic thinking on the part of the working people, especially economic managers and the entire party aktiv, plus trade union and youth organizations. This is unquestionably a key element in the emphasis on intensive development in the national economy. Further development of the practical effect of the whole mechanism of party influence may be achieved through uniform, coordinated guidance in all spheres of party work. A creative, scientific approach characterized by unity of thought and action is a guarantee of a responsible and professional projection of the principal tasks into political, organizational and ideological education, as well as mass political, cadre and control functions of the party.

Of key importance for the realization of adopted resolutions is effective control conducted from the top as well as from the bottom, control most closely linked with the fulfillment of concrete tasks at the worksites. One important place in control operations is the right of control by economic management. Today more than ever we see the importance of a responsible party approach to the tasks by management cadres. Party organizations must demand and simultaneously create conditions for management to fulfill its duties in eliminating tendencies to avoid tackling economic problems by merely relying on the force of regulations. Management cadres should instead apply their high professionalism and political know-how in leading the workers as they ensure the strategic goals of the party at their worksites.

A targeted, programmatic approach to economic intensification will help to achieve a higher level of general progress in our society. This presupposes that the whole party, all its elements, each and every

communist and work collective do not retreat from obstacles and problems but rather use a creative method of seeking ways of overcoming them. Work everywhere should be assessed not merely by the level of fulfillment but also by the degree of application of all accessible opportunities, conditions and resources in achieving concrete results.

In connection with characterizing the results of last year and the tasks for 1984, the CPCZ general secretary, Comrade Gustav Husak, pointed out two important facts at the November Central Committee plenum: "First, our national economy has in its assets, experience and people's skill, ample prerequisites and opportunities to develop at a faster rate in coming years and master more demanding tasks; second, it has been confirmed that to exploit these opportunities fully, an aggressive political approach is essential." This basic view of our conditions and opportunities fully applies to the deliberations of the party basic organizations. It requires assuming responsibility for difficult tasks, the fulfillment of which is within our reach wherever each and every communist becomes a determined fighter of the party.

The level of party meetings and approaches to the principal tasks will to a considerable extent depend on how well we succeed in turning this important programmatic and implementation process into thoughts and deeds, into a criterion of moral and material assessment. The creative force of the slogan "to think, work and live as a socialist" was proclaimed by the 16th CPCZ Congress as an urgent requirement. The congress also stressed that people's dedication possesses a great creative force capable of mobilizing society into coping with even the most complicated tasks.

The achievement of excellent results in accelerating of the intensification process requires application of all that is new, all that is born at the worksites, in plants and communities. We need to support and expand experiences which have been successful and the example of leading work collectives, pioneers of socialist labor, all that is beneficial to society. There are examples of such collectives in every region and district, units which under the leadership of the party organizations represent an innovative approach to task fulfillment not only during the period of plan preparation but rather on a sustained basis, seeking ways of best satisfying the needs of society as a whole.

An example worthy of broad emulation in the efforts of party organizations and work collectives was to make use of Soviet experiences in improving the instruments of planning and management, moral and material stimulation, results of the use of the khozraschet method of work and management, and developing the socialist principle of rewarding according to merit of both individuals and whole collectives.

Recently, we have been gratified by concrete instances of accelerated innovation, reduction in outlays, higher quality utility properties of products for both export and domestic use, for example, in Tatra

Koprivnice, Avia Letnany, Automobile Works in Mlada Boleslav, Adamov Engineering Works, Tesla Piestany and many other enterprises in all regions. All of these confirm that a purposeful approach by work collectives to dealing with key tasks of the plan on the basis of comprehensively elaborated projects and measures brings desired results.

An important component of the preparation for the membership meetings, especially in those places where there are shortcomings, is the creative application of the pioneering example of leading collectives. This is unquestionably a higher form of party work in basic organizations, based on thorough knowledge of the tasks, problems and people, an example of using available opportunities quickly and effectively. In this respect, the regional and district party committees are going through an important stage of improving the whole system of management of the basic organizations, anchored in granting effective assistance based on individual and differentiated approaches. It is a demanding but rewarding method of management which presupposes constant care for the party aktiv, thorough knowledge of the problems of the individual party organizations and worksites. It enables the committees to get to know the cadres, the ability of the basic organizations' committees, their chairmen, thus enhancing the action capability of party organizations. The combination of individual forms of work with party organizations equipped with the high-quality political and ideological arsenal of basic, elected aktiv at seminars indicates that this is the right way for avoiding excessive paperwork and strengthening living political endeavor.

The question might quite naturally arise whether we expect too much of the basic organizations and the membership meetings early in the new year, whether our demands are not excessive. It is obvious that we cannot achieve everything overnight. Patience is also a component of the Leninist style of party work, as is a realistic approach and proper perspective in the struggle to fulfill the goals set forth by the party. The all-party convocation of membership meetings early in the year, however, affords us an opportunity to set for ourselves demanding tasks. This cannot be viewed as a one-time affair but rather as an important milestone in the struggle for enhanced action capability of party organizations as well as of every individual party member.

The important thing is for meetings to be prepared everywhere in this spirit and that, on the basis of thorough discussion of past achievements, the current goals of the party stemming from the 16th Congress and specified in the state plan for economic and social progress for 1984 assume a highly activist image in the basic organizations. It represents higher effectiveness of party work which applies all available means to meet all planned tasks. In this manner all communists will be able to return to their worksites after the membership meetings with an awareness of their specific tasks and responsibilities.

It is very important that the report of the basic organizations' deliberations, resolutions and their committees' reports on measures dealing with the tasks for this year proceed from this vantage point. Specific, well-prepared mobilization conclusions will provide a good foundation for the subsequent public meetings.

We must constantly and with dedicated determination wage a principled struggle for the realization of party policy. The membership meetings at the beginning of this year are an inseparable part of this struggle.

9496

CSO: 2400/177

# USE OF ANGULAR REFLECTORS AS CAMOUFLAGE MEASURE REPORTED

East Berlin MILITAERTECHNIK in German No 6, 1983 (signed to press 9 Sep 83)  
pp 303-304

/Article by Lt Col H.-D. Preusker, military scientist: "Angular Reflectors for Camouflage against Radar"/

/Text/ To an increasing extent, the enemy is equipping its fighting forces with modern reconnaissance devices and uses basically novel methods to detect ground targets. This requires the effective use of pioneer-type camouflage equipment. It is presupposed that the enemy has complex technical reconnaissance (visual, heat, radar), thus also requiring a complex form of camouflage. The further discussion will only concern some problems of radar camouflage, particularly the use of angle reflectors (WR).

Angle reflectors can be used to represent equipment and installations (simulating the target signal of real equipment) and to camouflage equipment and installations (blanketing of the target signal from real equipment). Its action principle consists in the reflection of the electromagnetic waves radiated by a radar station (FuMS) in the direction of this radar station (Figure 1).




Figure 1:  
Diagram of the  
Reflection of  
Radar Waves  
a) with two-  
surface re-  
flectors  
b) with three-  
surface re-  
flectors  
Key:  
1. From the  
radar station  
2. To the radar  
station




Figure 2: Radar Image  
a) Apparent target  
b) Real target

This produces a target signal (Figure 2) on the screen of the radar station. The type of the angle reflector and the position of its reflection surfaces with respect to the radar station are decisive criteria for the size and brightness of the target signal.

Figure 3 shows the angle reflectors found in the equipment of the NVA (People's Army) and their application. They must be correctly selected and deployed. Here, the rules described below must be adhered to and must be specifically utilized.

Ground reliefs, buildings, and other structures cause a quiet, uniformly bright target signal at the radar station. On the other hand, vegetation generates a target signal which is constantly changing in brightness (fluctuating). Even minimal air motions cause a slight shaking of the leaves (needles, stems) of the growth.

Radar stations belonging to the enemy's equipment should already respond to leaf motions of one millimeter. In this way, a trained radar operator can use these fluctuations to distinguish, for example, between vegetation and buildings.

In general, the following yield no fluctuations:

- structures of stone, concrete, steel,
- armored equipment,
- stationary angle reflectors with tensioned reflection surfaces;

Small fluctuations:

- nonarmored vehicles,
- stationary angle reflectors,
- dummies;

Strong fluctuations:

- trees and bushes,
- suspended angle reflectors.










Designation	Dimensions (mm)	Weight (kg)	Application
DMU		3,2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Simulation of equipment</li> <li>- Construction of blinds on land</li> </ul>
T 4-60		7,0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Simulation of equipment if only air reconnaissance is expected</li> <li>- Like NS 4-60</li> </ul>
T 8-60		11,0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Simulation of equipment</li> <li>- Construction of blinds on land</li> <li>- Like NS 4-60</li> </ul>
KT 8-40		9,0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Simulation of small installations</li> </ul>
KT 8-50		13,0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Like KT 8-40</li> </ul>
Ugol		80,0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Simulation of objects and towns</li> </ul>
K 4-100		21,0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Like pyramids</li> </ul>
NS 4-60 (Sphära)		9,5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Simulation of pontoon and auxiliary bridges</li> <li>- Camouflage of water surfaces</li> </ul>
Pyramida Bild 3		120,0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Simulation of solid bridges, harbor installations, etc.</li> <li>- Camouflage of water surfaces</li> </ul>

Figure 3:  
Angle Reflectors  
and Their  
Possible Uses






Figure 4: Ways of Affixing the OMU Angle Reflector  
 a) as apparent target  
 b) as radar blind (variant)

The angle reflectors should be used in correspondence with these special features. The manner in which they are affixed is shown through the example of the OMU angle reflector in Figure 4.

If the funnel of an angle reflector, which is formed of three reflection surfaces, points precisely in the direction of the radar station, the corresponding target signal will be the largest in brightness. Since the location of the enemy ground radar station can be determined only in general and since the direction of the enemy air reconnaissance cannot be determined at all, it is suitable, when constructing radar interference blinds, always to affix two angle reflectors at a mutual angle of 45 degrees (see Figure 4b).

When simulating equipment, it is advisable to use several angle reflectors (see Figure 4a), since the technical capabilities of the enemy to isolate targets (better resolving power of the radar station in terms of direction and distance) will continue to improve in the future.

The action of the angle reflectors is impaired by the deformation and contamination of the reflection surfaces. Some examples of this: An angular inaccuracy of two reflection surfaces with respect to one another up to 5 degrees causes the efficiency of the OMU angle reflector to be reduced to 85 percent and causes the efficiency of the K 4-100 angle reflector to be reduced to 40 percent. A reflection surface bent by 5 mm lowers the efficiency to about 50 percent. This results in the requirement of paying more attention to the care and maintenance of the angle reflector. But this should prevent no one from increasingly using angle reflectors for combat training. Properly used, angle reflectors are an effective means to maintain one's own fighting force.

8348  
CSO:2300/245

PROMINENT FEMALE PEACE ACTIVISTS' BACKGROUND, ARREST

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLEGEMEINE in German 31 Dec 83 p 4

[Article by Peter Jochen Winters, chief of Berlin editorial bureau of FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE: "Baerbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe were under Surveillance by the GDR Authorities Long Before their Arrest"]

[Text] On December 12, painter and graphic artist Baerbel Bohley and museum employee Ulrike Poppe were arrested in East Berlin. Shortly before Christmas, "GDR Women for Peace" from three GDR cities protested against the arrest. The protest note, which reached the West, states: "Baerbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe are among the most committed and most influential fighters of the peace movement of this country. In their work, they always respect the laws of the GDR. Their arrest is intended to frighten all of us away from further peace efforts. Ever since the Bundestag decision on deployment, we keep learning about arrests under pretexts which, a year ago, would not have led to imprisonment. There are man-women among them...In the meantime, conservative politicians in the FRG assert that the political situation has not changed because of the decision for deployment. We must stress: the domestic climate in our country has deteriorated sharply. This is also true for non-state directed contacts with citizens of the other German state."

Baerbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe must expect to be tried for violation of paragraph 99 of the GDR Criminal Code. This paragraph was newly formulated in the Third Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1979. It carries the threat of a prison sentence of between 2 and 12 years to anyone who "gives, collects, or makes available information not subject to secrecy [but] detrimental to the interests of the GDR" to a foreign power, its institutions or representatives, to a secret service, or foreign organizations and their assistants. "The preparation and attempt [to deliver such information] are liable to prosecution."

Visitor from New Zealand

The two women had met in East Berlin with Barbara Einhorn, a citizen of New Zealand who, being active herself in the British peace movement, wanted to inform herself about peace activities carried out by GDR women

mostly in connection with church functions. During the exchange of ideas with the visitor from the West, the two GDR women also talked about a documentation of peace activities in the GDR which they planned to compile and publish. Barbara Einhorn was arrested by GDR security organs and interrogated for 4 days before being released to the West. On the basis of her statements and notes found on her about the conversation with Baerbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe, the two women were arrested and a preliminary investigation was initiated against them. Irina Kuckuz and Jutta Seidel, who were arrested at the same time, were released after 24 hours. Absolute secrecy was imposed on them regarding the subject of their interrogation. The same apparently is true for Barbara Einhorn. At any rate, after her release she did not comment publicly on the incident, probably because she was threatened with reprisals against relatives in the GDR. The husbands of the two prisoners were threatened with arrest, also, because there was supposed to be enough evidence against them.

There can be no doubt that the GDR security authorities had been preparing for some time a move against Baerbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe, whom they consider ringleaders of the autonomous GDR peace movement. After all, it is no longer a secret that it was above all these two women who conceived the October 1982 petition to Chairman of State Council Honecker in which GDR women protested against the new military service law of March 1982, under which women can be drafted into military service during mobilization and a state of national defense. This note, which contained the request for public debate, stated: "We, the women, declare ourselves unwilling to become subject to the general draft and demand the legal right of objection. The right of objection is necessary because the enactment of this law, which imposes the duty of general military service on women, curtails our freedom of conscience." About 200 women between the ages of 18 and 50 signed this petition.

The two initiators themselves were surprised how many women in the GDR were willing to sign this petition. Since they were not concerned with a political test of strength, they soon stopped collecting signatures. Fellow fighters in the peace movement do not doubt that it would have been easy to collect a four-digit number of signatures. Baerbel Bohley, Ulrike Poppe and others in their circle were not interested at the time in having the text of the petition published in the West. When this happened anyway later on, it was against their will.

### Conviction and Eloquence

Baerbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe are among those people in the GDR who are consistent in their willingness to embrace political, and especially human, solidarity at a cost of great personal sacrifice. The readiness to be there for other people, to help and assist them, together with the capability of openly presenting their own convictions with eloquence and persuasive power, but also being able to listen to others, gradually made the two women the focal point of a circle of people who--each in his own way--have difficulties leading their lives in the reality of existing socialism, in adapting to the existing norms. Yet the two women are not

"in opposition," but rather see themselves as socialists--the painter molded more by humanistic-Christian influences, the museum employee by Marx and Engels--whose place is in GDR society.

Ulrike Poppe, born in Rostock in January 1953, is the mother of two children, Jonas, 5, and Johanna, 2. After completing the Abitur, she studied art and history for two and a half years, then broke off her studies because of political difficulties. She worked in a home for children impaired by environmental influences, as a waitress, and as a nurses' aide in psychiatry. Finally she ended up at the Museum of German History in East Berlin where she worked on their art collection until her arrest. In private life, she involved herself in cultural activities as co-organizer of numerous children's festivals, theater performances for adults, private readings, and scientific and political discussion groups. In 1980 she initiated probably the only private "children's shop" in East Berlin, where some parents experimented with alternative educational methods outside of state control, but initially with state sufferance. This children's shop was cleared out and officially closed 4 days after her arrest.

A friend of Katja and Robert Havemann, and since 1977 married to Gerd Poppe--who is a friend of Wolf Biermann and Rudi Dutschke and who, since 1968, has been a persistent annoyance to GDR security officials as a "constant troublemaker" and activist--Ulrike Poppe is one of the first signers of the open letter to Leonid Brezhnev which Havemann wrote in September 1981. She signed the "Berlin appeal" of East Berlin pastor Eppelmann and several other resolutions, most recently the greeting of the East Berlin friends of peace to the "European Peace Conference" held in West Berlin in May, and in November of this year, the "Letter to the members of the Bundestag" with its demand to reject missile deployment. She worked actively for the release of the Jena friends of peace and protested the expatriation of Roland Jahn. Her work for peace, begun in 1981, led to close contacts with the church. The letter against military service for women in Fall of 1982 brought about the "GDR women for peace" movement.

#### Expulsion from the Association

Baerbel Bohley, born in Berlin only days after the "liberation"--on May 24, 1945--turned to learning business administration after the Abitur and became active in teacher training and as a cultural functionary. From 1969 to 1974 she completed her studies at the East Berlin Art Academy. Since then, she and her husband have been working as free-lance artists in East Berlin. She is a member of the GDR Association of Creative Artists and was allowed to travel to the FRG once when participating in an exhibit. Baerbel Bohley is not one of the well-known GDR artists, but her works can be seen in exhibits--her oil painting "Printer" was part of the representative IX. GDR art exhibit 1982/83 in Dresden--and are for sale in galleries. This has not (yet?) changed since her arrest. When more of her work was shown in the FRG in 1982, Baerbel Bohley was the only young artist not allowed to leave the GDR--apparently as a consequence of her peace activities.

Because of the letter against military service for women which was sent to Honecker with Baerbel Bohley's return address, the artist was expelled from the East Berlin district board of the Association of Creative Artists. Friends of hers report that the expulsion was carried out in violation of the provisions of the by-laws. Several board members had not been invited to the meeting, others were accused of bias and not permitted to vote. The expulsion was then decided by a vote of 5 to 4. On the eve of September 1, 1983, when some East Berliners silently demonstrated for peace with burning candles in front of the U.S. embassy, the association's party secretary tried to talk Baerbel Bohley out of participating in the event. The cultural policy of the GDR would be endangered if she created unrest among creative artists similar to that which had prevailed among writers, for a time. Could she accept the responsibility if artists were to suffer disadvantages because of her activities, or if the association were to get into difficulties? In any case, the party was not going to watch from the sidelines. Nevertheless, Baerbel Bohley took her candle and went to the U.S. embassy.

The Protestant church, to which Baerbel Bohley feels particularly drawn to, at first took a skeptical and negative attitude towards the "Women for Peace" group. But this soon changed. In 1982, the women participated in church functions--such as the "peace workshop" in East Berlin--; a year later, they themselves began to organize several events under the aegis of the church. In July, "Women for Peace" had their own booth at the second East Berlin "peace workshop." Visitors felt that this booth was not only the largest, but also the most committed and most original in the "market of possibilities" in the shadow of Erloeserkirche [Church of the Redeemer].

#### "To Speak Openly and Freely"

To discuss ways of working for peace, Baerbel Bohley was the only woman to appear on the podium of this "peace workshop" in the Erloeserkirche, together with other committed representatives of the independent peace movement in the GDR; with author Rolf Schneider; with church officials; with East Berlin Superintendent General Krusche; but also with someone like Carl Ordnung, full-time functionary of the East CDU and member of the "state" GDR peace movement and of the Peace Council, and regional secretary of the Christian Peace Conference (CFK). The Mecklenburg church paper reported: "Baerbel Bohley answered with great firmness the often difficult questions from the assembly: 'We must get accustomed to say openly and freely what we think. To be peace-loving also means retaining the capacity to change oneself.'"

During the autumn of this year, "Women for Peace" held church services in the East Berlin Auferstehungskirche [Church of the Resurrection]. In addition to two women pastors and Katja Havemann, the two women now imprisoned also took part. When it became known in October that nurses and post office employees in various GDR cities had been polled by military district headquarters, and evidently were to be registered for military service, "Women for Peace"--headed by Baerbel Bohley and

Ulrike Poppe--reacted with letters to church leaders and state authorities, in which they refused registration. In East Berlin, some 40 black-clad women came one by one to the post office at Alexanderplatz and mailed those letters. Security forces took action and arrested some of the women. Ulrike Poppe resisted arrest by shouting loudly: "I refuse to tolerate any indecent touching. Help, rape!" The men let go of her, and she fled with the other women to a cafe where they telephoned for assistance from other women and men. Finally, Superintendent General Krusche appeared and escorted Ulrike Poppe home. "Women for Peace" can claim success in that registration of women for military service has been halted, at least temporarily.

Before their arrest, Baerbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe had been arrested repeatedly and interrogated for several hours. Their apartments were searched, and their husbands and friends were intimidated in interrogations. For GDR authorities, exiling them would surely be the best solution. But the two women don't want to play along with that. Baerbel Bohley had told friends before her arrest that she would endure an extended prison term rather than leave the GDR. Ulrike Poppe wrote before her arrest: "My hope lies in a peace movement cutting across the blocs, which will not splinter into sectarian groups, and which also should take into consideration the given facts of Realpolitik. This means in precise terms: I want to work within the framework of GDR laws, and not against the state. But there must be a willingness towards dialogue on both sides."

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BRIEFS

TRAFFIC TOLL INCREASES--For the first time since 1976, the number of traffic accidents in the GDR has risen. As was reported by the GDR Interior Ministry, last year there occurred on GDR roads a total of 49,215 accidents in which 1,587 people died and 41,054 were injured. In 1982, there had been 48,939 traffic accidents with 1,600 fatalities and 41,172 injuries. As usual, one-quarter of all moving accidents are attributable to driving too fast, although the maximum speed limit in the GDR is set at 50 [km/h] in the cities, 80 on highways and 100 on autobahns. Although there is an absolute prohibition on drivers drinking, roughly every tenth accident occurred under the influence of alcohol; in addition, the traffic police complained of an increasingly aggressive driving technique, a prohibited weaving in and out of traffic, and driving through yellow lights, or even red ones. More and more pedestrians are causing accidents in GDR cities. Last year in East Berlin, 76 people were killed in traffic accidents and 2,821 injured. The traffic police find it especially alarming that 30 accidents occurred at pedestrian crossings in East Berlin last year, and that 92 happened in public transit boarding zones. [Text] [Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Jan 84 p 7]

SOCIALIST LITERARY ENGAGEMENT STRESSED--The GDR will "continue to base literary-political decisions on idea of cultural richness," declared Klaus Hoepcke, GDR deputy minister of culture. A literature which refuses "to probe with a profound conception of the world into the complex processes which alter society," and which are occurring in socialism, easily succumbs to the danger "of perching on a superficial realism which palms off appearances for reality, and which, not least of all, ends in criticism or a resigned rejection of the world," Hoepcke voiced support for a literature which "accedes to social changes, clearly identifies new things as being new, and combats ugliness and everything that impedes social progress." He observed that manuscripts in which "scepticism about the realization of socialist ideals" is expressed or "certain phenomena are unacceptably generalized" would have to be "discussed" with the authors and in the publishing houses. [Text] [Bonn IWE TAGESDIENST in German No 8, 14 Jan 84 Culture Supplement p 1]

PUBLISHERS' DISCONTENT NOTED--In connection with the "undoubtedly worsened economic conditions" under which publishers and book dealers in the GDR have to fulfill their tasks, Joachim Nowotny, vice president of the GDR authors' union, has detected a "kind of resignation" which amounts to a "subordination to a technological regime." He said it was a "gesture of regretful shoulder shrugging" in response to postponed publishing dates, for example, or to the "continued precarious delivery situation and purchasing habits of the book trade's customers." It would be better if people would stop shrugging their shoulders or "taking action" in individual cases, and seek a way back to a "normalcy" there once was in the relations among printers, publishers and the book trade. But, he said, those were perhaps "nostalgic notions." [Text] [Bonn IWE TAGESDIENST in German No 8, 14 Jan 84 Culture Supplement p 1]

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HUNGARY

POLITICAL REFORM NECESSITATES DECENTRALIZATION, PARTICIPATION

LD172248 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1500 GMT 17 Dec 83

[Text] The Hungarian Political Science Association, which was established a year ago, held its first general assembly this week. Janos Peter, chairman of the association, said among other things in his opening speech that in the expert departments, the debates about democracy did not in general bog down in considering the respective relations of bourgeois and socialist democracies. The subject matter was examined from the point of view of interconnections between the new social and national relations. The debates emphasized that our society needs a democracy in which society in its entirety can partake in the management of its own affairs. Among other things, it was precisely this issue which was raised by (Peter Schmidt), a lawyer specializing in administrative law, a university lecturer and head of faculty, in his speech which followed the chairman's report. Schmidt was interviewed by (Miklos Gyorffi), correspondent of Budapest Radio:

[Gyorffi] Can organizational forms of democracy, in themselves, create social changes--of course, progressive social changes?

[Schmidt] We cannot underestimate organizational forms in themselves. In other words, I would be denying my role as a lawyer if I said organizational forms have no significance. However, when I look at today's Hungarian society and its organizational system, I have to say that in contrast to statements to the contrary, we have problems but not primarily with organizational problems. In other words, in recent years, a list of measures and proposals were drafted which aimed to widen the organizational forms--organizational guarantees and the organizational forms of democracy. In spite of this, however, considering the type of measures introduced, democracy has not advanced much. If I speak about questions relating to the substance of democracy, the questions of substance of democracy are: To what extent can the citizen in general, (?in respect) of society, individuals and groups of society, express their opinions, interest? Can they oppose their views to the views of others and exert influence on the decisionmaking mechanism which, from the point of view of the life of society, makes vital decisions?

Now, the organizational form provides the possibility for me to have to say, but if there is not a real movement of social opinions and interests behind it, then that form remains a form only.

[Gyorffi] If I may, I would like [to] move onto more concrete things because, after all, you dealt with these in your lecture as well. What is happening with, and in which direction, is enterprise democracy moving?

[Schmidt] We are in approximately the same position that I spoke about just now. In other words, we have created various forms of enterprise democracy: Operation of trade unions, direct influence by citizens, the socialist brigade movement, and other organizational forms like, for example, the institutionalized meetings for trade union shop stewards. All these are appropriate forms for enabling citizens to participate in decisionmaking. In reality, however, these organizational forms are not 'living' sufficiently--either they do not live or they do not live sufficiently, both of these are possible--not sufficiently, because, after all, in the end organizational forms have to cover some kind of social form. What was the reason for creating enterprise democracy? Because it would enable the citizen to have a say? But if the worker says: I receive 10 or 15 or 20 forints an hour, then why should I want to have a say about the direction which the development of the enterprise might take? I have no material interest in it whatever. Excuse me, if you allow me.

In other words, enterprise democracy has a background substance, a *raison d'être* for which it wants to operate. If this background substance does not exist, or in other words, if the worker has no interest in having a say, then these remain empty formalities. There is another aspect to it. When I say that I allow the free expression of employees' interests against enterprise management, this by and large, and in its entirety, means today a trade union function. To what extent can this trade union function serve as a channel today for the worker? If it can do so only to a small extent then the form again remains empty. In my opinion, in reality the way our trade unions operate today, this channel does not operate properly precisely because of the lack of substance.

[Gyorffi] Does this enterprise fit into the entire economic organization in a democratic manner or, in other words, what is happening to enterprise independence?

[Schmidt] Economics today says that enterprise independence should be increased. I agree with this in principle. In other words, this--to a certain extent and considering central decisionmaking or statism--means decentralization. But I think we do not look sufficiently at the other side. Do I really decentralize? Has the collective any interest in having a say in decisionmaking, and what directions do the particular interests take which clash in this area? If I cannot express this then enterprise democracy as independence, in itself, means at the most widening the area of competence in decisionmaking from a social point of view and nothing more. I agree that if I want to create enterprise, independence and autonomy in the economy, then I need to enlarge the area of competence in decisionmaking for the technocrats as well but, in itself, from the point of view of society, it is not enough. Further thought should be given about what is the role which the enterprise as a social unit, as a human community, can play in this. Where can the enterprises' interest be expressed, and here the question of enterprise democracy is interlinked with the problems of enterprise independence.

[Gyorffi] The term decentralization has been raised twice now. There is a tendency--there has been a tendency--for the decentralization of public administration in Hungary today. Is this--if I listened to your lecture correctly--from the point of view of form versus substance, again another double-edged process?

[Schmidt] In my opinion it is. Because from this point of view as well, decentralization means transferring the area of competence of decisionmaking onto a lower level, where better decisions can be made. However, so far this is only problematic for organizational theory. Another matter belongs here: What about the community which attains this decentralized area of competence of decisionmaking. Is it the council chairman, the administrative organization or the population of the village for whom I need to decentralize? This is already the politics in this matter, the social element in this matter, and it is for this reason that I think decentralization in council organization is an important, very significant thing. But it needs to be connected with the independence of resident communities and with the right of people of resident communities to have a say in decisionmaking. If I do not do this and I decentralize only in terms of form, for the apparatus only, then I create only fiefs [kiskiraly]. The counterbalance to this can be created only by increasing social control.

[Gyorffi] What are the areas of socialist democracy where there is, in your opinion, a need for changes?

[Schmidt] Well, I consider that in this respect, for example, in the Hungarian decisionmaking system constant attention is paid to what society has to say about a particular decision. There is a constant sizing up of the ways in which various strata, groups and classes of society react to a particular decision: Do they agree, do they disagree? From this point of view there has been a change. We can, of course, argue whether the change is of a sufficient size or not, but there is no doubt that a tendency in this direction exists. I consider finally that certain autonomies have been born in (our) society. I think of such autonomies as the separation of public life from private life. Because after all, this is a very significant thing for it was characteristic of the early 1950's that one wanted to have private life swallowed up by public life. Such a relative separation of private life from public life is a step toward democracy. I consider also in this respect that in the area of arts and culture a certain autonomy has been created and a similar autonomy has been established for social sciences as well. This, in my opinion, gains expression in the fact that today the political leadership and the state leadership no longer expect that social science should merely provide justification for political decisions. The leadership recognizes the independence of social science and its autonomy with regard to the political leadership, and this again means a step in the direction of democracy. But I can give you (?examples) of this in the economy. Economy and state, creation of autonomy in the economy, independence of enterprises, all these are proof of the desire for creating autonomies in society. These, too, are part of democracy.

## SENSITIVE ISSUES OF POLITICAL PLURALISM--PART II

Budapest KRITIKA in Hungarian Nov 1983 pp 20-23

[Article by Joseph Bayer: "Pluralism as a Sensitive Problem;" Part II]

[Text] An examination of the general understanding concerning the rules of the game or political values of pluralism also raises strong doubts with respect to the validity of this assumption. True, there are significant differences among the respective countries in the stage of political culture necessary for pluralism, and thus in the degree of tolerance toward dissimilarity. But even with regard to the United States it has been demonstrated that certain sociological and economic conditions explain the stability of pluralist democracy much more than belief in the "values" and processes of pluralism. On the other hand, in West Germany, for example, where they have striven to implant pluralist values by vigorous propaganda--in contradistinction partly to a past foreshadowing something quite different, partly to a competitive socio-political system--the profession of these has peacefully harmonized in the pluralist doctrine of salvation with massive intolerance toward sceptics. Pluralism has become a combative idea, a "monopoly pluralism" of a special kind, in a spirit of which alternative political and ideological aspirations may be restricted and forced out. (And, oddly, the whip of pluralist strictness strikes exclusively on the left....)

Naturally, political pluralism may be analyzed in a quite extensive way, and the political direction of the judgment also strongly influences the picture formed of it. In what follows I will point out additionally merely some of those internal contradictions that are the subject of frequent questions, and not only in the anti-pluralism literature.

Pluralist democracy is based on the notion of democracy as the "competition of elites," which is merely the negative imprint in theory of the "apolitical" character of the masses in practice. If pluralism is also emphatically combined with notions of representative democracy (as with the father of West German neo-pluralism, E. Fraenkel), even then the disruption of the citizen holds good in the pluralist model: he must entrust the representation of his interests to particular interest organizations, in contrast to the general electoral mandate given to public representatives. "Multiple (overlapping) membership," which in the pluralist model is the guarantee of multilateral assertion of interests and a mutual counter-balancing, is,

according to empirical data, limited only to the elite; among the mass of ordinary people--as the previously-cited Presthus writes--belonging to a single interest group (or to a fixed bloc of them coordinated to each other) dominates in practice; they have no genuine possibility of choice.<sup>6</sup>

Related to this is the problem of individual freedom in the world of interest organizations. The individual purchases the protection of his own interests--of which he is not capable all by himself--from large interest organizations at the cost of his own vulnerability. Occasionally even the pluralists complain that the greater scope of individuals is merely apparent, and in the world of large organizations is based upon their practical insignificance and on the obvious ineffectiveness of their individual efforts. The political conceptions of individuals--when they do not simply reflect the imprint of the political clichés of the mass media--become "private whims," in the same way as religious ones. The chances of their getting organized--insofar as they diverge from the prevailing patterns--is slim or nearly impossible. If they adhere to their dissimilarity, they are reduced to narrow sects--and thus to political insignificance; if they are prepared to conform to the rules of the game of a pluralist system of established interests, they lose the originality of their alternative, thereby forfeiting their possible mass base. Often they do not even succeed in surmounting the boundaries imposed as a condition of joining the system. Those boundaries (collection of the necessary number of signatures, fixed proportions of votes, and the existence of material resources necessary for this) fill the same role in the pluralist system, according to some political scientists, as suffrage based on the census did formerly.

The "virtue" of pluralism, tolerance (R. P. Wolff), becomes repressive in this connection. It is precisely the altered parochial political value of tolerance that served as the basis for Marcuse's famous view of "repressive tolerance": from the battle cry of the oppressed it has become the passive justifier of authority. Tolerance is a function of social equality, and in a system of institutionalized inequality the material and institutional limitations on tolerance operating in the background outstrip expressed legal limitations, which produces the appearance of a general, "pure," tolerance. Abstract tolerance, however, which makes no distinction between good and bad, true and false, left-wing and right-wing, as a result of its relativism serves the purpose of manipulation and becomes the ideological instrument of authority. Its boundaries are fixed merely by the untouchability of the existing ruling structures, as pluralism itself is nothing else than the suppression of the struggle of "competing powers" in the common interest: "in order to defend and enlarge established positions, fight against historical alternatives, and prevent qualitative change."<sup>7</sup>

It may seem strange, but ever so many of its radical critics and its spokesmen alike see the social function of pluralism essentially in the avoidance of revolution. (Of course, they register this with varying value-emphasis). According to the previously-cited Wolff, the essence of pluralism is the "taming of the class struggle." The neo-pluralist Fraenkel emphasizes that it is not necessary to suppress social conflicts, which are in any case ceaseless, but to "channel" or drain them. Otherwise we only nourish and



exacerbate them, until finally suppression and resistance, reinforcing each other, lead to a revolutionary explosion. To blunt or iron out the fundamental (not always immediately obvious, but structural) conflict of irreconcilable interests by the institutionalized resolution of secondary (immediately obvious, for the most part distributional) conflicts--this is the goal of the neo-pluralist reform strategy.

From the conservative side, the West German R. Altmann, who rejects pluralism, expresses essentially the same idea: pluralism is the legalization of a society that has become totalitarian, that is, of the "natural order" of society, of its unequal plurality of interests. This, according to him, is the response of the citizenry to the revolutionary threat, if it does not want to be dragged into an open break with legality (cf. fascism).

The latter is not a pious allusion to a purely abstract possibility, but really expresses the internal limitation of bourgeois pluralism: one of its ineluctable spill-overs is in that direction, if it were not to succeed in holding the conflicting interests in balance and "social anarchy" were to threaten. The reason for the hostility to pluralism of the conservative forces is precisely the ambivalence of pluralism: offering scope to broader social forces and interests, with the end of prosperity and the sharpening of the distributional struggle, pluralism may also be turned against existing capitalist relations of production.

There is not yet--to our knowledge--a comprehensive Marxist theory of political pluralism. In this a role has no doubt been played by the fact that it has too often been dismissed as a mere pretence, and its doubtlessly real manipulative, ideological function pointed out. Appearances, however, are working elements of social reality, and often they have a hard basis in the structure of social life--we are thinking here of the insights of the Marxist critique of religion. Mere "exposés" cannot replace scientific analysis, as they cannot impede the effective functioning of appearances, either. An answer must be given to the question, how is it that in a class society--which (even if in modified forms) continues to be based upon private ownership of the means of production--it is not antagonistic class interests, but pluralist conflicts of interest, that stand in the forefront of political movements? How is this related to the economic structure of developed capitalism, to its internal and external political power conditions, to the peculiarities of national cultural development, etc.?

To us, those Marxist initiatives appear especially productive that interpret pluralism as an element in the strategy of "social peace," an internal political necessity of capitalist economic development at the present high stage of the given class balance of power and of the socialization of the forces production. According to the formulation of the previously cited B. Blanke, the legalization, "judicialization," of social conflicts--is a necessary process, because the development of production as a labor and marketing process makes the autonomous, unpredictable movements of the wage laborers continually troublesome. Therefore the costs of integration will increasingly be the necessary social costs of capital--social peace is paid for, as it were, by capital. The functioning of the pluralist system of

interest: assertion rests at the same time on a strict separation of the socio-economic system and the political system: this is merely a pluralism restricted to partial areas, which is adequate for the struggles of plural interests to influence the redistribution of social wealth, but is not sufficient to be unable to questioning of fundamental socio-economic relations. The thesis that private property is not the condition, but precisely the limitation, of genuine pluralism, at least in the sense of pluralist democracy, is considered the common property of left-wing thought. As H. Pross writes: "such an economic system, which reserves command over the forces of production to private owners and their agents, the managers, is theoretically inconsistent with the principle of pluralism."<sup>8</sup> A fully developed pluralist system must be a "system of universal co-determination"--the relations of the bourgeois economy, however, do not correspond to this model.

The functioning of the above-mentioned mechanisms of integration have already been extensively described. New Left thinkers of the 1960s have criticized its political consequences as a process of emasculation, formalization, of classical bourgeois democracy. J. Agnoli, for example, approaches the issue of pluralism as appearance in this way: "the debate over whether we live in a pluralistically articulated or an antagonistically divided society confuses its true subject. Our concern is rather with a duplicate social reality, in which both phenomena occur, but on different planes." This dual structure makes possible wholesale manipulation: the plurality of interests and the mediation of this on the distributional plane politically intersects the monopolization of social power on the production plane, obscuring the fundamental polarity. In public policies, however, only the plurality of partial interests is mediated, but not the irreconcilability of fundamental interests. Nevertheless, Agnoli emphasizes that "pluralist democracy" is an adequate form of constitutional rule with a capitalist market economy, even if not the most secure guarantee of it. (For this very reason, means of reversibility are always built in for the event of a crisis.) With its mechanisms of manipulation, "alongside the minimum oppression of the masses (the governed never feel themselves as free as in the western democracies), it ensures at state expense the highest degree of utilization of social power."<sup>9</sup>

Because of its dangerous ambivalence, however, the system-maintaining forces strive for the greatest possible degree of formalization of pluralism. In the event of a crisis, in the face of antagonism that is continuously springing up again and of the threat of "anarchy," only the "involution," the diminishment, of bourgeois democracy can ensure the survival of the socio-economic order. The basis of this is a transformation of the parliamentary and party system in such a way that it increasingly narrows down the struggle of social forces to a parliamentary debate of elites, and power conflict to merely a leadership conflict. The "people's parties," detached from their class basis, all slowly become of an identical type, "parties of order" that are interchangeable with each other, which--in Agnoli's words--essentially now comprise a plural form of one unity party.

## Socialist Pluralism Or Socialist Democracy?

Turning back to the question posed at the beginning of our article: how, after this, can one speak intelligibly of pluralism in connection with socialism? This much, surely, has emerged from the discussions so far, that political pluralism in one respect expresses real socio-political substance--above all, as a social-stabilizing technique for the political handling of conflicts of interest that is worthy of attention--at the same time that it is ideologically "overloaded." Its formulations point much more to a certain kind of political philosophy, than to an objective analytical theory. Its ideological features are especially magnified in the issue of the relation of socialism and pluralism. The chief spokesmen of bourgeois pluralism in principle assert the incompatibility of pluralism and socialism, and they connect pluralism with private property, with the "free" (in a good case, "social") market economy, and with the transfer of the principles of free competition to the political market. But even the more realistic political scientists, who acknowledge the existence of at best an "underdeveloped," or rather, "limited" pluralism in the western democracies, while they emphasize certain pluralist features of the socialist countries (as does, for example, K. von Beyme), still see an obstacle in principle in the way of pluralism in the leading role of the party and in the conflict-free "harmonious," conception of socialism.<sup>10</sup>

From the beginning, however, there have been more critical adherents of pluralism who, proceeding from the limitations of pluralism discussed above, have felt that the chance of implementing pluralist ideals exists precisely in a socialist society. (Even Harold Laski postponed his own pluralism by saying that it can only have a reality in a classless society.) Ideas related to socialist pluralism, however, are fairly slipshod, and this cannot be regarded as accidental. One of the reasons for this is surely that behind the notion regarding pluralism as synonymous with "western democracy" stand vast material forces and powerful propaganda machinery, and thus it is difficult in practice to shake this identification, even if its legitimacy is persuasively refuted in theory.<sup>11</sup> A further reason is that, in general, of the development and reform efforts of the socialist countries, the adherents of "socialist pluralism hold noteworthy only what somehow points in the direction of well-known patterns of bourgeois pluralism.<sup>12</sup> In all probability, however, the decisive reason is that there is lacking a unified left-wing strategy of the kind that could bring into accessible range in the West an alteration of the social system on a pluralist basis. Taken at its word, though, pluralism--as we have indicated--can always be turned against capitalism. Since, however, it is not possible to reorganize a nation's economy alternately in a capitalist or socialist way, accommodation to a pluralist political shift system--be it ever so important from the viewpoint of the defense of the interests of the working masses--imposes strong limits on a policy that is socialist in direction, and makes improbable a decisive political breakthrough in the direction of socialism. (Provided a substantial and unexpected shift of interests does not take place in existing domestic and foreign policy relations--today, however, this smells very much of catastrophe....)

If we look at socialist societies through the glasses of pluralist doctrines, in general there unfolds before us a bleak picture of a homogeneous totalitarian dictatorship, depicted in Orwellian colors, which we should not wonder at all--this is built in to the theory. For the majority of them are constructed as the kind of normative model that is an idealized mirror of the functioning of bourgeois democracy, without taking notice of its class content. Now if the practice of even bourgeois democracy does not correspond in every respect to this model, its application as a measure of value to socio-political systems with a different content and structure in the last analysis leaves obscure their original characteristics, for without a real analysis of them everything that does not fit into the preformed picture slips through the filter. This relates primarily to the socio-political structure of the socialist countries, but also to the political problems of the developing countries.

As a consequence of this normativeness and excessive ideological interpretation of pluralism--which undoubtedly also serves manipulative purposes--it often elicits extremely negative reactions in the socialist countries. Many are ready or able to see in pluralism merely a deceptive appearance, the "model of counter-revolution," the Trojan horse of imperialism.<sup>13</sup> In our opinion this ostensibly offensive, but in reality defensive, standpoint is unjustified. Naturally, socialist society is also pluralist, if by this we understand the plural distribution of interests in society; and not only the ideological, ethnic, cultural, etc., pluralism corresponding to this may be found in it, but even the political organizational forms of asserting interests are not completely devoid of pluralist features. Of course, it is precisely here that there are also fundamental differences compared to bourgeois pluralism. The entire system of presuppositions of the latter is, as we have seen, imposed on a capitalism based on the disjunction of economics and politics. (As the relation of economics to politics is modified in the direction of a stronger mutual constraint, so the pluralist structures of interest assertion are also shifted in the direction of a corporatist model of harmonizing interests.) The market has a fundamental role here as an institution of social integration. The "natural laws" of the capitalist economy reproduce in a spontaneous way--or with substantial state assistance, as in today's crisis-management capitalism--the fundamental relations of production, and therefore (at least in "peacetime") it is enough to be content with the legal and political safeguarding of these--everything else may in principle be assigned to the spontaneous play of forces, to the spontaneous (that is, involuntarily conforming to these laws) interactions of individuals.

Socialist society has no such spontaneously self-regulating mechanism--at least not for the time being. Even if the market does not disappear completely as the mediator of social relations (on the contrary, its role may even increase), the political factor nevertheless becomes decisive in the determination of socio-economic, cultural and other processes. Political institutions therefore have a constituent character here for the economic-social system, and are not merely the external safeguards of its operation. This on the other hand puts politics not merely into a generally favored situation in socialist society, but also to a large extent makes social stability dependent on politics. This alters both the character role of the

party system--and that independently of whether we are dealing with a one- or multi-party system--and the manner of operation of interest organizations, for it is dependent not on competition, but on cooperation, and they will become not merely particularistic organizations, but ones possessing broad social responsibility.<sup>14</sup>

Because of the considerable dependency on politics of social stability, it becomes an unavoidable question whether organizational pluralism, the open expression and competition of differences of interest, increases social stability and effectiveness and produces a firmer social bond, or rather, on the contrary dissipates the forces united for the transformation of society. This question similarly cannot be answered unhistorically, as in bourgeois development, too, we could not proceed from a model that was valid from the beginning. Historical circumstances, the dead weight of tradition, and the concrete tasks and historical circumstances of socialist transformation decisively influence the varying emphases on unity and diversity, and the local social value of monism and pluralism. If, proceeding from here, we examine the pluralist features of socialist society, we get a truer picture than in a direct comparison with a normative model.

Beyond a doubt, a factor working against pluralism has been, for example, the increased role of the state in the early period of socialism, after which, as a social and economic organizing force, it became the chief means of socialist transformation and construction. State authority, especially alongside undeveloped social forces and a strong external threat, receives a favored role--Gramsci already expressly regarded this as an East European characteristic, which seems to be recurring today in some developing countries. It would be unreasonable therefore to give this the value of a model for every possible socialist development. (The original Marxist notion of the state was probably more pluralist than any bourgeois constitution, asserts the Polish political scientist St. Erlich, in polemicizing with the bourgeois appropriation of "pluralism.")<sup>15</sup>

The role of the state--which also alters the function of the party--may significantly change, is indeed changing, with the development of socialism.<sup>16</sup> On the basis of economic reform, parallel with its economy-directing activity becoming more indirect--and thereby hopefully more effective--its outsized authority functions must more and more be replaced by administrative functions, and by eliminating excessive centralization and hierarchy its authority must be decentralized, entrusting more to society. (A cheap state, we could say.) The anticipated creation of the material and legal-political conditions of local self-management not only would mean a return to the original model of council democracy, but obviously would simultaneously be accompanied by greater pluralism. The other way around, however, this interconnection is not true--mere pluralization, decentralization, and multiplication of representations of particular organizational interests would in itself not yet signify greater democracy. The pluralist bargaining of "socialist high-rollers" (in Csaba Gombár's mordant expression) in like manner cannot substitute for democratic institutions of local power, as on other levels also the pluralism of the various "socialist elites" is not identical to the ideal realization of socialist democracy. It would perhaps

even be unnecessary to proclaim this, if in efforts working in the direction of democratization pluralism were not sometimes suddenly to appear as some sort of general democratic model of social integration. This ideologically loaded content, however, that is contained in pluralist doctrines, precisely because of its attachment to the capitalist socio-economic structure, is unsuitable as the ideology of a general program of democratization. This does not mean that partially valid lessons have not been accumulated. The pluralist mechanism of asserting interests, in one respect anyway, merits our attention--namely, the open acknowledgement and institutional "handling" of limited conflicts does not necessarily have a destabilizing effect, on the contrary, among consolidated relations it may as a matter of fact signify greater social cohesion, and may increase social unity and solidarity.

The stumbling-block in the eyes of the pluralists, however--especially since they themselves have also become "étatist"--is not even the favored role of the state, but primarily with the smaller parties of a one-party or hegemonic-party system that cluster around the leading unity party. Against this it is first of all necessary to stress that only a quite formal typology may disregard such substantial differences of party systems and mainly one-party systems--as the goals pursued by these parties, their social basis, the social interests expressed and asserted by them, the rationality of their ideology, etc. Secondly, we do not make the one-party system, either, into a permanently valid model of socialism, rather we emphasize its specific historical character. (Just as there are also numerous specific historical conditions of the operation of a successful--not merely formal--multi-party system, as for example suitable traditions, a certain stage of economic development, as well as the state of internal and external consolidation.) At the same time the old truth has not lost its validity, that a multi-party system--which today is more and more reduced in practice to a two-party system--that is built on the shift system of government party and opposition, though it offers an opportunity for greater political maneuvering and has then numerous advantages, is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the control of the governors by the governed (as the fundamental principle of democracy is sometimes formulated). Disillusionment with this form is not accidental, a sign of which is the appearance of mass movements outside the parties and the mass "desertion" of the traditional parties, in the same way as, in some places, the truly startling extent of abstention from elections. At the same time nothing offers grounds, in a socialist one-party system--where bourgeois parties do not already have a basis for existence anyway--for the articulation of the plural interests of society that cannot be transmitted all the way to the political decisions of the unity party. Fundamental social interests--with weight and preference varying in accordance with historical tasks--receive a place in the political program of the party. There is no automatic guarantee, of course, of their predominance--how far the party is capable of fulfilling its natural role of interest integration depends in large measure on the success of internal party democracy, the relation of the party to the masses, and on the realism of its entire policy.

The acknowledgement of differences, indeed conflicts of interest--as opposed to the harmonizing ideology of an earlier period--is a general feature of present-day politics. Socialist economic and social development doubtless

has tendencies, or at least alternatives, of the kind that may be construed as steps taken in the direction of greater pluralism. Thus there is greater enterprise autonomy, the broadening spectrum of forms of agriculture and property, the anticipated trend of strengthening the decentralization of the sphere of authority of decision-making and of local self-management, the expanding role in the process of interest representation and reconciliation of the various social and interest organizations (the trade unions, Patriotic People's Front, regional and professional associations, the range of "pressure groups" similar to the National Council of Producer Cooperatives and the Chamber of Commerce, etc), etc. There are undeniable pluralist tendencies corresponding to this in intellectual life, as well, although these are not organized in differentiated institutions. This presents a problem primarily when divergent social interests cannot be expressed politically--then, as Gramsci writes, they manifest themselves as cultural issues, and as such, become insoluble. (So-called ideological pluralism may also to this extent be regarded as a non-political--and thus politically inadequate--manifestation of the plurality of interests.) Similarly, pluralism of patterns of everyday ways of life and values pursued is striking today, to such an extent that the counter-balancing role of any sort of hegemonic center seems to be lacking.

Parallel with the proportionally greater predominance of commodity relations, with the relative, functional separation of economics and politics ("civil society" and the "political state"), we may reckon only on the further intensification of these tendencies, or rather, efforts. A political basis for everything is the reform policy and broad alliance policy of the party, which offers room for action for every effort that acknowledges socialist foundations (a bond to a fundamental consensus, as we have seen, is also bourgeois pluralism's own), in addition to its open, hegemonistic (and not monopolistic) cultural policy.

This pluralization, often termed "liberalization," is in itself not yet identical with democratization (although possibly it is a precondition of it.) There are still insufficient examples of the open acceptance of conflicts of interest, of the practice of reconciliation of clamorous, organized interests alongside of the democratic control of the public, instead of the "democracy of mutual compliance" (Tamas Kolosi). Today surely there is more chance for asserting unexpressed interests. (Polish sociologist and political scientist J. Wiatr has noted as an interesting feature of the practice of socialist reconciliation of interests that the representatives of weaker interests are often able to exert pressure precisely by threatening to make the conflict of interest public.)

Following from the basic structure of socialist society, there will naturally always be political limits to the "open competition" of interests. Though socialism is also a society based on the principle of results, as is usually stressed, it is not ruthlessly that. The complete elimination of competition, however, leads to the sort of harmful consequences that are well known: to a false sense of security, which in the long run is the certain basis of ruin; to the absence of a selection mechanism for genuine values (to the well-known problem of counter-selection in the most diverse fields), etc.



Given their content, the theories and ideologies of pluralism scarcely provide ready prescriptions for the solution of these problems of ours.

Or should we regard certain elements of them as serviceable, while others are to be rejected? For pluralism doubtless comprises the democratic principle of the distribution of power, and thereby its social and political control;<sup>17</sup> the counter-balancing and thereby stabilizing principle of the civilized handling, the institutional "servicing," of limited conflicts; and, with the principle of tolerance toward other interests and values, the socio-ethical basis of bourgeois democratic civil rights. But even on the level of principle--let us not consider now the contradiction of principle and reality--it comprises at the same time the false assumption of the coequality of interests, even the absolute relativity of truth and other values, in addition to the "repressiveness" of tolerance that arises from this, as well. And it includes the tacit presupposition that insoluble conflicts of interests and values are decided by the balance of market forces of the capitalist "natural laws" that fall outside of the pluralist universe and have been made taboo--therefore it embraces as an internal constraint the manipulative employment of the pluralist universe, but in case of necessity even its sacrifices on the altar of a goal extrinsic as compared to itself.

And so, of course, we may proceed like the Polish J. Wiatr, who in examining the pluralist features of socialist society brushes aside the whole ideological baggage of the doctrine of pluralism and puts the issue within its real framework: how is the real distribution of interests of society mediated, how does it manifest itself in the political system of socialism? What kinds of forms and levels does and may social control have under given political conditions?<sup>18</sup>

However it may be--whether we should use the idea of pluralism in such a precise and limited sense, or reject it because of its ideological taintedness and contradictory contents--the fundamental issue either way remains the working out of the concrete content of the further development of socialist democracy.

#### FOOTNOTES

6. R. Presthus, "Toward a Post-Pluralist Theory of Democratic Stability, in Three Faces of Pluralism," edition cited, pp 65-80.
7. R. P. Wolff--B. Moore--H. Marcuse, "Critique of Pure Tolerance," Boston: Beacon Press, 1965.
8. Helge Pross, "Zum Begriff der pluralistischen Gesellschaft, in Kapitalismus und Demokratie," Studien uber westdeutsche Sozialstrukturen, Frankfurt/M., 1972.
9. J. Agnoli--P. Bruckner, "Die Transformation der Demokratie, Berlin/West, 1977.

10. K. v. Beyme, "Interessengruppen in der Demokratie," Munich, 1969; idem, "Der Neokorporatismus und die Politik des begrenzten Pluralismus in der BRD, in Stichworte zur geistigen Situation der Zeit," Bd. 1 (Nation und Republik), Frankfurt/M.; Suhrkamp, 1979.
11. R. Eisfeld explains this problem quite persuasively in analyzing the successful capitalist international strategy directed at throttling Portuguese "socialist pluralism." See "Nelkenrevolution und Aussenpolitik," in LEVIATHAN, 1982/4, pp 483-514. His thesis is that East-West opposition to a very large extent makes uniform and thus distorts the various conceptions of system politics, and hinders creative, original political experimentation, of which however there would be great need for movement from the present stalemate situation.
12. Compare U. Bernbach--F. Nuscheler, "Sozialistischer Pluralismus," Hamburg; Hoffman u. Campe, 1973. This volume contains predominantly the writings of "revisionist" domestic critics of the socialist countries and of some Euro-communists. In the introduction the authors raise this interesting question: if we charge bourgeois pluralism on suspicion of ideology, are we not entitled to ask also what kind of interest ambitions are reflected in the conceptions of the "socialist pluralists"? Do they not express an acceptance/justification of functionally unwarranted social differentiation in socialism? (Though their response is negative, it is without convincing justification.)
13. Compare Arno Winkler, "Pluralismus--Modell der Konterrevolution," Berlin; Dietz Verlag, 1982.
14. J. Wiatr, "The Sociology of Political Relations," Budapest; Kossuth K., 1980, pp 194ff, as well as "Studies in the Polish Political System," Warsaw/Wroclaw (published by the Polish Academy of Science), 1967; especially two studies by Wiatr: "The Hegemonic Party System in Poland," pp 109-123, and Control without Opposition (with Przeworski), pp 124-139.
15. St. Erlich, "Pluralism and Marxism," in "Three Faces of Pluralism," edition cited, pp 34-35.
16. On rethinking the role of the state, see Miklos Vilaghy's thought-provoking writing "Allam es humanum" [State and Humanity], VALOSAG, 1980/5.) and Tibor Hadju's study: "A szocialista állam lenini elmeletének történetéhez" [On Leninist Theory of the Socialist State], MAGYAR FILOZOFIAI SZEMLE, 1970/2. (Hadju here writes the following about the changing function of the revolutionary party: "The close association of the Communist Party and the state apparatus, which Lenin had already initiated, turned out to be a more effective control of the process of bureaucratization (i.e., with workers' control, which the state had annexed with its institutions--J. B.). This solution has become universal in every socialist country, but its temporary character has remained to the extent that, beyond a theoretical justification, it exists almost implicitly from the viewpoint of the system of

constitutional law, and the laws reflect it at most inconsistently. The leading role of the party does not supersede the workers' running of the 1917-18 soviets, but impedes the complete alienation of the state apparatus, its elevation over society.")

Let us note that this function of the party is also decisive where on lower levels they strive for the pluralism of horizontal self-management structures, which duly lowers the unanimous enthusiasm among pluralists for, for example, the Yugoslav model.

17. This element of pluralism was kept principally in view by Istvan Bibó in his academic inaugural lecture, entitled "Az államhatalmak szétválasztása egykor és most" [The Separation of State Powers In Times Past and Now], VIGILIA, 1980/8, when he spoke about the political pluralism related to the principle of the distribution of power as one of the most significant trends of modern political theory. His main problem here was guarding against "the modern dangers of the concentration of power," the pressure for the moral justification of power, and he felt this technically achievable through various forms of the distribution of power. What necessarily remained outside his field of vision, however, was that feature of "established" pluralism--mainly late in developing--whereby even it itself had become a technique of the exercise of power based upon the principle of "divide and conquer," as C. W. Mills characterized it, with all the moral and ideological problems arising from this.
18. "Analysing the issue of power in socialist society, attention must be directed to the nature of political pluralism that is characteristic of the system. We understand political pluralism here as the occurrence of organized forces in political life, which legally express the interests of different social groups. Remainder of text illegible."

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POLITICAL PLURALISM RAISES SENSITIVE ISSUES--PART I

Budapest KRITIKA in Hungarian Oct 83 pp 14-16

[Article by Jozsef Bayer: "Pluralism as a Sensitive Question I"]

[Text] The star of pluralism is in the ascendant in the heavens of our debates on public life/politics, even if for the time being it is perceptible in only a narrow sphere. I believe, however, that, in contrast to other technical social science terms that come rapidly into fashion and wear out equally rapidly, pluralism has more long-lasting prospects for survival. What will keep this issue on the agenda is, above all, the increasing internal differentiation of socialist society.<sup>1</sup>

It appears as if socialism would develop from an originally theorized egalitarianism in the direction of a classless, yet temporarily quite differentiated, society rather than in the direction of a homegeneous society. This prospect calls into question the validity of our earlier picture of socialism, as it also discredits numerous ideological dogmas. In the case of such ideological muddles the inclination to seek alternative concepts, even to adopt ready-made patterns, will increase. Bourgeois pluralism, especially in its idealized form, may seem an attractive alternative for maintaining in political balance, perchance for managing more democratically, a society that is becoming more differentiated and burdened with conflicts. The question may come up: is not some sort of combination of socialism and pluralism possible?

Pluralism's attraction may be heightened by its being the fruit of a forbidden tree--for quite a long time it was considered a sensitive issue in political thought and ideology, and not without reason. The idea and theory of pluralism contains a challenge for us with regard to the interpretation of democracy. In some trends of political science and chiefly in political ideology this idea has by now become almost a synonym for "modern," "western," bourgeois democracies--with a certain apologetic zealousness: the "free world"; it is often even explicitly conceptualized as the proper antidote to Marxist socialism. Adding to this is the fact that variously inclined reformers of crisis periods of socialism have also often prescribed pluralism for the treatment of our problems. Finally, even some of the most significant western Communist parties, striving for a strategic reorientation, put faith in one version of pluralism, more substantial than the bourgeois and even criticize the practice of the socialist countries in terms of this.

Ideological distrust of the expression is, therefore, not entirely without foundation. Yet the situation with pluralism is the same as with many other nasty expressions--it retains its mystery and ideologically sensitive character until we clarify its meaning, balancing its various senses. Meanwhile it is first of all necessary to be made conscious of the difference between what pluralism is designed for, with what kind of political-ideological mission it is invested, and what constitutes its real content. Secondly, we must realize that not everyone is thinking of the same thing when they speak about pluralism. Even in bourgeois political science--where alone it has taken a definite form--there is no unified theory or doctrine of pluralism, although common features can of course be highlighted from the various tendencies. Obviously, however, there is a big difference between linking "pluralism democracy" in advance to the free movement of private capital, and--let us say--understanding by it the necessity of decentralization within a socialist society, not even to mention the pluralist principle of local and enterprise self-management. In this brief essay I will not undertake more than to suggest a preliminary approximation of the complex character of this concept, to differentiate the meanings that have adhered to it historically and politically, and to sketch the ideological context of political pluralism, narrowly construed, of which we can scarcely treat it as independent.

#### Pluralism in Bourgeois Society

It was not even so long ago (in practice, it caught on only after World War II) that the political system of advanced bourgeois societies was described by the concepts of theories of pluralism. Although this process is very much debated even in bourgeois political science, it is often the subject of heated and highly effective criticism. This disturbs the adherents of pluralism not one bit--they see in this, too, merely the demonstration of pluralism exercising the virtue of tolerance. From this, too, it appears how massive, almost impregnable an ideological formation pluralism has become--for even its adversaries seemingly corroborate it. As has already occurred with other concepts of political theory, as well, by the time its scientific credibility can really be shaken, it has been promoted into a public political philosophy in a form made suitable for mass consumption; the same kind of modern creed that is no longer troubled by scholarly cavillings.

In the fact that from pre-1900 theories with an oppositional coloration pluralism has by today become an official/semi-official creed expressing the political identity of the more advanced capitalist countries, we must see more than the integrative capacity of the machinery of monopoly-capitalist manipulation brought to perfection. True, pluralism would scarcely have had such a successful career if it had not proved a remarkably suitable means of ideological mobilization against the "totalitarian" systems.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, however, the theories of pluralism also express important changes that have taken place in the structure of bourgeois society in recent decades, which do not affect the substance of the capitalist socio-economic order, but do its political form.

If we want to untangle the complications that have arisen around pluralism, we must by way of introduction clarify the concept, in order to know precisely what it is we dispute in it. For since the concept of pluralism emerged at the beginning of this century and slowly started to spread, it has acquired numerous extensions that have nothing in common with our problem taken in a narrower sense.

The words plural, pluralist, pluralism, taken from Latin, serve in the abstract merely to express multifariousness or diversity, of necessity (although not always in a conscious manner) on the basis of some unity, whether of an intellectual, territorial, political or other nature. Diversity naturally may be a value in the same way as unity, and emphasis on or revaluation of one or the other always occurs in a definite historical, political or ideological connection. The meaning of pluralism is different in different areas. One speaks of pluralism in philosophy, for example, when a philosophical system is constructed (whether in an ontological or epistemological sense) from several fundamental principles, in contrast to monism. One speaks in general of religious pluralism where several religions are on good terms within the framework of one state. But we also call some tolerant religions in themselves pluralist (for example, Buddhism, on the level of theology of course rather than ritual religious life). Into Christianity, for example, at the cost of great struggles, the Reformation brought movement in a pluralist direction. The high degree of religious particularism of the United States is a good example of pluralism in this sense, with its own innumerable churches and sects. An ethnic and cultural medley also sometimes qualifies as pluralist--in the United States, for example, under the slogan of "cultural pluralism" they deal with anti-assimilation socio-cultural endeavors struggling against absorption into the great "social melting-pot." Not only guaranteed competition among several scientific tendencies and schools is called scientific pluralism; recently an endeavor has manifested itself to establish pluralism epistemologically, chiefly starting from Popper's philosophy of science. That ideological pluralism exists (even where ideological unity is stressed at all costs) follows already from the concept of ideology, whatever definition we take as a base.

Finally, as far as socio-political pluralism is concerned, with which we want primarily to deal in what follows, here too an expansion of the concept is discernible, above all in a historical sense. In general we may speak of pluralism, obviously, everywhere that a political structure is based on autonomous units--if, that is to say, we consider it as independent of its social content. However surprising, in an abstract sense it is still logical when, for example, feudal societies--independently of the feudal hierarchy--are sometimes called pluralistic, and all the more, the greater the independence of the provincial lords. (Feudal anarchy then might finally be the ne plus ultra of pluralism.)

Pluralism in such an extended sense, however, does not have much in common with the modern problem, which was formulated in the first pre-1900 theories of pluralism. These are theories unequivocally tailored to bourgeois society, indeed to a late stage of development of it--to the problems of

the state monopoly period, to explain which of the traditional political theory models of individual liberalism were already unsuitable. For the appearance of large mass organizations, of a wide range of organized interest groups (with employer associations and employee trade unions at its center), as well as the appearance of mass parties rooted in social classes, fundamentally rearranges the stage of politics. It alters not only the character of party structure and parliamentarism, but also the relation of economics and politics, "civil society" and the "political state," together with the new structure of which the relation of citizens, or rather, private individuals, and the state is also altered.

It is a substantial innovation of pluralism that instead of the abstract citizen and his abstract state, it made bodies actually mediating them--political parties and other interest associations possessing economic or social power--into the main actors of politics. These struggle with each other on the stage of politics to make or influence the decisions of the state power that is otherwise regarded as neutral.

The propagandists of pluralism themselves also emphasize the novelty of their view, and not merely for the sake of historical originality. The bourgeois societies arising from feudalism--today many tend to forget this--were not in the least pluralist, but the opposite. Until capitalist relations become generally dominant, the middle classes do not show much inclination toward pluralism, except for a sharing of power with the feudal forces resulting from a forced class compromise. The new states arising from bourgeois revolutions in themselves represent the "general and rational will," with which for a time the revolutionary middle classes were able in good faith to identify their own class interests. Not only Hobbes, the adherent of absolutism, spoke contemptuously of associations of private citizens as destructive boils on the body of the state, but the first American constitutions also forbade factionalism, and even the Jacobin dictatorship paved the way for the general will by the Terror--not even to speak of later Bonapartism. The poet Andre Chenier--later himself, too, a victim of the Terror--gave expression to the Zeitgeist in this way: "Bad and unhappy is the state in which there are various societies and groups whose members evince such behavior and represent such interests as diverge from the general behavior and the general interest. Happy is the country in which there is no other association, only the state, no other group than the homeland, and other interest than the common good." From the original excesses--such, for example, as the decision of the French National Assembly according to which a truly free state could not tolerate any sort of corporation on its national territory, even such as devote themselves in the service of the homeland to the matter of public education--this much remained everywhere, that law for a long time forbade the organizing of the workers. The increasing alteration of this initial antipluralist bias was set in motion not only by associations of the various factions of the ruling classes organizing in the competitive struggle, but was forced chiefly by the strengthening of various social movements, above all the labor movement. It is enough for us to read the Founding Message of the First International, formulated by Marx, to realize that the recognition of the political weight of organized interests and the political pressure that could be exercised

by it are not by any means the discovery of 20th century theories of pluralism. The undoubted merit of the latter, on the other hand, is making people conscious of the new situation that arose with the multiplicity of organized interest (pressure) groups and modern party structures, as opposed to traditional liberal or conservative theories of the state.

Merely for interest's sake we observe to what extent the existence of several parties did not play a role in the earliest pluralist reflections (as opposed to the present situation). Social pluralism and the political mediation of this that occurred with respect to state power stood at the center of interest. At the same time, the relation of pluralism and democracy also emerged entirely differently than today. Madison, regarded as the forerunner of American pluralism, who was not bound by ideological considerations as are numerous present-day authors, precisely as a balm against pressure from the street, against the threat of democracy, proposes a pluralism held in check by the state--as well as by the particular interests of each other.

#### Variant Forms of Pluralism

We do not have space to survey the intellectual history of pluralism;<sup>3</sup> we will merely point out its historically very divergent variant forms. Early English pluralism--whose best-known representative is H. Laski--arose in a spirit of protest against a state power that had increased fearfully in the imperialist period. Emphasizing and demanding the moral and political autonomy of groups massed in social organizations (trade unions, churches, etc.), it questioned the absolute sovereignty of the state. Anti-state-power, "anarchist," variants of pluralism, struggling for decentralized local authorities, are active to this very day, but are no longer dominant.

In German development, the reformist trend of the cooperative movement and of the labor movement, respectively, was by and large the bearer of pluralist endeavors. The main substance of pluralism here was not the limitation of the sovereignty of the state, but the transformation of the acknowledged antagonism of classes into a counter-balanced, "dilectical" or "collective" democracy, resting on class cooperation. This reformist pluralism is a living variety up till today, "pluralism as the state philosophy of reformism" (E. Frankel).

At the heart of American theories of pluralism, on the other hand, there stood from the beginning the political power game of different--regarded in principle as equal--interest groups, the competition for influence over state decisions. The outcome of the struggle was open, a function of prevailing power relations, beyond the precondition of certain fixed rules. This is "pure" groups pluralism, which is today regarded as an alternative to Marxist class theory, a characteristic product of American social development, but today it is by no means limited to the United States.



Although the diverse well-springs of pluralism still color present-day theories of pluralism, the common features are now seen as more substantial. It seems advisable first of all to differentiate social and political pluralism, although they are not rigidly separable.

Social pluralism refers to the fact that every modern society with a division of labor is comprised of variously articulated groups with heterogeneous interests, and to this extent has a plural structure. A common feature of theories of pluralism, however, is that the social structure is not apprehended on the basis of the decisive criteria of class theory (relation to the means of production, position occupied in the division of labor), but on the basis of secondary, "finer," indicators of social stratification (achievement, status, income, prestige), as well as belonging to certain "naturally given," or adopted, respectively, communities (such as, for example, ethnic, racial, cultural, religious groups). The basis of group organization is interest, which--considering that it is a key concept--is understood for the most part quite loosely and subjectively. On the basis of his various interests the individual is a member of numerous groups with diverse functions, among which his loyalty is divided. In this model, society is composed of the open, free competition of organized groups endeavoring to assert their interests. Thus the free competition of isolated private individuals is replaced by the competition of their organizations--bound by certain legal regulations--faithfully reflecting the replacement of liberal free competition by the oligopolistic market of monopolies. (Oligopoly is the dominance of a small number of large capitalist enterprises over some branch of the economy.)

The reformist variety of the theory of pluralism extends all this further by the theory of the parity of the main social groups--above all, employers and employees, which is a further vestige of the traditions of class struggle of the labor movement, and is even better adaptable to European relations. The American variant, in contradistinction to this, strives for the greatest possible dispersion of the plurality of interests, and guards against socially treating any social group whatsoever with special favor. (This is even reflected in income statistics--while, for example, in the FRG they record separately the income of entrepreneurs and of those dependent on wages, in the United States they set up a continuous income scale divided into deciles....)

#### "Pluralist Democracy"

Political pluralism differs from this social pluralism that has fundamentally been described sociologically; in bourgeois political science it is expounded as the concept of "pluralist democracy," a theory at the same time descriptive and normative. This is essentially a combination of the above social pluralism and traditional forms of bourgeois democracy. Pluralist democracy is where the articulation of plural interests may also appear in the political realm, and may exercise a decisive influence on the formation of the central political will. In a descriptive sense therefore a political system may be called pluralist whose chief criteria are: federalism (in the case of larger states), the existence of several parliamentary parties (but at least one legal organized opposition force), a multiplicity of autonomous interest

associations, which check each other during the course of their open competition, limit and counter-balance each other's power, and in a conflictual, open process of the clashing and conciliation of interests influence fundamental political decisions; finally, a pluralist structure of intellectual life corresponding to this (alternative sources of information, a plurality of intellectual centers).

This pluralism is essentially not so much a theory of the distribution of power but rather one of the diffusion of power. According to R. Dahl (one of the chief figures of American pluralism), in pluralist democracy there is no longer in fact a majority will, only a multiplicity of minority will predominates (polyarchy), which form shifting coalitions during the pursuit of certain of their interests. Political decisions are thus the results of ad hoc compromises, and thereby offer a tolerable solution to every conflict that arises. Thus social harmony comes into being out of the struggle of particular interests, during which no one gets all of what they demand, but as a consequence of bargaining everyone receives something, no one is completely cheated. (What else is this than the bringing of rational market calculation into the political arena? If only every political interest could be expressed in money--writes Dahl in one place--as in the wage negotiations of trade unions and contractors; it would easily be possible to reach agreement even in the most serious conflicts....)

It would be senseless to deny that the "western" democracies are pluralist in terms of the above descriptive criteria. As we need not conceal, either, what advantages this has as against openly dictatorial forms of capitalist domination. Criticism of pluralism aims above all at the transferability of its normative postulates, against its analysis suggesting social harmony and fully-realized democracy, as well as against its ideological function--on the pretext of the dispersion of social differentiation, of a plurality of interests--whereby it conceals the class society nature of bourgeois society, which continues to be based on the private ownership of the means of production.

There are certain "minimal preconditions" of the model of pluralist democracy that most pluralists postulate, such as (according to left-wing West German political scientist B. Blanke<sup>4</sup>): the organizability of every interest into an association; a balance of power and equality of opportunity of interests organized in this way; the openness of the system to newly-articulated interests; a guarantee of the organization of counter-associations, of countervailing power, for the event of the threat of a one-sided interest demand; and further, the existence of fundamental common agreement as regards the operating principles of the pluralist system. (This latter is especially stressed in West German neopluralism, which is wedded to the dominance of the social integrating role of collectively shared interests.)

In the clamorous political science debates over pluralism, one after the other of these preconditions has been disproved, as a consequence of which pluralist doctrines have also been modified occasionally (without this, of course, having had an effect on the propaganda cliches put into general circulation).

It is an observed fact that not every interest is organized, nor can it be. If we conceive of interests more concretely, and not abstractly, as the "jointly shared attitude" of a certain number of individuals, the dissimilarity of their hierarchy of content and ability to assert themselves becomes apparent, which latter is by no means always proportional to how (and mainly, to whom) vitally important they are. It is precisely the representation of the most general interests that cannot be worked out in this way--weapons manufacturers or the heads of the chemical industry, for example, can more easily organize and assert their particular interests through lobbying than the supporters of peace or of environmental protection. The balance of power and equality of opportunity of interests is excluded in advance as a consequence of the vastly unequal division of material resources necessary to their organization. Today not even the pluralists dispute that the pluralist model of interest assertion only increases underlying inequalities, they merely insist on the maintenance of equality in principle, and more and more frequently summon the state as a neutral referee in the defense of weaker interests. The state, however, according to the evidence of empirical investigations, as well, is by no means neutral; for the most part it protects the stronger interests. Meanwhile the class character of its decisions sometimes shows quite openly: while the anti-trust law in the United States remained a dead letter, the anti-union Taft-Hartley law was ruthlessly enforced.

The general experience is that the pluralist model serves the benefit of established interests, to the detriment or even with the exclusion of late arrivals. (R.P. Wolff, one of the American critics of pluralism, compares the domain of the pluralist assertion of interests to a large plateau--those who have once clambered up block others from managing to get there.) R. Dahl himself also recognizes that the dynamism ascribed to pluralism an an organized form of resolution of conflicts of interest is only an appearance, and that this system tends toward rigidity (stasis, stagnation).<sup>5</sup> Thus, instead of being the engine of perpetual renewal and reforms, which it is generally proclaimed to be, it shows rather a conservative tendency. The supposed correction, or rather, control, which the development of countervailing powers might signify, is often out of the question, as a result of the opposition of interest associations that have once been established and have reached an understanding with each other; these divide up the market of political influence among themselves in the same way as the large capitalist concerns do internal and external markets in the economy.

The pluralist system, therefore, as a whole is conservative rather than inclined to reforms, and less competitive rather than cartel-like. Thus it is a matter nowadays of "limited" or "corporate" pluralism, rather than of "pure" or "laissez-faire" pluralism. (The concept of "public pluralism," in which mediators or referees of the state play a role in the game of pluralist forces, likewise points in the direction of a greater political hardening of the system.)

(We will publish the concluding part in our next number.)

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See Tamas Kolosi, "The Outlines of Structural Relations," a comprehensive, thought-provoking situation analysis, VALOSAG, 1982/11.
2. The doctrine of totalitarianism is the product of a comparative analysis of forms of political domination, abstracted from the concrete characteristics of the social system. The theory, originally attached to fascism, was quite quickly placed in the service of anti-communist Cold War propaganda, reducing fascism and "communism" to a common denominator. Following C.J. Friedrich, the following are regarded as the chief characteristics of totalitarian rule: a one-party system, a unified ideology, terror, a monopoly of propaganda, the centralization of state power, and total control of the economy. In essence, the ideal type of "pluralist democracy" is based on the antithesis of these, and thus we can also treat them as complementary concepts.
3. On the history and variants of pluralism, see for example Peter Hardi, "Notions of Pluralism in American Political Science," VILAGOSSAG, 1980/4; Jozsef Bayer, "Pluralism and Its Critics," TARSADALMI SZEMLE, 1981/No 9.
4. B. Blanke, U. Jurgens, H. Kastendiek, Kritik der politischer Wissenschaft, Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus, 1975, pp 204ff.
5. R.A. Dahl, "Pluralism Revisited," in Three Faces of Pluralism: Political, Ethnic, Religious, ed. by St. Ehrlich and G. Wootton, Gower, Westmead (GB), 1980, pp 20-34.

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PROBLEMS IN EDUCATIONAL POLICIES WEIGHED

Budapest MAGYAR IFJÚSÁG in Hungarian 16 Dec 83 pp 14-15

[Interview with András Knopp, deputy director of the Central Committee Department of Scientific, Public Education and Cultural Affairs, by Iván Wiesel, "Picture of the Future, 2000?" Date and place not given.]

[Text] The question arises worldwide, how adequate the various present educational methods are, to what degree they are suitable to train, by the turn of the millenium and the following period, professionals able to solve creatively and innovatively the problems that are not even defined today. This question is being dealt with both by specialists and educational authorities of the developed capitalist countries and by those of the developing world and the socialist states, and it is raised as a global problem. We will try to address this problem, which is a great concern for our youthfulness, with the help of András Knopp, deputy director of department of the MSZMP's Central Committee.

[Question] It is often mentioned in the literature and in the mass media that education is in a worldwide crisis. Do you share this opinion?

[Answer] The educational system has serious problems in many places of the Earth, it is indeed in a crisis. Of course, the concerns and the emerging problems are different, depending on whether we are talking about socialist, capitalist or developing countries. For example, it is a general problem that the results of science and research reach instruction too slowly and with great delay. Not infrequently it takes 10 years for scientific results to appear in curricula. A few extra years are needed until they reach the instructional materials as well. In our country, a text is used for 10 to 15 years. Consequently, instructional materials are lagging at least 20 to 25 years behind science. And this means not only a factual but frequently an ideological and methodological back-lag. Our curricula, texts, and our school system in general, is thus put, of course, at a disadvantage or, from case to case, even at a contradiction with other sources of information that are at the disposal of almost everyone as a result of the information explosion. Let us only think about a young person who turns the TV set on at home and sees scientists tearing apart those theories that are being taught in school, or one who reads a book or article which considers a method outdated which his teachers proclaim as the only good one. This is a challenge to the school.

The educational system cannot give the real answer to this challenge. This is one reason why educational reforms are being worked out in almost all countries of the world, so that a way can be found out of this critical situation. Ever newer curricula, "central" reforms and new texts are, however, less and less suitable for keeping abreast with the new results and for meeting the demands of our times. A possible and real answer would be to train instructors who would be able to keep up with science, would be able to supply new results in a sovereign way, and would transmit their knowledge to the new generation with modern views. In view of the lacking conditions, however, this would presuppose a reform of our entire educational "philosophy" as well.

Question Where is Hungary's place in terms of the development of the educational system?

Answer Hungary has made great strides in this area, not only relative to the previous development of our education but also in view of international results. In the last 40 years, Hungary saw a 5.5-fold increase of the number of professionals with graduate degrees, and the distribution of the various fields has also changed considerably. In terms of the number of professionals, Hungary stands, among the socialist countries, second to the Soviet Union. This means 6th place in the European field, shoulder-to-shoulder with West Germany. We should not be ashamed about the quality of training either. The Hungarian high school, for example, is considered in the United States as equivalent to the requirements of the first 2 years of higher education. This is, of course, connected with the grave problems of the American educational system. These have been recently summarized under the title, "The Nation Is in Danger," written by numerous specialists, commissioned by President Reagan. The report shows that for the first time in the history of the United States, generations leave high school with less knowledge than the previous generations. Of course, it would be a mistake to see our own situation through colored glasses, referring to the educational problems of other countries. Our educational system also has numerous and grave problems. We must deal with these first of all, without consoling ourselves that a part of our problems belongs to a world-wide crisis phenomenon or that problems are even worse in other places. However, even in view of our concerns and problems, we must not be ashamed of our achievements, namely, that our people's educational level corresponds not only to its level of social and economic development but also to a pretty good European standard. This creates an adequate foundation regarding the future and the reality of our developmental plans.

Question I am not debating our achievements. But still, we see many practical problems. Employers complain that schools do not provide them with well-trained professionals, and recent graduates complain that employers do not provide them with responsibilities that are commensurate with their training.

Answer Generally, there is no problem with the theoretical training of young professionals; indeed, they are often better trained than would be required by their job. We must pay attention to this, for a lasting conflict between the two may create problems in the well-being and social

identification of the young generations. Training is often the problem. In some areas it must be brought closer to practice. Young professionals often cannot apply their theoretical knowledge in practice. For instance, a young architect learns at the university how to design and build new buildings but often remains ignorant about the engineering problems of reconstruction, although this is much needed today in the construction industry. Young professionals are often unfamiliar even with the basic principles of administration. But it is also true that employers expect the schools to provide them with "seasoned" professionals, ready to solve even special problems. However, no country or no educational system is capable of training specialists for such specialized and concrete demands. Training should be able to make professionals knowledgeable in the basics of the given specialty, able to quickly adapt themselves to the demands of our rapidly changing world, able to follow the development of the given specialty through continued self-education.

Question It is often maintained nowadays that there is an over-supply of graduates in Hungary and, consequently, the value of degrees is decreasing. Is this problem real?

Answer The problems of training policy and employment policy are closely connected. In some areas there may be an over-supply but it does not necessarily come to surface. If young professionals can find jobs in their chosen fields, public opinion does not mention over-supply although many of them may work under their level of training, i.e., are "under-employed." In other areas the number of graduates is not large but enterprises and institutions have no demand for professionals with the given training--there are various reasons for this, e.g., the manager does not have this kind of degree. In these instances, it seems, there is an over-supply. But this should not be a definite conclusion.

Alongside with our globally impressive achievements, our higher education, for example, is at the bottom of the European ranks in almost all areas of theoretical training, including the natural sciences (biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, etc.) and the social sciences (sociology, psychology, etc.). At the same time it is strange that it is precisely these areas--where the number of graduates is the lowest--where finding a job is most difficult. This is connected, in the case of the natural sciences, to the fact that employers do not need enough specialists with an interest in research and with an ability to help innovative processes through research. Only the most dynamic enterprises are looking for such specialists. In Hungarian agriculture, for example (which, by the way, stands in the first place in the world in terms of the number of professionals employed), according to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, only 49 biologists were employed in 1978 but more than 1,200 lawyers were working in agricultural enterprises. This no doubt also reflects a certain attitude. There is another paradox, namely, that the number of job applicants is highest in those areas where employment is even difficult. Young people are looking for creative and innovative areas, and this is good in terms of the future. However, this explains only part of the problems in career decisions. We must also change the one-sidedness of career orientation. In the choice of

careers we must also change our social attitude, especially for the benefit of careers in technology and the natural sciences. For this, of course, we must make these careers more attractive financially. In addition, I think, a change of attitude is also needed in the sphere of accepting novices. Our national economy can hardly be internationally competitive without innovative specialists who are able to apply scientific results. Our intellectual resources and a better use of the human factor are the best resources for dealing with our tasks.

Question It is a frequent complaint that the financial recognition of young professionals is inadequate or that the responsibilities given to them are below their abilities and thus they leave their chosen field. What is the situation in this area?

Answer Indeed, young professionals represent cheap labor. This is why it is not infrequent that they are employed in large numbers even where their knowledge is unneeded. This also expresses the fact that the financial and moral recognition of intellectual work and knowledge is inadequate in our society. Thus the solution of young professionals' problems mentioned also depends on the general social recognition of higher training and performance. When the young professional will cease to be "cheap labor," the enterprises will also think twice on the number of graduates they will employ, and novices will also sooner be assigned responsibilities about which they were dreaming during their studies at the university.

Question I read the other day in one of our daily papers that 3,000 teaching positions are unfilled, that 4,100 teachers are unlicensed and that only 75 percent of the qualified and licensed teachers work in their field. These data are something to think about. What are your "comments" on these statistics?

Answer I am convinced that the educational system is a building that can be built only from the top, i.e., much depends on teacher training. But teacher training can fulfill its responsibility only if teaching is attractive enough. The main problem today is the high number of teachers leaving this profession, and the low number of qualified teachers teaching. Unfortunately, I know even more alarming statistics than what you quoted. For example, only 35-38 percent of graduates in the arts and sciences in Budapest become teachers. The teacher shortage is thus primarily not the result of faulty planning but that of the steady decline in the attractiveness of this profession. In addition, the number of unqualified teachers on the job is related to the fact that this profession is becoming more and more feminine. Today more than 75 percent of the teachers are women. Most of them are young. Consequently, the number of them on leave because of child birth is high, and their replacement can be made in most cases only with unlicensed persons. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs is examining, on the basis of last year's resolution of the Central Committee, the possibilities of a significant increase of financial and moral recognition of educators. Hopefully, this will result in a higher attractiveness of the field. Perhaps the "drawing away" effects may also be diminished. It is very important to adequately solve the problem of continued teacher training as well, for it is also an



important factor in the prestige of the field. And finally, from the viewpoint of the field's social recognition, the most important thing is perhaps to increase the respect of the local authorities and parents toward the educators, and to defend the latter against the frequently humiliating responsibilities and tasks given to them. These are frequently the things today that scare away those who like children, teaching, and the "joint experience" only teachers know--who know what it means to "work" together with a class.

Question The traditional university is also a research center. But it seems that this function of our universities had faded away and, consequently, they do not transmit enough innovative and creative mentality to the students. Routine is often dominating at our universities, and there is a rather wide gap between science and school. What are we to do?

Answer In 1969 the guidelines for scientific policy emphasized the development of research activities at our universities. In the last 15 years, such possibilities increased more at the universities than at the research institutes. Despite the efforts made in the last 15 years, there is still a wide gap between the universities' and research institutes' conditions for scientific activity. Today it is still the university where scientific investment is lowest for each researcher, affecting the efficiency of the research. Fewer of the university instructors go abroad to research institutes and to study. The reason for less opportunity for research at the university is not lower qualification or lower intellectual performance of university instructors, for the majority of those who have degrees in science work at the university. An important element of the new development program of higher education is to narrow this gap in the coming years. This will make it necessary to strengthen the scientific capacity of the universities and colleges, primarily including the up-dating of equipment. It will also require the elimination of the separation of universities and research institutes, and thus organizational and other measures will have to be taken. Another reason why the development of research at the university is important is that the student (the professional of the future) must become familiar with up-to-date scientific results, attitude, and methods, which are needed for him to become a professional.

Question We often hear that closed personal groups are being formed at higher education, becoming intolerant toward anything new. What is your opinion on this phenomenon?

Answer Unfortunately, this occurs indeed. Certain fossilized views may make instruction conservative for a period of time. It is not unfrequent that in some institutes of higher learning situations of monopoly and inbreeding develop which are difficult to break down and which do not accept, of course, more intelligent and innovative researchers. This sometimes results in serious damages. Even in public education, the proliferation of the new and the up-to-date sometimes entails grave conflicts. Conflicts cannot be eliminated, of course, from the dialectics of life, but the way to deal with them, and the fate of new and up-to-date efforts, may be extremely important in terms of the educational system as a whole or the attitude of an institution. For the attitude and innovative atmosphere of the school and of the

educational system is also an educational factor, often affecting the generation that is growing up. Creative people can be educated only by creative institutions capable of self-renewal. Socialist school, socialist education presupposes the school's constant inner renewal. This is why personal groups, which slow down and hinder the new, better, and more modern scientific and pedagogic efforts, are especially dangerous.

Question The financial resources of our national economy will become scarcer. How will this affect public education? How will it be possible, under these circumstances, to achieve results in the reforms?

Answer Although the funds for public expenditures are more scarce than before, more and more money is allotted annually for public education. This makes it certain--considering price increases as well--that the conditions will not deteriorate despite the growing number of students. At the same time, social demands toward the schools are also increasing. The parents are working, and more and more of the responsibilities of raising children is given to the school. The social communities, which accepted such responsibilities as well, "exploded," and the families themselves became more and more isolated units. Unfortunately, most of our schools are still unable to solve the problems of recreation, meals or sports. In view of the school functions like these, which are socially "expected," the lag is especially great. Let us only think of gymnasiums, dining halls and recreation rooms. Since they come to school from generally more cultured and better equipped homes, the children are more aware of these shortcomings, not to speak of the parents. Of course, the improvement of quality also has inner resources. It must be clearly seen, however, that, on the long range, the development of a school system and instructional system that meets today's and the future's demands can be accomplished only through significant and increased investments. For this, however, the conditions must be created in the national economy. Stepping forward in the area of instruction is an important condition of social and economic development. The quality of instruction today is not only part of the general culture but an important factor in investment and production as well. We must create a higher social awareness that higher professional standards, higher culture, and better training are indispensable for us to take a place in the ever more rapid scientific and technical progress which makes both society's development and the individual's success possible.

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REFORMED CHURCH'S 1983 ACTIVITIES RECOUNTED

LD191622 Budapest in Hungarian to Australia and New Zealand 1000 GMT 19 Dec 83

[Text] The end of the year is a time for recording balances. This year's balance of the activities of the Hungarian Reformed Church has been recounted by Attila Kovach, [words indistinct] Bishop.

[Kovach] Looking back at the last 12 months, we can give a favorable account of numerous joyful events and developments in the life of the Hungarian Reformed Church. Among other things, the progress of our big building (?projects) has caused much joy. At the beginning of October, we inaugurated the new wing of the Budapest [word indistinct] College. This means that our theology students, the ministers of the future, can live and study in modern conditions. We also have good hopes that the remaining part of this 70-million-forints project, the complete renovation of the old building, will be completed in 1985. The work on the new building, with a capacity of more than 100 beds, of the children's health home at (Almasmeszme) has begun and is progressing significantly. The foundations have also been laid for the [name indistinct] Parish's new headquarters in Miskolc. In addition to this, our congregations have renovated several churches and church buildings and have even built even some new churches and homes for ministers. In order to prepare the new, revised order of sermons, hard and successful theological work has been carried out. It is a joyful development that the publications of our press department can also be purchased in state bookshops, and for the first time this year in the center of the capital, publishers of the Protestant churches also operated stalls during book week.

For us, the many events of the Luther jubilee has also brought enrichment through the increased attention paid to the period of reform and its fruits and messages for today.

In the area of our international relations, the number of outstanding events has increased even more. Many noted representatives of several foreign churches and international religious organizations have visited us. The Christian Peace Conference, which was established 25 years ago, held its conference in our country. We sent representative delegations to several international religious consultations, including the sixth meeting of the World Council of Churches, which took place in Vancouver [Canada]. The declaration of this meeting together

with those of other (?similar) events have really proven that in the circle of Christians throughout the world, the protest against armament, particularly against nuclear weapons, has strengthened, by jointly taking a stand on the side of peace and disarmament. This process is supported fullheartedly by our church.

Naturally, we have had to deal with worries and problems on more than one occasion. For example, in the last 10 years, a wide enough strata of the ministers reached retirement age. Their replacement is difficult to achieve, although we have many young ministers and theology students. The life of the Reformed Church congregations of several small settlements that are declining in population also causes worries.

At year-end we recount that it is not only the events of the life of our church that concern us. It is a true joy for us that our country and people in 1983 could also live and work in peace. Despite the hardened economic circumstances, we have succeeded in maintaining the favorable achievements of the past few decades, and in several areas, progress has even been made. We greatly appreciate this and we know that there is hard work and serious effort behind it. The worries and problems, on the other hand, remind us that the people of Reformed faith have to work for the prosperity of our people by steadfastness every day and by creating and guarding moral, spiritual, and material values.

Together with many millions of people, we also share concern and anxiety for the world situation. The last part of the year has been particularly overshadowed by the beginning of the deployment of new (?nuclear) missiles in Western Europe. Millions, among them churches and international religious organizations, have raised their voices against this development. To hope for and to endeavor toward a better, more just, and peaceful future of mankind is more difficult today than it has ever been.

If, in this festive period, I could give any message to our listeners, I would like to remind them that Christmas is the festivity of love and peace. It calls us to think about things we can do to (?ensure) that love, [words indistinct], and helpfulness should permeate people's relations with one another, and that peace between countries and the spirit of cooperation should be strengthened. What the world needs is that for us to get together to overcome the alienation that threatens human relations, with nuclear catastrophe, and to achieve peace. I wish my dear listeners, celebrating families, Christian congregations remembering the birth of Jesus Christ, and everybody pleasant and blessed holiday days. Let the dangers threatening mankind be removed; let life be more humane; and let peace be stronger throughout the world.

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KWIATKOWSKI DISCUSSES NEW PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

Budapest JEL KEP in Hungarian No 4, 1983 pp 149-153

[Article by Docent Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, director of the Public Opinion Research Center: "The Public Opinion Research Center in Poland"]

[Text] At the request of our journal, the director of the new Polish research center describes the circumstances under which the center was established, and its work to date.

The Public Opinion Research Center was formed in Poland in 1982, but the idea to establish it emerged much earlier. It is hard to say why the realization of this idea was delayed so long. But the fact that the research center opened under martial law, and that it was General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, who signed the resolution establishing the research center, has its significance.

Regulations of this kind have been multiplying lately. Socialist democracy has begun to assume tangible forms, the earlier perfunctory regulations have gained substance, and many regulations have been issued also about consulting society. These regulations specify how citizens can participate in the administration of public affairs, in debating the economic questions, and in preparing the decisions affecting them. Thereby the consultations, representing the voice of public opinion, gradually become forms of control and prevent the adoption of hasty resolutions that disregard the opinion of those whom the resolutions directly affect.

In its effort to learn as fully as possible what the citizens' requirements and aspirations are, the government asks questions and listens to the comments. It purposefully gives up the luxury of remaining ignorant. It is fully aware that ignorance cannot serve as an excuse. Incidentally, it would be better if an excuse were not needed at all. For sensible regulations require no explanation, and there is no need for alibis.

The purpose of the Public Opinion Research Center that has been established pursuant to the aforementioned resolutions is "to gather information reflecting the opinion of entire society regarding the social and economic tasks set or carried out by the government."

The research center's basic task is to organize public opinion research, to process and analyze the materials of its surveys, and to submit reports on them

to the Council of Ministers, the members of its presidium, the chairman of the Office of the Council of Ministers, and the government's spokesman.

In greater detail, the tasks of the center are as follows:

1. To initiate, organize and conduct public opinion surveys on matters that are in the center of the government's attention.
2. To cooperate with the institutions that survey public opinion, and to participate in the commissioning, conduct and supervision of surveys.
3. To check the results of the surveys.
4. To draw conclusions from the data in the possession of state organs and institutions, and of the mass media.
5. To perform other tasks that fall within the scope of public opinion research, on the basis of commissions or on the center's own initiative.

This year, as an initial step, the Public Opinion Research Center will have to confine itself to the tasks listed under the first item, because of the organizational, training and methodological problems that must be overcome, and also in view of a certain mistrust stemming from the present state of sociological research in Poland and from its not always Marxist methods.

#### A Political Institution

The center's activity must conform to the government's needs. This is seemingly simple if we think in terms of a commission and its implementation. But what will we benefit from this? We must realize how little time we have to investigate even a single topic, despite the highest degree of operational flexibility possible. We either should be getting our commissions much sooner--but in this case the situation could change significantly specifically when the research cycle has already ended--or we could investigate only the effects of the government's measures and limit ourselves to quick sample surveys of public opinion. Naturally, this too would be meaningful, but it would be far below our potential. On the principle that the research center is a link between the state leadership and society, it must signal the accumulated tensions and call attention to them in due time. For the situation in which the research center was established has willy-nilly made it a political institution, a governmental institution. But this does not mean that the center is a partner of equal standing in the questions it investigates. And, naturally, the center employs scientific methods, because without them its existence would be meaningless to both the government and society.

In plain language, we serve state power but do not cater to it. Consequently, the research center must conduct its investigations through special optics peculiar to it. It must take two distinct viewpoints into consideration: the viewpoint of the government, and the viewpoint of the citizen, of the interested party, in terms of individual and professional or social groups. Our dilemma is how to reconcile these two viewpoints, in the interest of the objectives that guide both sides.

Naturally, by its decisions the government wishes to serve the interests and welfare of society. In the course of their realization, however, the decisions could have so many unpredictable effects that they might backfire and seem harmful, injurious and meaningless. The various classes, strata and social groups interpret differently each government decision, which can never please everybody. However, the mere recognition of this fact does not yet solve anything. Before a decision is adopted, a realistic assessment must be made of who will benefit from the decision and for whom will it be, respectively, indifferent and detrimental. This leads to ideological selection criteria such as whose interests must be served primarily (those of the working class), whose interests must not be underestimated (those of private farmers and artisans), who must be protected (the weakest economically), who must be treated with tolerance (the petite bourgeoisie), with whom must we cooperate (the church), and who must be suppressed (the newly rich).

Up to now public opinion research did not provide the government these criteria for the assessment of its activity. Nor can the research center supply them overnight, because it is focusing its attention on opinions, i.e., on something that is only secondary, reflected, in its optics. In accordance with the possibilities, however, the research center will strive to learn as much as possible about the real socioeconomic situation of the working class, relative to the other classes and strata. With time, then, the research center will have also an ideological function. In addition, it will have to exert an active propaganda effect, develop a language common to both sides, reconcile as closely as possible the viewpoints of the government and of society, and attempt to make perceptible the ideal of social harmony, by presenting the activity of the government in the light of interest contradictions and differences.

It is common knowledge that public opinion, the subject of our investigation, can be "scanned" only very laboriously; we must proceed step by step until the entire picture emerges, like a mosaic. Each survey explores another new bit but does not reveal the whole. In the course of our work we employ a variety of methods. This explains the many departments and working groups within the research center's structure. And it also explains the many-sidedness of the research projects and the planned diversity of the employed methods and procedures.

In addition to the Department of Social Surveys that conducts typically sociological, long-term and periodically repeated surveys (of working-class awareness, for example), we established another department for immediate, short-term surveys to investigate the public response to government decisions, political events, the more important documents, and official statements.

In addition to our own research work, we intend to commission research also at other institutions of similar specialization. This is why we establish contact with them, coordinate their activity. And this is also the reason why we set up a Department of Scientific Analysis, and a Scientific Information and Library Department to monitor what others are doing, to preserve for the government all the data that can facilitate the decision-making process, and to help perfect the style and methods of exercising power.

The Department of Press Analysis continuously monitors the writings in the central and provincial press, and even in the plant newspapers. We are interested primarily in the views and comments of experts, and in the publicists' indications regarding various facts and trends, and society's response to the government's specific actions or initiatives.

#### Letters and Phone Calls

We have also a department that analyzes the letters received by the central organs and other national agencies. There is a bureau of complaints attached to practically every party and state central organ: the PZPR Central Committee, the Sejm, the Council of State, the Office of the Council of Ministers, the Office of the Chief Prosecutor, the Supreme Chamber of Control, the Supreme Court, and the ministries. The "Letters to the Editor" columns in newspapers are also well known. Millions of citizens express their views on the most diverse questions. The writers of the letters are regarded as petitioners, and the letters are handled accordingly. These letters are not being analyzed properly, yet they could be exceptionally useful for the mapping and a better understanding of public opinion. Although the letters are not representative of every population stratum, their information content is very valuable because their authors provide comprehensive information about the activity of the local organs of power, direct attention to the most serious problems, and adopt definite standpoints.

Writing a letter is unquestionably a very personal form of expressing opinions. Many kinds of people write about many different things that affect them in some way or other: somebody has a grievance and is seeking redress, or the people are bothered by something and therefore pick up pen and paper to let off steam, or to call attention to some social question they regard as important, with the intention of helping to improve things.

More intensive investigation of the letters requires suitable training, especially in information processing. For the time being we are gaining experience by studying our own mail and the mail, especially the so-called letters from citizens, received by the Office of the Council of Ministers. Several tens of thousands of such letters are received each year. Their writers report on the life of their immediate environment, on the things that annoy them or cause them joy. I might add that we do not handle the complaints but refer them to the Bureau of Complaints attached to the Office of the Council of Ministers.

Which does not mean that we attach less importance to personal petitions. Incidentally, personal matters cease to be personal when they accumulate and thereby indicate a general social problem that requires statutory regulation or the amendment of existing regulations. The letters treated on this principle give us a better understanding of reality, bring us closer to the recognition of the truth, help to verify hypotheses and serve as the basis of other investigations (for example, questionnaire surveys).

The research center has also a so-called hot line for maintaining contact with society. We established this hot line in order to gain information as quickly as possible about the concerns, worries and problems of the various social strata and groups, and of individual citizens. The hot line is staffed ten



hours a day. According to our experience to date, the reports received over the hot line are very useful for the authorities and definitely prompt them to take action. They enable us to monitor the public mood and the citizens' feelings. Thus they can usefully complement the sociological surveys and determine their direction.

With the help of the hot line, we are able to keep both feet on the ground. In addition to our other methods, it is an effective way of maintaining constant contact with society; especially with those of its members to whom it is not indifferent what is happening around them. The idea of the hot line originated from our desire to reach the silent, passive and indifferent people. We reckon that they will pick up the phone if something raises their ire, and perhaps will even follow up the phone call with a letter. Incidentally, this is what our leaflets encourage them to do. A copy of the leaflets is reproduced on the following page [not available].

#### Without Footholds

Basically everything at the research center--from the organizational structure and mechanism of operation to the employed methods and procedures--is somehow new; we had no model to follow that would have provided practical and theoretical footholds for us. Our basic objective is to form for ourselves a picture of society's consciousness at any given time, in all its complexity in which it appears in the press, in scientific papers and in the expressed views of the citizens. On this basis we have begun--independently of everything that already is happening within the walls of our institute--to develop the theoretical basis of our activity. As a first step, we organized a National Seminar on Methods, jointly with the scientists of several Marxists institutions. Together with them, we would like to develop theoretical and methodological procedures we could use in our research. At the seminar we set up a programming group that has already scheduled the topics for the coming period. Mostly the investigation of social consciousness, critical evaluation of the research conducted so far, the class structure of society, and the categories of public opinion were discussed at the first sessions.

The other part of the theoretical basis is being developed by the seminar's public opinion research group. Its purpose is to explore primarily the intelligentsia, the social stratum that is the most active in shaping public opinion. It might be said that the composition of the research group reflects an openness similar to that of PRON (Patriotic Movement of National Renewal). The scientists participating in its work have different world outlooks, represent different theoretical standpoints and belong to different political parties or Catholic organizations. The topic of this group's first conference was "What Kind of Socialism Do We Want?"

Before we set up the research center's organizational structure, we turned to the ministries and central organs and asked them what they expected of us and what kind of information they needed. It turned out that some of them did not want our services at all, while others did not have a clear idea of what we could give them. Moreover, some of the questions they asked us amused the Social Policy Committee of the Council of Ministers, which approved our work plan. Thus information about the opportunities that our institute can offer

has yet to become widespread. We must teach the interested agencies the difficult art of formulating questions. We must combat official complacency, the misconception that an agency knows all there is to know about everything.

Actually the entire idea is just beginning to take shape, and it probably will evoke also certain displeasure and opposition. Especially if the research results will differ from society's (perhaps wishful) self-image. Also for this reason it is worth while to make the citizens understand that society is not a monolithic structure, but a complex system of different social strata and classes, with different interests. It is our intention to engage in suitable propaganda to disseminate our research results as widely as possible.

In 1983, we have been or still are investigating the following groups of questions:

1. Wages and social policy, as the workers of large-scale industry see them.
2. View of the workers in large-scale industry regarding the economic reform.
3. The economization drive and the war against inflation, according to the standpoint of the National Conference of Worker Aktivs.
4. The workers' opinion regarding the new trade unions.
5. The standpoints of industrial self-managements, economic managers, party committees and trade unions on economic reforms, wages, and the establishment of trade unions.
6. The basis of the conflicts and social tensions reflected in the citizens' letters to the Office of the Council of Ministers.
7. Public administration according to our own assessment and the citizens' opinion.
8. The individual social strata or groups' assessment of the government's propaganda activity and measures.

None of these topics can be exhausted in a single survey. Therefore we are striving to investigate them as thoroughly as possible, taking into consideration the interests and situation of the various social groups.

1014

CSO: 2500/165

## PRON ACTIVITIES IN 1983 PRAISED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Jan 84 p 3

[Interview with Jan Dobraczynski, chairman of the PRON National Council, conducted by Lucjan Pracki: "The Dialogue Continues"]

[Text] [Question] Mr Dobraczynski, how do you evaluate the progress of the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth [PRON] in the past year? What were the movement's gains and shortcomings? In what way did it meet social and state expectations? How did it disappoint them or fail to return the anticipated results?

[Answer] The Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth is still young--both as far as organization and methods of action are concerned. It was the May congress which laid the groundwork for the movement. At that time, the key instant was when during the congress' proceedings the movement's program was finally formulated, its documents recognized, and its proposals adopted. The congress itself, its essential contents and its resolutions need to be regarded as a great accomplishment for the movement, but also for the entire country, because we laid the basis for dialogue and gave society a chance to be heard. I do not regard the fact that this dialogue is growing ever more intensive as an achievement, but simply as the confirmation of the justness of an idea which is the basis for PRON--the idea of national rebirth and understanding.

Now, the uphill work in implementing what the congress adopted is ongoing. That this work is going slowly could be regarded as a shortcoming. Sometimes it goes too slowly, but I stress that PRON is indeed young and is still looking for ways to act.

The movement's activity undoubtedly influences the acceleration of the democratization process in social life, it enlarges the role of the citizen in exercising influence over a part of the decisionmaking which affects him in the end. The movement's demands are well known; all can convince themselves of the fact that we have tried to settle many issues. Have we reached every goal we set for ourselves? Certainly not, but we can be satisfied with our partial results, even if we do not consider the thousands of personal acts which we carried out efficiently in explaining many matters at issue or helping some way.

There were instances when PRON's opinions were not considered; here I am thinking about the neglected consultations with the movement with regard to the decision to reinstate meat rationing. On the other hand, I am personally satisfied with the way our opinion was regarded concerning the living conditions of retirees and pensioners.

[Question] What advantages did the national council gain by forming a partnership with the authorities, particularly the Sejm and the government? Are working contacts developing in this area, and, if so, what do they touch upon?

[Answer] These contacts are strong and touch upon the most important issues in our lives. Of course, they are not restricted to official meetings of presidium organs, but are tied to meetings and interviews of a working nature. If we are talking about the Sejm, then I need to say that a member of the presidium of the PRON National Council is the Sejm's own vice marshal. These things are in the movement's makeup and documents.

One of the indicators of the movement's influence in the Sejm is the announced ministerial proposal by members of the Sejm--members of PRON--with regard to aiding retirees and pensioners; this proposal begins a totally new aspect in PRON's activities and serves as an example in the movement's quest for new methods of action.

The contacts with state agencies touch upon the most various of issues and this variety is the result of the kind of ventures or requests with which the citizen turns to the movement. In especially delineating matters of a personal nature, I would like to point to matters of a social nature such as our appeal, which was implemented, to extend the period for people who had been involved with the opposition out of political motivation to turn themselves in, or the PRON draft resolution on public consultations. Now the movement is discussing a new elections law and the results will be formulated at a meeting of the PRON National Council in mid-January for presentation to the State Council.

[Question] Within the movement's ranks there is an apprehension about being shoved off to the sidelines, specifically, that the government has somehow "gotten used" to it and is beginning to regard it bureaucratically. Rumor has it that the movement's activeness decreased after the congress. This will not increase its contributions, and threatens stagnation. Why do you think about all this?

[Answer] I cannot agree with these ideas, inasmuch as it seems to me that PRON's activities are of a permanent and specific nature; it has distanced itself from those issues which affect public opinion in a spectacular way. Before the congress there was a great deal of information in the news media on the establishment of the movement and its program. The congress itself was the high point of the movement in the mass media. After the congress, when the movement's real work began,

relatively little information has been put out about PRON and even less with regard to its real work in all the elements. And the fact that there has been a distinct decline in the movement's activity can be regarded as a reproof of the mass media. I am convinced that information on PRON's activities is currently our weak point. Since you mention of the danger that the government has "gotten used" to us--well, it does exist, but we are fighting it as best we can.

[Question] In your opinion, how is the struggle for the ideas of understanding and national rebirth which PRON champions going?

[Answer] Generally speaking, there are definite political realities which are associated with the situation in Europe and the world. There are lines of division which dramatically run between skill and the lack thereof in knowing how to think in terms of country and people. This thinking is the result of understanding reality and the fundamental laws shaping our sociopolitical lives. Such thinking leads to an evaluation of the situation and, in turn, to specific proposals as to what attitudes or activity really serve the common national good.

[Question] In judging PRON's experiences, what would you say deserves dissemination and what belongs to the movement's weakness and needs improvement?

[Answer] We need tirelessly to spread in those directions of activity which seek new ways to increase the subjective role of the citizen in the state's life. We have much experience in this area; this experience varies depending on the level of the movement's organization in question. We need to get out all the achievements which touch upon either economic issues, culture or education and which have been implemented in individual elements. I am sure that there are many such elements and the achievements will be of enormous advantage to a specific public.

On the other hand, the problem of participation in PRON's activities is a weak point and an item which needs to be considerably improved. Many express the view that they will come to like PRON when it settles this matter or that. Anticipating something from PRON while standing on the sidelines is a misunderstanding. PRON is a movement which can accomplish a great deal when everyone, or at least many people, take an active part in it. Nothing can be achieved if the movement is condemned to depend on the exclusive efforts of single units.

[Question] Participation in the elections to the national councils will be the movement's acid test with regard to credibility. The elections themselves will certainly be the country's main event in 1984. What role do you see for PRON in the preparations for and conduct of these elections?

[Answer] The elections will of course be the central task of 1984 and it will be a difficult one. As I have said before, this task will require the extensive participation of the public, above all, the non-partisan public, more so than any other activities undertaken up until now. PRON's role arises from the provisions of the electoral law which has already been published and discussed in all of the movement's elements. This law will be the focal point and exceptionally important. Of course, the preparation for and conduct of the elections will be a kind of acid test.

[Question] What do you wish for society, the movement and yourself in 1984?

[Answer] I wish society, the movement and myself much strength, freedom of action, discretion and fraternal affection.

[Interviewer] We will join in your wishes and we thank you for the interview.

12247

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RECENT MYSL WOJSKOWA ISSUES REVIEWED

September 1983 Issue

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 3 Oct 83 p 3

[Article by SZA: "Prospects for the Development of Rockets"; MYSL WOJSKOWA (Military Thought) is a Polish journal devoted to issues of military interest]

[Text] The rapid development of rocket technology since World War II has been observed with great alarm by nations desiring to live in peace. Distance is no longer a barrier to modern rocketry and thus people are placing much hope in Soviet-American negotiations on limiting nuclear missile arsenals. It is no secret that both sides possess an enormous destructive potential. Given this potential, there is no advantage at all in numbers.

Unfortunately, the negotiations have been systematically torpedoed by the aggressive imperialist circles for which any pretext is valid. The United States has been particularly active in disrupting nuclear arms negotiations. This makes it urgently necessary to not only learn about the actual capabilities of nuclear weaponry, which holds a position of such importance in the mad arms race, but to be aware of prospects and trends in its development as well.

Brig Gen Cz. Dega's article "Prospects for the Development of Rocketry and Its Use in Combat" in the September issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA is devoted to that topic.

After a tactical and technical discussion of modern rockets in use by NATO, the author presents foreseeable directions their development may take. "The present tendencies in rocketry," he states, "are a total replacement of rockets guided by ground-based radiolocational stations with independently programmable rockets, reduction in weight and further modernization of launch preparation equipment, the construction of smaller-scale rockets with greater accuracy, improvement of the dependability of all elements of rocket systems, guidance systems and their

construction, increasing the mobility of rocket systems in terrain with poor roads, reducing rocket deployment and launch time, adapting rocket systems to air transport and replacing explosive warheads with cannister-type warheads that can increase by several times the area of fire."

The next important development in rocketry is the fact that liquid fuel has for several years been being replaced by solid fuel as the main propellant. It should be assumed that solid fuel engines will dominate rocket propulsion systems in the future. This is dictated by the need to ensure rocket troops a high degree of combat readiness. Solid fuel speeds up launch preparation, reduces the necessary amount of maintenance work and is safer to use.

Just as rockets are being developed, intensive efforts are also being made to find means of neutralizing them. In the coming years, the chief threat to ballistic missiles will most certainly be antiaircraft rocket systems. This will be true once designers succeed in improving the effectiveness of target recognition and increase the launch velocity of antiaircraft rockets. Solutions to both problems are very near.

In the near future, ideas such as "high-energy shields" and "combat lasers" that once were in the realm of science fiction may revolutionize methods of neutralizing rockets in the same way that nuclear weapons revolutionized for combat (target destruction). In the conclusion to his article, the author again stresses the threat posed by nuclear weapons whose rapid development and constant improvement must cause great alarm over the fate of the world.

The September issue included many other interesting items: "The Decision-making Process" (Lt Col Z. Galewski), "Converting a Tactical Formation From Offense to Defense" (Lt Col M. Huzarski), "Requirements for Directing Antiaircraft Fire" (Lt Col J. Sadowski), and "Overcoming Traditional Minefields in Troop Combat Activities" (Col T. Procak and Col L. Rutkowski).

The section "Organization and Computer Science" contains two articles: "Introduction of Programming for Subscriber Computer Systems to Data-Processing Organs" (Maj M. Gnilka) and "Using the Values of Communicated Information to Control Data Transmission in Telecommunications Networks" (Col Z. Kowalczyk and Lt Col W. Kubicki).

The "Economics" section contained the articles "Defense Expenditures of the Second Republic" (Lt Col H. Sajecki) and "Observations on the Development of Polish Power Engineering" (J. Krzyzanowski).

This issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA concluded with the "Military History" and "Fraternal Armies" sections, reviews and discussions.



October 1983 Issue

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 11 Oct 83 p 11

[Article by SZA: "Anniversary of the Polish Peoples' Army"]

[Text] The entire October issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA is dedicated to the 40th Anniversary of the Polish Peoples' Army. The dedicated majority of articles in this issue are not only historical in nature but reflect the prospects and directions for the further development of the branches of the armed forces and the various other areas of the national defense. The authors of these articles are competent representatives of the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense.

The anniversary issue opens with an article by the chief inspector of local defense, secretary of the National Defense Committee and vice minister of national defense, Gen of Arms Tadeusz Tuczapski: "The Defense System of the Polish Peoples' Republic--The Guarantee of State Security."

"The system of defenses of the PRL [Polish Peoples' Republic]," states the author, "as a complex creation has many features. The socialist state is the most important central organization for the entire spectrum of society. According to the constitution and other laws adopted by the Sejm, the most important organ of popular representation, only the state has the authority to decree universal laws and responsibilities and direct the various realms of social, political and economic life. Within the diversity of state activities, one can distinguish certain directions and basic missions known as the functions of state.

"The sphere of missions given most attention by the state is recognized by the basic direction that state activities take. At this time, the state, along with all of its other functions required by the general strategy of socialist development, must perform one of its most important tasks: it must defend the nation against dangers and war and preserve the socialist order and its laws. These functions, especially in periods of constant and high levels of defense readiness, are fulfilled by all organs and echelons of the political system in Poland and especially by the system of national defense."

The author concludes his reflections with a very important point. The modern defense system of the Polish Peoples' Republic, created in accordance with socialist ideological values, meets the real needs of our country's peaceful development. It is not a strategic structure but, together with the socialist state, transformation of the political and strategic situation and scientific and technological process, is undergoing constant development, improvement and enrichment and is becoming the best guarantee of national security, independence, and the interests of all of Polish society in the fact of imperialist aggression.

Successive articles expand upon and particularize the topics and ideas presented in the introductory article and present the past, present and future of the branches and services of the armed forces.

These articles include "The OPK [Home Air Defense]--An Important Link in the System of State Defense" by Div Gen L. Lozowicki, "The Polish Peoples' Air Force--Future and Present" by Brig Gen Tytus Krawczyc, "Combat Preparation of Units in the Pomeranian Military District" by Brig Gen Zbigniew Blechman, "Quartermaster's Services During the 40th Anniversary of the Polish Peoples' Army" by Brig Gen Stanislaw Fryn, "The Technical Development of the Armed Forces, 1943-1983" by Brig Gen Tadeusz Kusmierski and "40th Anniversary of the Higher Army School" by Brig Gen Leslaw Dudek.

The "Organization and Computer Science" section contains an article by Col K. Glabek, "The Growth of Computer Use in the Armed Forces," in which the author discusses the history of computer use in the military and its prospects.

Articles published in the "Economics" section cover the history and prospects of military economics and predict its future directions. This subject is addressed by Brig Gen Jerzy Wojtala in "The Role of Economics in the Armed Forces of the Polish Peoples' Republic" and Col S. Stankiewicz in "The Balance of Development and New Tasks in Military Economic Thought."

The remaining articles in the October issue of MYSL WOJSKOWA are also devoted to the army anniversary.

12261

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## FOREIGN JOURNALISTS VISIT PENAL INSTITUTIONS

Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish No 51, 17 Dec 83 pp 1, 6, 7

[Article by Ryszard Czerniawski: "What Is Behind the Wall"]

[Text] It is still dark as we leave Warsaw. Almost everyone is dozing before we reach Blonie. The Spanish woman puts her hat under her head; the Japanese disappear in down jackets; the Germans wrap up in their coats. Despite the heater working full blast, it is cold in the bus.

INTERPRESS, jointly with the Central Administration of Penal Institutions [CZZK], had organized for foreign journalists a trip to several penal institutions. This was an unprecedented decision and undoubtedly did not come about easily, which after all is no wonder. No administration ever gladly shows structures of this type.

In the third quarter of this year in penal institutions and under court confinement there were on the average 58,235 people. Despite martial law, since 1980 the number of those sentenced has decreased by 26,000, and by 44,000 since 1974. In 1982, 148,456 people were sentenced by the courts, of which 107,717 were punished with imprisonment. Imprisonment without appeal was imposed upon 38,845 people. Last year, 51 people were sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment, and the death sentence was imposed on 3 people. Of those sentenced, 97 percent were men.

In the clubroom of the administration building, we are officially greeted by Colonel Stanislaw Wrona, who discusses in detail the legal regulations in force, the functioning of the penitentiary system, the organization of prison management, and the like.

"Penal institutions," he says, "can be divided into work centers, ordinary and traditional institutions, institutions for juveniles, for habitual criminals, for people requiring the use of special curative-educational centers together with penal institutions for people serving sentences for a military charge. You will see ordinary penal institutions and institutions for habitual criminals, work centers for juveniles and for people who committed an unintentional crime, as well as a penal institution for women."

## Lowicz

The head of the prison, Lieutenant-Colonel Stanislaw Chrzanowski: "In the institutions in Lowicz, habitual criminals are placed who have a maximum of number illegible years left in their sentences and who are capable of hard physical labor. The inmates work primarily for the benefit of the PKP Polish State Railroads by installing and disassembling railroad tracks in Lowicz and Skierniewice. The institution is designed for 615 people and came into use in 1931. During 10 months of this year it was inhabited by 504 people on the average. Of the inmates, 39 percent are serving time for crimes involving private property, and 21 percent for crimes involving the family (for example, evading alimony payments). The rest are serving time for, among others, robbery or rape. Wake-up is at 5 am. After roll call and breakfast, departure for work is at 6 am. Dinner is delivered to the work place. After returning to the cells, everyone must rest in bed. Supper is served between 5:30 and 6 pm. Roll call is at 6 pm and afterwards there is free time. Quiet time begins at 9 pm."

After this introduction, we go to the prison grounds. At first we go through a part of the building where visits take place. In the middle of a large hall several cubicles separated from each other stand in a row. On one side there are stools for the prisoners, and on the other, chairs for the visitors. Only in one of the cubicles is there a partition of glass making direct contact impossible (a type of punishment).

After leaving the building we pass by a working railroad platform with tracks. Two railroad cars which transport inmates to work in Skierniewice leave here every morning.

I look around. Only now do I realize that I am really in a prison. A white, 3- to 4-meter high wall topped with barbed wire surrounds the entire area. There are several turrets in which armed guards shelter themselves from the gusty wind. A few steps forward and I stand in front of an approximately 2- to 3-meter high chainlink fence, dividing the inner prison yard into smaller parcels in which stand the buildings.

The prisoners live in large, one-story halls. A siren at the gate announces that an electromagnetic lock was opened.

We stand in an illuminated corridor by the upper windows. On both sides extend rows of doors supplied with bars and locks. Each is empty, their inhabitants are now at work. In each of the cells there are several layers of metal beds. On a hanging cupboard there are bowls arranged upside down in a pyramid. Metal mugs are arranged similarly. One corner of the cell is separated by a more or less half-meter high plywood wall. Behind it one finds a toilet, sink, and a shelf for toiletries. On the floor along the wall lie slippers. Near one of the beds there is a small table. On it are a chess set, dominoes and two books, fantasies, both with stamps from the prison library.

Everywhere it is perfectly clean, not a bit of dust on the floor, sheets without a wrinkle. Everything is even and stands, lies, or hangs in a row, or

at a right angle. This austere order awakens anxiety. One wants to displace or move something to disturb the perfect and cold peace of the living quarters.

In the corridor, several people have gathered under a bulletin board with announcements. There is a pattern for making beds, folding clothes neatly, a television program; the barber shop is open Wednesdays and Saturdays. On the side hangs an order for the leader of the day. Awards: Wielsaw M., a 1-hour visit without supervision; Janusz W., praise; Andrzej J., an additional visit. Punishment: Tadeusz O., 7 days in a hard bed.

Almost opposite the bulletin board is a reading room with a television, a platoon of stools, a few newspapers and magazines. By one of the walls there is an artificial fireplace, beside this, three aquariums. Apparently at some time there existed a theory recommending aquariums in prisons. Looking at fish was supposed to have a quieting influence. A similarity of situation?

We enter the kitchen. Several prisoners dressed in white aprons are next to cauldrons. There are big metal thermoses by the wall. I copy the menu. Breakfast: cream of wheat with milk and bread. Dinner: cabbage soup, goulash with grits, and beets. Supper: coffee, bread, and marmalade.

We return to the reading room. It is time to ask questions of the director and the representatives of the CZZK.

"How much do the prisoners earn on the average?"

"For 10 months, it amounts to around 6,700 zlotys on the average. The part of the sum left to the disposal of the prisoner is registered on special cards, (there is no cash payment) and he can dispose of this sum by buying extra food twice a month, paying into a savings account, and the like."

"Are there political prisoners here?"

"No."

"The rate for food, as we read in the kitchen, amounts to 62 zlotys and 90 grosz. Is this charged to the prisoners or to the state budget?"

"The budget."

"How many guards work here?"

"These matters are confidential. I can say that for each functionary there are on the average 3 or 4 inmates. This is quite a bit fewer than at the institutions near Belfast, from which several inmates escaped. I would like to remind you that we are in an institution for habitual criminals. In others, of the open or half-open type, there are fewer functionaries in the guard force."

"How much does a guard earn?"

"The size of the salary for functionaries in penitentiary service does not differ from average salaries in the country. Depending on what kind of institution they work in, they receive different sizes of bonuses."

"I earn 20,400 zlotys monthly," says the director. "I have worked in prison service for 26 years. On the average the pay in the institution amounts to 15,000 zlotys, with the lowest being 10,750 zlotys."

#### Lubliniec

Through Arcadia, we ride to Lubliniec in Czestochowa Province. A large edifice located in the center of the town was built at the end of the last century and from that time it has not changed its assignment.

"The penal institution in Lubliniec," says Lieutenant Colonel Jan Dabrowicz, "is reserved for women. On the average there are 240 people here. More than half were sentenced for crimes involving private property, more than 16 percent for crimes involving public property. The remaining inmates are serving time for, among others, crimes involving life or health (including murder), family and guardians, road regulations, sexual matters. Most women have sentences of from 1 to 2 years or from 5 to 10 years. Three people are serving sentences of 25 years. There is also in the institution a section for women with psychological problems and for those temporarily under arrest. Women inmates are treated somewhat differently than men. Among other things, the visiting time is extended, they are allowed to deliver presents, especially to children, and also there is no limit to the amount of correspondence they can receive. Women in Lubliniec work mainly outside the institutions at sewing clothing, producing purses, and also gluing envelopes. We employ them after a doctor expresses his consent. Doctors of several specialties, including four psychiatrists, assure their medical care."

Sitting in the reading room, we did not realize that the cells can be found just beyond the wall. One step and we find ourselves in a part of the building where there are women prisoners. What we see is in keeping with the image created by films. We are standing in a big and high hall divided into three stories, which are identical. On the opposite walls are rows of cell doors. At a distance of about 2 meters from the walls the floors end at a balustrade encircling a formidable "hole" in the middle of each floor. Standing near it, it is possible to observe what is happening on other levels, because it is filled with wire netting. Also the stairs leading from floor to floor are surrounded by wire netting.

The cells are not large, four or five people per cell. They are similar to those in Lowicz, but at the same time, different. The same exemplary order, the same equipment, but the roughness of the inside is softened by little trifles. On the rail of one bed a curtain is hung, on another a napkin, and near the next a photograph of the pope.

A few meters from the main building one finds a many-storied extension. If one ignores the bars on the entrance doors and in the windows, nothing differentiates this from other types of buildings. Normal doors lead from

the corridor to several rooms. In the first room on the righthand side several women in civilian clothes are sewing flannel shirts. We stand in a group at the door. The situation is quite awkward. This state is overcome by the "television." In Lowicz, several of the criminals we met did not agree to be filmed. Here the question concerning permission to film is acknowledged with consenting smiles. The women bend over the machines and the sound of the machines is a little louder. It is clear that a pretty girl with long, black hair sitting by the window has caught the eye of the cameramen. They film her the longest.

One of the female journalists is intrigued by the fact that the director of the prison for women is a man.

"Are there penal institutions in which the directors are women?"

"Yes, a woman is the head of the institution in Grudziadz and a holding facility in Warszawa-Grochow. In Lubliniec and Krzywaniac, women are assistant directors."

"How many prisons are there for women?"

"Three. I named them a moment ago. Not long ago there was also an institution in Fordon, but because of the decreasing number of women sentenced, it was transformed into a male institution. There are also several small jails."

"How many women political prisoners are there?"

"There are no women sentenced to serve time for a crime committed for political reasons at this time."

"What happens to a woman who is sentenced while she is pregnant?"

"If it happens that a woman commits, for example, murder, then it is impossible to conditionally suspend or postpone carrying out the punishment. If a woman is pregnant, she is placed in the gynecological-obstetric section of the penal institution in Grudziadz. There the child is born and she stays with it until it is 12 months old. If someone from the family, for example the husband, wants to care for the child, it can be given to him. If no one wishes to do so, the mother is transferred with the child to Krzywaniac where they stay until the child is 3 years old. Later, if the woman has a long sentence and the family does not want to take the child, it is given over to a children's home or a foster family is searched for."

"This is a very complicated matter. For example, in West Germany the child stays with its mother until it reaches school age. Psychologists state that the most important period for the child is the first 3 years and during that time it ought to be under the mother's care."

From the answers to other questions one could learn that the average earnings of the inmates amount to around 5,000 zlotys, wake-up call is at 6 am, and on Sunday and holidays an hour later. Quiet hours begin at 9 pm and at that

time lights are turned off. Christmas trees are allowed in the cells, and for Christmas Eve dinner the kitchen prepares the traditional dishes.

At dusk we leave for Katowice. In the hotel room, the first thing to catch my eye is a window without bars.

#### Strzelce Opolskie

As in the previous day, we begin the visit to the prison in Strzelce Opolskie in the reading room. A slight agitation is caused by the black robes of a priest among the uniforms. After the presentation of coworkers and the chaplain of the prison, the director, Major Wladyslaw Bebala, informs us that this penal institution is meant for nonhabitual criminals. On the average there are 621 people within the prison. Over 40 percent of the prisoners are serving sentences for crimes involving property, almost 15 percent for robbery, and around 14 percent for murder. The prison was built before the war and was modernized during the 1970's; the building was equipped with a sewage system and central heating. The earnings of the prisoners amount to from 5,200 to 6,300 zlotys.

Bars and enclosures of wire netting are no longer a novelty for us. However, the internal structure is different. There are three buildings of moderate size for the inmates. Each building has three stories. The characteristic bars in the windows are filmed with enthusiasm by the television crew. The insides of the buildings are very similarly equipped to those in Lubliniec; one can say classically equipped.

Before the entrance to the second building several people sniff the air and say, "fish." It is a fact.

We read through the menu. Breakfast: coffee, margarine, bread, an egg, cheese. Dinner: rice soup, fried fish, salad, potatoes. Supper: coffee, milk soup with macaroni, bread. At the sight of the cameras, the prisoners employed in the kitchen turn away, hiding their faces.

In the next building we look over the outpatient department and sickrooms. A trade school, a printing school, a primary school and one high school class operate in the prison. Classes take place three times a week after work.

On the next floor up is the reading room. There is a billiard table, a ping-pong table, magazines, and a film screen. I copy the monthly repertoire: "Mrs Latter's Pension," "Road of Skeletons," "Upside Down," and "Palace Hotel." The upper part of one of the walls of the reading room is covered with a copy of "Batory Before Pskov" painted by one of the prisoners.

As one might expect, many questions were addressed to the priest.

"Does the prison chaplain meet with many complaints from the prisoners on the way they are treated?"



"Normally the prisoners do not come to me with these matters because I am a priest and such is my function. I can say that the prisoners trust me and if they had any problems, they would turn to me."

"What percent of the prisoners take part in the practice of religion?"

"To tell the truth, I have never asked how many inmates there are. But the group you are asking about is numerous, especially during Christmas and Easter. On Sunday, I often conduct two masses. Around 100 people come to each one."

"Are there followers of other religions?"

"There are a few people of other denominations, for example, Jehovah's Witnesses."

"Can a murderer receive absolution?"

"God's commandment says, 'Thou shalt not kill.' If he asks for forgiveness and repents, he can receive it. Of course, penance is assigned. East prison chaplain has special authorization in these matters."

There was also no lack of questions directed to the CZZK representatives and the institution administration.

"Do the economic difficulties of the country have an effect on the lives of the prisoners?"

"Of course they do, but to a small extent."

"Are there problems with discipline?"

"Small transgressions of a rule-breaking nature occur."

"Often one speaks of the so-called health paths. Under what conditions might the prisoners be beaten?"

"They cannot be beaten. In certain situations, physical force may be used. Appropriate rules regulate this. In practice force is used when an inmate is aggressive in relation to other prisoners or towards an intervening functionary. The use of force is limited to indispensable needs."

"Is there anyone here sentenced to death?"

"No. Several inmates have sentences of 25 years."

"How is the death sentence carried out?"

"By hanging, and with regard to a soldier, by firing squad."

"In which institutions are there political prisoners?"

"Those sentenced for crimes committed for political reasons are kept in three institutions. As of today there are 55 of them. From the beginning of using the punishment of imprisonment against these individuals, they have been serving time in separate institutions without contact with the rest of the prisoners. They are not required to work. They have possibilities for self-education, keeping books and newspapers."

Bedzin

Soon after entering the gate in Bedzin, one can see clearly that this is a lighter prison. Actually the whole area is surrounded by a normal wall, and the many-storied barracks are not separated from each other by a chainlink fence. At the end of the compound, one can see a soccer field.

Major Ryszard Kurnik has this to say?

"This institution," he says, "is meant for juveniles, that is, men of less than 21 years of age together with those who have committed unintentional crimes. On the average there are around 700 people here. This institution is characterized by being half free and by having relatively wide contact with the outside world. Almost two-thirds of the juveniles committed crimes involving private property, around 17 percent public property. Concerning the 'unintentionals,' 99.5 percent are serving time for crimes concerning traffic violations. The inmates work primarily on the outside at construction sites, in mines and steel mills."

On the grounds of the institution one finds a trade school. One individual is continuing his studies at a polytechnical university, and one is learning at an automobile engineering high school. In relation to both groups, juveniles and "unintentionals," many amenities apply: unlimited correspondence, more frequent and longer visits, free movement around the grounds. Quite often one is allowed to leave the penal institution, without the supervision of a guard, for several hours. "A very important stimulus for working on oneself," emphasized the director, "is a program of conditional early release. This year around 700 people used this program."

We begin the visit in the section designated for juveniles. In the first, one story barracks, just near the entrance, is a clubroom that is also a projection hall. On the stage stand drums, guitars, and amplifiers. Farther on, one finds rooms. The term "cell" in this instance perhaps does not fit. In truth both on the windows and on the entrance doors to the barracks there are bars, and the layers of beds are also neatly made, but the doors to the corridor are normal, just like in an apartment. Also there is no toilet and sink in each room. They are off the corridor.

The next barracks is a school. On the wall of the corridor there are several large bulletin boards with pictures of graduates and teachers. We go by the basketball and soccer field to get to the barracks in which there is a reading room. Behind a partition one finds a music studio with several tape recorders,

amplifiers and a radio. The inside of the studio is plastered with color photos and posters of rock stars.

The part for juveniles and for "unintentionals" is divided by a normal wall. Beyond it, in quite a large area, two two story pavilions stand. The windows are without bars and instead there are curtains. The impression of offices or a workers hotel is spoiled only by a surrounding wall and the bars on the entrance doors. The one and only set of bars.

The rooms hold four or five people. Above the beds are pictures of children, wives, girls. There hang pictures of Mother Mary, crucifixes, pictures of the pope, tapestry, and guitars.

In one room we come upon the inhabitants. I talk with a man who is around 50 years old.

"All five of us are drivers," he says. "All from 145, only different paragraphs. I still have 2 and 1/2 years to go, and to conditional release, 83 days. Yes, the chances for getting it are rather good. Last Sunday I was at home; I got a 10-hour leave. Each Sunday, 60 or 70 individuals get one. Maybe for the holidays I will get a 5-day pass. Last year one was given to something like 120 or 130 people. They were divided into two groups. Those with families get passes for the holidays and bachelors for New Year's Eve."

On the way to the reading room, we pass near the cafeteria. In all three of the prisons visited earlier, the meals were eaten in the cells. The last series of questions and answers follows.

"Was prison life not presented to us in a rather rosy perspective? Is there not in them a so-called second life?"

"We do not want you to understand that we want to present penal institutions as an ideal. Because of the meeting of different personalities, there must exist what is called a second life. The prison succumbs to different fluctuations and styles. For example, in the 1960's in institutions for juveniles, tatoos were in style. The more one had of them, the higher was his place in the hierarchy. Cuts were also a fashion, the so-called styles. We used to meet and still meet the phenomenon of the division into 'humans' and 'non-humans.' These divisions undergo changes, during different periods different names are obligatory. We also observed that forms of behavior in criminal environments at large were transmitted to the penal institutions and vice versa.

"It seems that the prison subculture is based on certain aggressive tendencies and domination over others. At the same time it is characterized by ritualization of conduct, so that in the case of a transgression of rules obligatory in a given environment, pressure can be applied. Among others, there is a prohibition against using certain generally used words, for example 'love.' If someone uses this word, this automatically exposes one

to aggression from others. Research shows that only about 5 percent of the acts of aggression have emotional undercurrents. The rest are purposeful, instrumental behavior. The purpose is, for example, to find oneself in a different institution, in a different cell, in the hospital. These actions also aim at gaining certain prestige. The subculture in women's prisons is not based on aggression to the same degree as among the men. It is based mainly on emotional and sexual needs."

"In 1981, there were cases of protests by prisoners. What changes came about after them? What was done to prevent more of them?"

"Changes in the regulations for serving sentences were introduced in May of 1981, that is, before the protests. Reasons for the protests should be sought in the sociopolitical situation which existed then."

"Do the prisons make a profit?"

"From the work of the inmates, we contribute 1.2 million zlotys to the national treasury along with part of the profits of the enterprises. Half of the money designated for prison management is refunded through inmate work and profits from enterprises."

In closing, the assistant director of the CZZK, Colonel Stanislaw Wrona, says:

"We have shown you typical penal institutions. We hid nothing. I think that now you know the penitentiary system in Poland better than that of your own countries."

12432

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DAILY REPORTS ON PRISON CONDITIONS

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 293, 10-11 Dec 83 p 6

[Article by Cezary Rudzinski: "From the Other Side...A TRYBUNA LUDU Reporter's Story"]

[Text] Penal institutions from up close.

For some time, Western information sources have been showing an increased interest in the state of prison management in Poland; they complain about the fate of individuals who have lost their freedom and conditions of their stay in penitentiaries. Publications that appear on this topic are based on facts and observations selected at random or interpreted at will.

Because of this interest, to which, among other things, questions posed at conferences of the government's press representative attest, the press agency INTERPRESS, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice and the state press spokesman's office, organized a study tour to penal institutions for them. A group of Polish journalists took part in it as well, among them the TRYBUNA LUDU reporter.

A Few Basic Facts

We begin the 2-day encounter with problems uncommon to the majority of us by becoming acquainted with the principles of the prison system in Poland, and with data and facts contained both in a vast amount of written references as well as in the statements of Col Stanislaw Wrona, first assistant director of the Central Office for Penal Institutions, and other officials of this institution.

A total of 148,000 individuals were legally sentenced in Poland in 1982. Of these, 26.2 percent were sentenced to unconditional loss of freedom, 11.4 percent received sentences curtailing their freedom, 15.8 percent had fines levied, 0.2 percent received an additional independent penalty, and 46.4 percent received suspended prison sentences. Three individuals were sentenced to death while 51 individuals received prison sentences of 25 years.

During the first 3 quarters of 1983, an average of 58,235 individuals were detained in penal institutions or under investigative detention. There were more than 44,000 fewer of them than the overall number of inmates of these institutions before the amnesty in 1974. In spite of martial law, the number sentenced has decreased by more than 26,000 individuals from 1980 to date.

In all, 56,470 men were sentenced, i.e., 97 percent; 1,765 women, i.e., 3 percent; and 5,351 young people--under 21 years of age--i.e., 9.2 percent. About 42 percent of the population of individuals serving prison sentences are habitual criminals.

"The purpose for serving a prison sentence," we read in our reference, "is to shape a socially desired attitude in convicts, especially to train them for socially useful work and the observance of law and order, thereby resisting a return to crime."

#### The System's Procedures

There is an attempt to achieve the objective by subjecting convicts to discipline and order in an appropriate institution, as well as exerting an influence on them through work, which is the basic influence for social rehabilitation, and also through learning and educational-training activities. The prison system in Poland has at its disposal six kinds of penal institutions: ordinary ones, those for young people, habitual criminals, convicts requiring the application of special correction-training measures, work centers and for those serving military sentences.

Prison sentences are served under three conditions: basic, moderate and more severe. At the same time, it is obligatory that all those sentenced for willful crimes begin serving their sentences under basic conditions. After completing designated requirements, demonstrating a proper attitude, among other things, they can be deserving of moderate conditions. On the other hand, the more severe system is taken as a form of degradation.

Social rehabilitation through work is customary. More than 99 percent of the convicts able to work, i.e., around 47,000 individuals at present, work in establishments attached to prisons and on auxiliary farms, and also outside the premises of the penal institutions. For their work, they receive wages in keeping with the type of work performed and results obtained--according to rules that are binding for that branch of production in which they are employed. Depending on the conditions in which the sentence is being served, and also on support responsibilities and the material situation of their families, convicts receive 20 to 75 percent of the amount earned. The remainder is turned over to the state treasury.

Payment for work, the amount of which takes into account the sum of the convict's share as well as that turned over to his family or to individuals authorized to receive support, comes to an average of 6,800 zl this year. Of this, about 1,700 zl are put into the account (there is no payment in

cash in penal institutions) of the convict, e.g., one serving under basic conditions. He has the right to spend them for the purchase of necessary items, also designated food products, or to save. Convicts turn over an average of up to about 2,500 z1 monthly to their families. Annually, this amounts to about 300,000,000 z1 from all prisoners.

Another important means for social rehabilitation is learning and gaining a vocation. Convicts under the age of 50 who have no qualifications or who desire to enhance them are eligible. During the 1982-1983 school year, the prison system jointly had at its disposal 58 elementary schools, 39 vocational and secondary schools, 258 vocational courses in 16 specialties such as locksmith, welder, lathe operator, mason, steel reinforcer-concrete worker, carpenter, shoemaker, dressmaker, and the like. A total of 9,525 prisoners took advantage of all these forms of study.

Cultural-enlightenment activities are organized in penal institutions during free time from work and learning. Institutions are provided with radio equipment, club rooms are equipped with televisions and games, prison libraries have at their disposal a total of nearly 1,500,000 volumes, primarily fiction titles.

The Lowicz Penal Institution, from which we begin our tour of prison establishments, is intended for habitual criminals capable of hard physical labor with 5 years remaining on their sentence. Among more than 600 prisoners currently staying there, those sentenced for crimes against private and public property predominate.

Severe conditions are in effect here, instilling habits of discipline in the convicts. The daily schedule is bound by a rigid framework; 5:00 am--reveille (on days free from work--7:00 am), next is wash and dress time, morning roll call and breakfast, 6:10 am--departure for work, which lasts 8 hours, 11:30 am-12:30 pm--lunch break. After work, just before dinner, there is time to rest, for personal affairs, and taking advantage of cultural activities and also, which seems obvious, for maintaining order and cleanliness in the cells and corridors, the results of which we will soon see at every turn. From 5:30 to 6:00 pm--dinner. At 7:00 pm--evening roll call; after that there is an opportunity to participate in cultural-training activities and to rest, or convicts may spend the time on their own affairs. Lights-out is in effect from 9:00 pm.

We visit the living quarters in the annexes--closed cells with peep-holes, anywhere from 10 to 20 bunk beds in each made as if for display, tables, a sanitary corner (behind a low partition: a toilet, wash basin and a cold water faucet, toilet articles, and electric water heater, and house slippers belonging to convicts at work at this time), a small cabinet for dishes and personal food products. There are corridors partitioned off by bars, bulletin boards and antialcohol posters on the walls. Near the wards there is a promenade area. There are simple club rooms with TV sets, newspapers and magazines. There is a noticeable cleanliness.

It will be the same as well in the institutions we will see next. In Strzelce Opolskie--for habitual criminals, men with sentences up to 25 years of incarceration. In Lubliniec--for women requiring the employment of specific remedial-training measures. In Bedzin--in the Work Center for Juveniles and also perpetrators of unpremeditated crimes. Everywhere there are shiny tile and parquet floors, house slippers, very clean tables and dishes, and a distinctive absence of any sort of smell.

We are interested in the diet and work of the prisoners both in the Lowicz ZK [Penal Institution] as well as in the remaining establishments. They receive three meals a day, and those working in the cold out in the open air receive an additional meal break provided by the establishment for whose benefit they are working--according to the same principles as regular workers. The penal institution guarantees those working 3,200 calories, and those who do not 2,800. A number of diets exist, depending on state of health and prison conditions.

#### There Are No Difficult Questions

There are psychologists, educators, instructors in occupational therapy and physicians with various specialties working in the penal institutions. In Strzelce Opolski, the prison chaplain participated in the meeting. He answered numerous questions concerned with the performance of religious services by him. Among other things, he says Mass in which the convicts take part, provided they want to, and he has opportunities for unhampered conversations with them, and the like.

Those convicted of unpremeditated crimes, above all traffic offenses, have the least painful--if this expression fits people sentenced to a loss of freedom--conditions during their stay in the penal institution. They are grouped together in Bedzin in a special section which is more reminiscent of a workers' hotel than a prison. Outside the center they work without supervision. In the center itself, they are given broad authority in maintaining self-discipline, in organizing living quarters, contacts with family and close friends, and the like.

Meetings with the administrations of particular penal institutions and with representatives of the CZZK [Central Office for Penal Institutions], especially the final ones in Bedzin, gave us a chance to ask questions; and the journalists, especially those from abroad, did not hold back. It turned out that there were no taboo questions. The one question which prison officials refrained from answering concerned the number of penal institutions in Poland.

In the institutions that were shown us, there is no one serving a sentence for a crime committed because of political motives. However, Col S. Wrona's information on this subject is worth quoting. He maintained that 55 convicts are serving sentences at present for this sort of crime. They are in three penal institutions, separated from contacts with other categories of convicts. They are not obliged to work; other than that, the general mandatory regulations are applied to them.



Depending on personal behavior, they can take advantage of some adjustments having to do with furnishing living quarters, articles for personal use, and the like. They have an opportunity for self-education, to receive newspapers, magazines and books from their families as well; separate cultural-educational activities are organized for them, religious services, and the like.

From what I saw and heard in the four institutions (typical of the Polish prison system) as well as from officials in prison service and civilian workers, among others, teachers, psychologists, physicians, the chaplain, the managers of work shops and work establishments attached to the prisons, as well as the convicts themselves, the sentence passed is carried out in a humanitarian manner. Does this mean that the penalty is light?

The fact of losing freedom alone and being severed from society and family becomes tremendously painful for the majority of the convicts. And, after all, to this should be added forcing them into routines of rigor and discipline, life in a small area within a group of people of various dispositions, character, and intellectual and cultural levels.

There is no doubt in my mind that this is a penalty that makes itself felt. After all, it is supposed to be that way, in keeping with its establishment.

12491

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## POLITICAL PLURALISM DISCUSSED IN CONTEXT OF EUROCOMMUNISM

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 10, Oct 83 pp 162-176

[Article by Tadeusz Lemanczyk: "Once Again on Political Pluralism"]

[Text] In reply to an invitation to discuss some problems outlined by J. Wawrzyniak in his article "Dialectics of the Leading Role of the Party and of Socialist Democracy" (NOWE DROGI 1982, No 9), an invitation tended by the editorial board of the theoretical and political organ of our party (NOWE DROGI 1982, No 12), I would like to present some results of my own research. It started in 1976-1980, when I was carrying out a research project within the framework of a joint project called "The Leading Role of the Marxist-Leninist Party and the Problem of So-Called Political Pluralism (An Essay in Generalization, Based on the Analysis of the New Theoretical Tendencies in Communist Doctrine and Propaganda in Western Europe Since 1969)."

In our country, since the Wawrzyniak article was published, a lot has been written about political pluralism, not in NOWE DROGI alone. The results of this discussion have, to a large extent, influenced the present selection of the above-mentioned research problems. One cannot ignore, in particular, an interview with Professor St. Ehrlich by Z. Rykowski and W. Wladyka, published in TU I TERAZ (1983, No 42), and significantly entitled "They Marched, Shouting 'Pluralism, pluralism...'" I fully agree with Prof St. Ehrlich that the answer to the question: one pluralism or many? is a most essential one. I think, however, that a multiplicity of pluralisms will appear here mainly in the conceptual domain, determined by differentiated interests, or even by individual ability soundly to evaluate the surrounding political reality. Had we, however, kowtowed to the rationality principle advocated by St. Ehrlich, we would have to conclude that there is only one pluralism, conditioned by history alone. In such a case, before institutionalized parties had emerged, it would have been difficult indeed to reduce rational political pluralism to a multiplicity of political parties. However, in times when political parties best play their role of articulating differentiated political interests, it would have been difficult in turn to associate the existence of rational political pluralism with the existence of a one-party system (while admitting that a one-party system, and a system of a dominant party, are two quite different things, and acknowledging its relative character, articulated here in the phrase "the most pluralistic among the non-pluralistic ones").

Similarly, when history diminishes the impact of political parties, one would have to reduce rational political pluralism to something different from a multiplicity of political parties.

Communist parties have provided many meaningful answers to the questions raised here, but St. Ehrlich devoted relatively little space to them in his work "The Faces of Pluralism" (this concerns his chapter, "Pluralism as Represented by Communist Parties of Latin Europe"). By now, those parties are fairly generally known as eurocommunist. One has, however, to stress most emphatically the large measure of relative stipulation involved in the term "eurocommunist parties." It refers to those parties within which a set of conceptions--at present fairly coherent ones--which constitute the essence of eurocommunism has been regularly reflected in their official party policies, including congress resolutions, and without a shadow of a doubt presents a leading and--to a large extent--permanent line of action. This does not mean, however, that such a line--and in particular all of its components--actually enjoys the support of all members of the eurocommunist parties, without exception. On the contrary, in all the eurocommunist parties this line has been questioned, to a larger or smaller degree, by considerable parts of their rank and file, and in some eurocommunist parties this has even triggered an organizational split. This group includes, certainly, the parties of Italian, Spanish, French, British, and Swedish communists.

In our country the very term "eurocommunism" is perceived in a different way. People most often write about the so-called eurocommunism, or at least put the term in quotation marks. Such a procedure obviously reveals more or less clear-cut ideopolitical options. That is why one should welcome, in this context, the convention used by M. Orzechowski at the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee: speaking about the arguments put forward [to demonstrate] our country's immaturity in undertaking the task of the construction of socialism, he said, inter alia: "[Such arguments] are also used by revisionists and by native eurocommunists [emphasis added--T.L.], who somewhat ironically prop themselves up with quotations from Marx" ("Ideopolitical Premises for the Celebrations of the 40th Anniversary of People's Poland," TRYBUNA LUDU, 1983, No 245). It does not follow that our native eurocommunists are a much more coherent and lasting phenomenon than the Western European eurocommunists, or that the latter in particular should be treated as "so-called," or even mentioned in quotation marks.

In the present article I will try to avoid evaluating views represented by those parties. Their views are rooted in theoretical reflection. Such reflection breeds many interesting and valuable issues. Not all of them are well balanced and precisely formulated. They deal with a socioeconomic reality which differs from the real existing socialism. While avoiding all attempts to judge the correctness of their opinions concerning their own countries, as formulated in some parties of Western Europe, I would also ignore all the judgments pronounced by those parties concerning the issue of the real existing socialism, including socialism in Poland. Often they are false, tendentious, and unjust. They behoove us to engage in polemics, and to express our opposition. Because of the subject matter of this article, I would not do it here. I would rather confine myself to a relatively objective

presentation of opinions concerning the problem of political pluralism in the above-mentioned West European parties.

We treat with respect all creative quests within the framework of Marxism-Leninism which reflect the spirit of the contemporary class struggle, but at the same time one should skeptically approach all attempts to absolutize controversial theoretical problems as the universal truth.

In accordance with the nature of communist tolerance, no one should ever impose on anybody else one's own experience and one's own generalization, allegedly derived from some exclusively correct hypothetical or theoretical opinions. It is the patriotic and internationalist duty of each party--and at the same time its sovereign right--to choose a programmatic line which follows the universal rules and the specific circumstances of each country. Without denying any communist party its right to criticize such a choice, one has to say, nonetheless, that public, and sometimes even aggressive, judgments, and especially inspired and orchestrated propaganda campaigns directed against a certain party--like the ones the PZPR has recently had to cope with in a most painful manner--constitute a form of public and inadmissible interference with the internal affairs [of such a party]. They run against the grain of Marxist rules of discussion, and of internationalist solidarity.

Nothing can be properly understood concerning the eurocommunist conception on how a Marxist-Leninist party operates in the political system of socialism, without paying heed to the place political pluralism takes within such a set of concepts. Political pluralism appears here as a real social background for legally articulated systemic solutions concerning the way a Marxist-Leninist party operates. The leading eurocommunist parties in particular boast of safeguarding full correlation between the different elements of the basis, and this part of the superstructure which represents the political system of a society wherever such a system is not artificially isolated from the social conditions that imply it, but appears as if it were their natural product.

The eurocommunists are fully aware of the conviction--fairly generally shared in their countries--that the very idea of "pluralism" is alien to the communist ideology. Hence, above all, they try at first to justify the prominence political pluralism is accorded in their conceptions. Only later do they point out the roots of political pluralism, such as critique of the idea of "active minority," as well as their rejection of all civil wars, replaced by parliamentary forms of action. The prime place they accord, however, to social pluralism and to ideological pluralism, the main props of party pluralism. It is the multiplicity of social classes and strata prior to the construction of a classless society, as well as the multiplicity of ideological mainstreams which continue to function even in a non-antagonistic, socialist class society, which are supposed to become institutionalized, naturally and automatically, in the form of respective political parties; barring those natural trends would allegedly trigger dangers which--according to the eurocommunists--are always implied in the imposition of any artificial or abnormal solutions.

Only if one takes into account the thus-conceived place of political pluralism in the eurocommunist conception can one correctly assess the degree of

practicability involved in several problematic components of the eurocommunist theoretical prescription for the running of a Marxist-Leninist party.

The place held by political pluralism within the theoretical conception of eurocommunism spurs us to pose the following question: How do the euro-communists regard bourgeois pluralism, and how do they perceive the connection between it and the solution they advocate? All the Marxist-Leninist parties of Western Europe, without exception, are unanimous in severely criticizing the divergences between the principles of pluralism as advocated by bourgeois ideologists and the political reality of the contemporary capitalist states of Western Europe. The rules of pluralism operate in a natural way solely within the framework of a bourgeois social orientation, while the proletarian orientation is discriminated against. As a matter of fact, it is discriminated against, above all, through the economic conditioning of capitalist society. In a country like Turkey, and to a certain extent in the Federal Republic of Germany as well, it is also discriminated against through certain legally sanctioned solutions, namely the outlawing of communist parties or banning communists from professional activity in public service. The Western European communists perceive all the attempts to achieve full equality of chances with the bourgeoisie not in some explicit premises of a bourgeois political system, but rather in the long-term successful struggle of the working people against the world of capital. At this point the path taken by the eurocommunist parties starts to diverge from that of the remaining Marxist-Leninist parties of Western Europe.

The eurocommunist parties believe that even those components of pluralism which can be found within the capitalist state constitute an accomplishment of the working people. The positive assessment of such accomplishments, and the attachment of the eurocommunists, are so strong that they do not intend to give them up after the transition from a capitalist formation to a communist one. They all agree that socialism should safeguard and enhance all the democratic accomplishments which have existed in their countries, and which have been achieved thanks to actions fought by many generations, including the once progressive bourgeoisie as well. Among the democratic accomplishments to be transferred from capitalism to socialism, they stress in particular the so-called democratic procedures which, while originating in bourgeois society, would not, in their opinion, lose their validity in a socialist society. They stress the need--consistently rooted in the very history of the development of Western European countries--to carry over the concept of political pluralism, including, especially, the party system shaped by the history of bourgeois democracy.

But the takeover of the entire democratic heritage must raise the question of at whom the pluralistic privileges of the working people under socialism should be pointed? After all, those accomplishments were supposed to improve the situation of the working people in their relationship with the capitalist class. The eurocommunist answer, based on their analysis of the experience of the European socialist countries, is simple. In their opinion, the "conventional place" of capitalists is taken by people to whom the management of production, or, to put it in more general terms, the affairs of the society as a whole, had been entrusted. Unlike the capitalists used to, they have no

need to appropriate the surplus value produced by the society. However, the position within the society entrusted to them by the proletariat, as well as their often unique professional qualifications, provide them with manifold opportunities to appropriate unearned values, arbitrarily to steer the process of production and distribution of goods within the society, according to their wish, which does not necessarily coincide with the ideals of socialism, etc. The social development of socialism enforces automatically, as it were, an improved form of social control. Political pluralism is supposed to promote more perfect moral values of the ruling representatives of the working people. To achieve such a state of affairs, it is therefore necessary for the system of real authority not to replace, but rather to enlarge, the system of formal authority; nor should the institution of direct participation replace representative institutions. In the eurocommunist conception we are confronted, therefore, with the problem of continuity of democratic accomplishments under modified circumstances: instead of a system of capitalists versus working people, a system of rulers versus the ruled ones.

The eurocommunists also add that, in their opinion, a socialist society contains contradictions which have not resulted from class-enemy activity, but have been produced by the foundations of socialism itself. Hence, different points of view are bred within socialism. The political system of socialism should provide instruments for solving such contradictions without recourse to violence, abiding by the principle of creative emulation, which makes the idea of political pluralism exceptionally fruitful.

Finally, the eurocommunists also argue that it would have been rather odd to fight for the right to form independent political parties and for the right of free expression of opinion under capitalism, but to deny the validity of similar rights under socialism. In their view, the vanguard of the oppressed masses should never consider the possibility of oppressing anybody; by socialism they mean the end to all oppression, total freedom for everybody. It is under such circumstances that the eurocommunist parties consider themselves the most consistent advocates of political pluralism, the sole ones capable of fully implementing it in practice under socialism.

The eurocommunist parties claim that all the earlier revolutions were made by "active minorities" fighting against another "active minority," while the "silent majority" remained passive; in a short period of time they achieved such ambitious and complex goals that--obviously--they could not rely on very great support by the unenlightened masses. In the case of socialist revolutions in particular, this would hold true not only during the actual takeover of political power, but would continue throughout the entire process of communist construction. As a rule, the actual takeover of political power from the old ruling class enjoyed relatively massive support, thanks to the exploitation of the destructive sentiments the society bestowed upon their authority. In such moments a major role was also played by catchy slogans, ever so often bordering on social demagoguery.

That is why the whole problem concerns primarily the period of time when it becomes necessary to start acting in a constructive way, to implement the ideological program of the new ruling class, by rallying--if possible--the

entire society. In case of antagonistic societal formations, no such implementation, which takes fully into account the essentials of the program, has ever been, or is--by its very nature--possible. But even in case of the communist formation, the socially privileged position of the intelligentsia, of the peasantry, and of representatives of the urban small-producer segment, gives those classes and strata no incentive to proceed quickly toward a classless society, that is to say, toward the target consistently strived at by the working class. No wonder, therefore, that a situation imposes upon the "active minorities" the need to have recourse to more or less coercive methods, through the most diverse means of administrative pressure, civil war included. Revolutionary changes used to be accomplished by means of armed struggle.

According to the eurocommunist parties, the present world situation, in particular in the highly developed capitalist countries of Western Europe, makes possible, and simultaneously rejects, not only the minority solutions, but even those that involve a too narrow majority. In their opinion, the population is so well informed, and its political activity is so intense, that the overwhelming majority of the society should be won over for the consecutive measures on the road to socialist construction by means of ideological influence; that should be reflected in parliamentary activity implemented--in extremis--exclusively through general elections. More realistically minded people would add here the pressure imposed by the working people by means of extraparlimentary mass actions, e.g., by strikes. It is just at this moment that the differences between the positions taken by the Western European parties in regard to revolutionary changes by peaceful means become blurred, since there is at present no communist party in Western Europe which would advocate armed struggle. However, even if the divergences concerning the expected extent of coercion used during the proclaimed peaceful transformation are not very clear, the actual inclination of the eurocommunist parties to treat peaceful transformation as an absolute clearly separates those parties from the anti-eurocommunist ones which--while at present advocating the peaceful path--do not take for granted the internal and external circumstances under which they will have, in the last resort, to implement revolutionary changes in their countries; they, therefore, prepare their rank and file seriously to consider both contingencies.

It is not, therefore, fully the case that the eurocommunist parties are totally committed to idealism, nor do they assume that in their countries the communist construction would be carried out by omitting all that is conventionally associated with the notion of the use of coercion; however, they go so far in the repudiation of the use of coercion against "those who are not with us" that conditions became ripe for giving up the notion of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," not only in the most literal meaning of the word, i.e., as pure revolutionary coercion, unarticulated by any legal standards, but also in its broader meaning, i.e., of coercion imposed by the state but abiding by legal standards, in order to defend socialist values.

According to the eurocommunist parties, the majority which nowadays gets consciously involved in the communist construction is greatly differentiated, both socially and ideologically. They call it social pluralism and

ideological pluralism. From the social point of view, such a majority would include virtually all the classes and strata of the contemporary capitalist society, excluding the monopolistic bourgeoisie but embracing the petty and the middle bourgeoisie as well. In this connection it seems most significant that the eurocommunist parties do not confine this conception to the stage concerned with the antimonopolistic revolution, but proclaim its full validity in the socialist stage as well. According to their rationale, in order to gain the support of the petty and middle bourgeoisie in the antimonopolistic revolution advocated by the communists, the inviolability of property owned by the petty and middle bourgeoisie must be safeguarded. Taking, however, into account how well capitalist societies are informed, and how much they know about the experience of some socialist states and about the eurocommunists' reluctance to resort to coercive measures, [the eurocommunists] claim that the decision to safeguard the bourgeois property could not be withdrawn for a very long time. Hence, their conception of socialism provides for the survival not only of small-producer property, but of petty and middle bourgeois property as well, and consequently for the survival of the petty and middle bourgeoisie in a socialist society.

This majority, which along with workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia includes precisely the petty and middle bourgeoisie, is supposed to operate as a broad societal front, given various names by various parties: The Union of the French People (PCF), Alliance of Forces of Labor and Culture (PCE), the Historical Bloc (PCI), etc. In various eurocommunist parties attitudes differ, but the lively discussion held among representatives of social forces expected to join such fronts, and the inclination to treat them as having fully equal rights in their aspiration to achieve the targets they had set up for themselves, become more and more conspicuous. Consequently, this leads to the petty and middle bourgeoisie being considered a driving force of socialist revolutionary changes, similar to the nationalist bourgeoisie in movements of national liberation.

The situation looks similar with regard to the ideological pluralism of such a majority: only extremist rightwing doctrines, and fascism in particular, are left beyond the pale. The eurocommunists find some elements useful to the development of socialism in every doctrine and in every ideological mainstream within such a majority. They perceive particularly many such elements in contemporary Catholicism.

The original character of the idea of a pluralistic--social and ideological--makeup of the majority supposed to construct socialism surfaces not only in the statement that the petty or middle bourgeois, who determines his behavior according to some moderate bourgeois doctrine, might join the construction, but also in the sui generis understanding of the dialectics of "militant unity" of social ideas and forces. The eurocommunist parties believe that, once the monopolistic capital is overwhelmed thanks to measures of coercion used only sporadically against extreme rightwing doctrines, the future progress of communist construction could well be left to the rules of free confrontation, based solely on measures of ideological influence. The eurocommunists, it should be added, pay major attention to the possibility of bringing even the petty and middle bourgeoisie around to the communist ideals. Thus, communist



ideology, even without any additional measures such as, for instance, political censorship or prevention of extensive activity by political forces remote from the communists, should be capable--in a certain period of time--of prevailing over the entire society, and of bringing about--by means of fully accepted actions--its class homogeneity, that is to say, a classless society.

Besides, the eurocommunists do not believe that any different way of dealing with the problem is possible at present. Given the present internal and external circumstances, [a different approach] would paralyze all the social and ideological forces denied--be it to the slightest degree--their full equality of rights with the working class and with the communists; in some more drastic cases it might even provoke their hostility, push them underground, make them resort to terrorist methods at a time when the eurocommunists are in this respect fully preoccupied with their struggle against the neofascists.

Social pluralism and ideological pluralism, thus conceived, provide the groundwork for party pluralism. Its fairly natural result would be [the premise] that various political parties represent different social classes or their segments, additionally split (or merged, as the case may be) by various ideological mainstreams; in future they should go on reflecting the entire socioideological spectrum. The task of the eurocommunists consists of preventing the emergence of such pluralistic institutionalization of political divergences within the political system of socialism, as projected by them. Besides, since the situation forces the communists to reach various social groups and various ideological mainstreams, it would be worthwhile to seek support for such activities among other parties in order to save the communist party from the dangers of eclecticism, inherent in such an approach. Obviously, the principal problem involves the question of whether such other parties would be strongly enough interested in supporting the communists. In this matter, too, the eurocommunists express their profound belief that this is what is going to happen.

Unlike the theories which deal with the functioning of a political system in the already existing socialist states, the eurocommunist theory pays much attention to the functioning of the kind of political system under which oppositional parties continue to operate. In a similar way, the acceptance of the idea of general elections, different from the one which has functioned in the existing socialist states, enriches the eurocommunist conception of the functioning of political systems, and supplements it by considering a possible alternative to the political authority in which a Marxist-Leninist party participates.

Within the debate dealing with that part of the eurocommunist multiparty system--the part which in the existing socialist states, as well as in the political doctrine of the antieurocommunist parties, exhausts the sum total of the party system--the functioning of a coalition of parties which collaborate with a Marxist-Leninist party is also argued about. But as far as the principle of running such a coalition is concerned, there are significant divergences between various eurocommunist parties.

Similar divergences also surface in connection with the rules of intraparty life within the Marxist-Leninist party.

To sum up, the entire eurocommunist conception on the functioning of Marxist-Leninist parties under the earlier discussed circumstances of pluralism introduces certain modifications to the idea of how the leading role of a Marxist-Leninist party should operate, both with regard to the accepted solutions in the relationship between the party and the socialist state, and between the party and the society.

In the eurocommunist conception, the rules on how the entire party system operates are based on the functioning of general elections, expected to produce a majority. Generally speaking, all the communist parties in Western Europe advocate the idea of proportional elections. They reject the majority concept mainly because its machinery would eliminate any parliamentary activities by minor parties, since their constituency, including their supporters, would not wish either to lose their vote or to pave the way for an electoral victory of a major--but in their opinion less desirable--party; consequently, they would rather vote for another major party, thus opting for a lesser evil. Such considerations have already had a negative impact on the development of several Western European communist parties. The most significant, however, is the fact that the majority system precludes all the broad activity around which great masses of the electorate might be rallied: the subsequent formation of a coalition of many different parties, preceded by elaboration of some compromise programs for future development, would--according to the eurocommunists--have much better chances of being accepted by the broadest societal segments. The majority system automatically, through its electoral machinery itself, favors major parties, which can hardly be compelled to step beyond their narrow programmatic premises which are fully accepted by some parts of the population only, i.e., by the rank and file and by the followers [of such a party]. According to the eurocommunist parties, only the proportional system of general elections is geared each time to reflect in full the current social moods, and to assure even the minor political orientations that their voice would be heard, and that they would obtain parliamentary representation genuinely commensurate with their influence in the electorate.

The eurocommunist parties need precisely such a system of general elections, and their political doctrine treats it as the most important mechanism and the main touchstone of the policies carried out by communist parties. Ignoring the fact that in properly conducted general elections the respective representation of all social classes and strata tend to counterbalance each other, regardless of the role played by them in the society or of the interest aroused by the construction of different political systems, the eurocommunist parties are convinced that every step taken by them eventually towards the construction of the communist formation would have to be sanctioned by the previous support and goodwill of the electorate. They are, therefore, resolutely opposed to even the slightest electoral "tricks," liable to modify the will of the electorate.

The contingency of granting rights to an oppositional minority raises a most controversial issue. In principle, the eurocommunist parties do not rule out the possibility of free functioning of any political force whatsoever, of their unrestricted activity among the population, of their right to form

political parties of their own, including even an attempt--undertaken by means of general elections--to overcome their status of a party in opposition. The sole precondition, binding on all the parties, behooves them to stay within the legal system, and to renounce all means not provided for by the law.

As a rule, in order to avoid useless discussion of the notion of legalism, [the eurocommunists] propose to retain in this area all the progressive legal solutions elaborated within the framework of a bourgeois system. This would primarily amount to the refutation of all suspicions that the communists, after their seizure of power, might actually prevent at least some political forces from freely pursuing their oppositional activities, by enacting certain standards of socialist law and by their interpretation. Similarly, the eurocommunists would thus like to disarm suspicion that they might ever attempt, by measures similar to the West German Berufsverbot, to discriminate in any way against members of an opposition party, and thus--in a coercive, instead of an ideological way--would restrain the freedom of development of some oppositional forces. This problem would also call for closer identification of certain concepts and of certain terms. Enacting a legal standard which would impose a ban on certain counterrevolutionary groups, for instance, would have to imply that only such groups which intend to overthrow the existing order by use of armed force have been envisaged. On the other hand, the eurocommunists can assume the survival within the future socialist system of groups opposed to such a system. They do not object to the survival of any political forces opposed to them, which would--using more or less ambiguous slogans, or even quite openly--call upon the population to return to capitalism; they would even be allowed to take part in the general elections under such slogans.

Even more controversy is involved in the issue of alternatives to the political power exercised with the participation of a Marxist-Leninist party. As a rule no consideration is given to the associated but not identical alternative of class rule. Up till now, the participation of communist parties in several Western European countries in the exercise of power has never substantially undermined the class rule of the bourgeoisie, or favored a proletarian class rule. Fairly exceptional in this regard was only the participation of the Portuguese communists in the government, during the revolutionary turmoil in Portugal in 1974-76.

Reflection on this issue as a whole could, however, create an impression that the eurocommunist parties do not even consider any possibility of return to the bourgeois alternative as far as class rule is concerned, while the contingency of a Marxist-Leninist party being excluded from a ruling coalition would involve no breakdown of the rule of the proletariat (read: the working people), but would only slow down the rate of progress in the construction of communism, and--from the point of view of a Marxist-Leninist party--would only amount to some irregularities in this construction. Since all that, however, is supposed to happen in a parliamentary manner, through properly conducted general elections, the eurocommunist parties are fully prepared to accept such a contingency, because, in their opinion, nothing can be done when the will of the masses is ignored, and even less when acting against their will.

It should also be added that even when the eurocommunist parties do envisage a possible return to the bourgeois alternative in terms of class rule, they foresee it only as achieved by force of arms. But they expect no such difficulties during the communist construction, nor such a breakdown in the consciousness of the electorate which might allow the bourgeoisie to restore the old order in compliance with the legal standards.

The rules which determine how a coalition of parties which collaborate with a Marxist-Leninist party might operate are by now subject to far-reaching modifications within the Western European communist movement. Its starting point used to be a coalition of broadly conceived social left wing. That has remained unchanged. The social democratic parties in particular are still regarded as the principal ally of the communist parties. However, since the working class provides the mass basis for other political parties as well, including those of a different ideological orientation, the eurocommunist parties in particular demonstrate at present their growing interest in concluding an alliance with such parties also. For similar reasons, one can see at present their growing interest in concluding an alliance with such parties also. For similar reasons, one can see at present no Western European Marxist-Leninist parties showing the slightest interest in collaboration with any extreme-left groups. This is due not only to the venomous anticommunist, and in particular anti-Soviet ideological program of such groups; it is rather their elitist, as opposed to mass-based, character which explains why the communists resolutely reject any offers of cooperation extended by such groups.

Even quite recently, the prospect of such a broadly conceived coalition of leftwing forces winning more than 50 percent electoral support and leaving the remaining parties in the opposition has been rather generally shared throughout Western Europe. The threat lately realized there concerned mainly the lack of stability of such a government (especially frequent might prove to be fluctuations within the 10-percent limit among the most recent, and therefore least stable), voters as well as the impossibility of achieving construction of communism under the existing circumstances, given the previously discussed pluralistic premises of eurocommunism, and the passive, reluctant, or even hostile, attitude of nearly 50 percent of the population. Hence, in the attitude of the eurocommunist parties in particular, the recently prevailing trend to include in the political scene virtually all the political parties representative of all the antimonopolistic classes and strata within the broad societal front. The Chilean events in particular have induced the Italian communists, above all, to put forward offers of "historical compromise" with the bourgeois Christian Democratic party, and to try and achieve the goals of a socialist revolution with 70-90 percent support of the Italian electorate.

The broader the alliance between political parties which collaborate with a Marxist-Leninist party, the greater the interest raised by the chance to work out a program of compromise within the framework of so broadly outlined a coalition. According to the eurocommunist parties, the program of a coalition government should include the programs of all the parties that participate in the coalition. In no way do the eurocommunists envisage such a common program as identical with the program of the communist party; all members of the coalition should be able to underwrite it.

Not all the Marxist-Leninist parties in Western Europe include in their theoretical concepts such fully developed and detailed rules for running a coalition of parties which collaborate with a Marxist-Leninist party. However, those who do stress the fact that all members of such a coalition fully share equal rights and duties. Less fanatical eurocommunists approach this problem in a different manner: they only point out the need to avoid posing the question of the special role of a communist party within the coalition as a precondition for its participation in the coalition, and believe that a communist party would be able to win the role it deserves in the coalition under conditions of healthy rivalry with the remaining parties.

Relying on their analysis of the theory and practice of the functioning of multiparty systems in the already existing European socialist countries, the eurocommunist parties go so far in stressing the need to accept some element of rivalry and competition within the coalition of parties collaborating with a Marxist-Leninist party that the French communists have even coined a crisp slogan: "union est combat" [unity means struggle]. The acceptance of a common governmental program does not exclude--it rather assumes--common discussion and mutual attempts to convince one another to accept the ideological values each one professes. Consequently, the expected modifications in the programs of various parties would have nothing to do with undermining the autonomy and the sovereignty of each of those parties, since they are supposed to take place without recourse to coercion, solely by means of ideological rivalry accepted by all, and of the resulting corrections freely and independently introduced by each party. What unites the parties of the leftwing coalition should be powerful enough to ensure that even the most passionate discussions, and even the strongest divergences of opinion within the coalition, would never compel anybody to leave the coalition and to reach an alliance with its adversaries.

Every West European communist party poses the question of unity of all parties of the working class. In each case the organizational merger, which would mean the unification of the working-class movement within one party, is pushed into the distant future. This happens because the communists are not interested in organizational unity as a goal per se, to be striven for at all costs. Had it amounted to the foundation of another party tainted by reformism, for instance, with the consistently Marxist-Leninist party being eliminated from the political scene, would have a definitely negative impact on future progress of the society--actually more negative than the [existing] split itself. Especially instructive in this context are, therefore, the experiences of the working-class movements in Norway and Greece, where other parties, more than the communists, have been interested in the organizational unity of the political parties of the working class.

For reasons other than those in the previously described cases, some Italian communists accept within the framework of their idea of political pluralism the ongoing split between several parties in the working-class movement in their country, even though such a split is, to a certain extent, rather artificial. Theirs is, above all, the result of the assumed premise concerning the future possibility of the permanent formation of more and more new parties, including parties of the working class. They also believe that, while the unity of the

working class is the most desirable from their point of view, it cannot be an enforced unity but solely one that is born and reborn again, thanks to continuous, lively exchange of views on all issues which are of concern to the workers movement. In particular, their polemics with the Portuguese communists concerning the unity of the trade union movement seem to indicate that once such a unity had been achieved, no formal, legal act should ever have put an end to development of this kind or ruled out possible renewed splits--and any unification agreement would be precisely such an act.

The development of the idea of political pluralism inevitably points at the Marxist-Leninist party itself, and influences the rules of its intraparty life. This starts as soon as the nature of party membership, the extent to which the party is open to an influx of new members, or the mandatory criteria for admittance to the party, are spelled out. The statutes of each party define such criteria differently. According to the statutes of the Italian Communist Party, for instance, members are admitted "regardless of their professed religion." In the eurocommunist parties there is room for representatives of virtually all the rich social and ideological components of the socialism-building majority, including those representatives of the petty and middle bourgeoisie who are ready to accept the party program and statutes.

In the eurocommunist parties of the Latin countries of Western Europe a particularly interesting problem is raised by their Catholic membership. The Weltanschauung contradictions, fairly well understood in those countries and difficult to reconcile inside a communist party, have been eliminated by the eurocommunist parties through interpretation of the philosophical component of Marxism-Leninism reduced to problems of historical materialism only. This means that the theoretical foundations for the functioning of a eurocommunist party--and thus the essence of knowledge absorbed by the rank and file of such a party--have been reduced to Marxism-Leninism divested of the dialectical materialism.

The socially and ideologically differentiated membership of a Marxist-Leninist party consequently leads to the emergence of many differentiated attitudes inside the party. In a eurocommunist party the left wing of the party very often closely abuts some extreme-left groups, while its right wing approaches the social democratic party. Some eurocommunists, however, very highly regard such a differentiation of attitudes inside the party. In the Italian Communist Party, for instance, it is assumed that it provides great opportunities for gaining influence on various ideologically differentiated groups of Italian society; even some comrades in the party leadership, well known by name, or theoreticians clustered around them, articulate ideas very different from the rather vaguely drawn general line of the party and address them to those societal groups which are closest to them, thus winning supporters for the party among ideologically differentiated communities.

This, however, breeds a particularly dangerous threat of factionalism. Until now, thanks to the principle of democratic centralism, each communist party of Western Europe has managed to maintain its ideological unity. But consistent struggle for the ideological purity of the party rank and file often results in organizational splits, in the withdrawal of some ideological orientation

from the party, and in its forming a party of its own. Hence, in some West European Marxist-Leninist parties, we are confronted with even such inadmissible, one would suppose, phenomena as the legitimized existence of factions inside the party of Finnish communists; compared to an organizational split, it is regarded a lesser evil.

In many eurocommunist parties more and more voices have recently been heard calling for a far-reaching remodeling of the principle of democratic centralism, aimed at enhanced intraparty democracy, remodeled structure and powers of various party echelons at different levels, and increased opportunity for grassroots initiative. Inside the eurocommunist parties more and more lively discussions are being held at present, touching inter alia, on such questions as: is it right to make a show of artificial unity, in particular at the top levels--i.e., at the congress--solely in order to achieve an external propaganda effect, although it has been generally known (as proven, for instance, by the pre-congress campaign, or by election results at lower levels) that there had been divergent opinions inside the party and that the principle of democratic centralism would in any case safeguard unity, thanks to the minority surrendering to the majority opinion? This is supposed to happen only after the decision had been made, but it already has been well known that such a minority had surfaced before, and during, the decisionmaking; does democratic centralism safeguard clashless transformation of progressive minorities inside the party into a majority, or would the party leadership be changed only in the aftermath of social disturbances or of decisions made by narrow circles in such a discreet way, that they would surprise not only public opinion but the party rank and file as well?

The eurocommunist parties, however, are most consistent in one respect. The idea of political pluralism cannot be applied to a Marxist-Leninist party itself. The aforementioned principles of political pluralism and its consequences are concerned with the functioning of a societal organism as a whole, where a Marxist-Leninist party is but one of its components; since [the party] had assumed the role of guarantor for the efficient and pluralistic functioning of this organism, it has been important enough to follow--in its inner life--rules of its own, on which the fulfillment of such a role depends. Otherwise, a pluralistic Marxist-Leninist party would be "dissolved" in a pluralistic society.

The idea of the theoretical functioning of a political system of socialism in Western Europe, outlined in this manner and none other, provokes stormy arguments concerning the very term of the "leading role of the party." There are attempts to replace it by some less drastic--according to the eurocommunists--terms, such as the "guiding role." It is assumed that a new formula would not equally strongly undermine the credibility of the claim for equality of status for all the political parties within the framework of a left-oriented coalition which would represent all the social classes and strata and all the ideological tendencies involved in the construction of socialism. Hence, the eurocommunist parties tend to ascribe the idea and essence of the "leading role" to the working class rather than to a Marxist-Leninist party. They believe that the Marxist-Leninist party has no monopolistic claim on its leading role, and might implement it together with other parties of the working



class. This logically leads to the conclusion that undermining the trust of the working class in the Marxist-Leninist party could consequently deprive such a party of its role, but rather than creating a vacuum it would bring about the continued fulfillment of that role by other working-class parties which had not lost their credibility.

The eurocommunist parties believe that this has been one of the reasons why the leading role of a Marxist-Leninist party, and in particular of a specifically named party, should at no stage in the development of communist construction assume the form of a legally binding constitutional standard: it has to be won over and over again, on the "free ideological market." Not enshrining the leading role of the party in the constitution might give rise, however, to certain negative results, namely, one of the principal rules for the functioning of a political system would not be reflected in an act of law of the highest rank, such as the constitution. The constitution would thus become deficient, and the image of how such a system operates--based on the constitution alone--would become a most misleading one. But according to the eurocommunists, a constitution that embodies the leading role of a specific Marxist-Leninist party would impose a much worse solution. The main danger would appear in presenting the constitutional norm as a premise for the leading role of the party, and a very strong premise at that, since it would have been fortified by the entire might and prestige of the socialist state, capable of imposing on its citizens compliance with the normative leading role of the party, similar to compliance with all the other constitutional standards. Inside the Marxist-Leninist party itself this might weaken all the efforts aimed at gaining societal consensus for its leading role, for its specific ideas and deeds, and thus weaken the efforts of the party and its rank and file to enhance the party prestige in all the areas of its social activity, and provoke disdain for the basic premises of the leading role of the party among its rank and file, thus making them disregard the need of its consistent propagation among the population. The danger would become even greater in case such a constitutional norm, instead of sanctioning a state of affairs already accepted by the society, virtually would have to initiate to a large extent the very process of accepting the leading role of a specific Marxist-Leninist party by considerable segments of the society.

It was the conclusions drawn from the analysis of how the leading role of the party has functioned in the already existing socialist countries of Europe which have shaped the characteristic articulation of the idea of the leading role of the party by the eurocommunist parties. They have emphasized the need for a party to implement its leading role by its ideological impact on the masses. Since the party itself has at its disposal no means of coercion, all the attempts to gain influence for the party by recourse to coercion would, sooner or later, lead to full identification of the party with the organs of the socialist state.

Hence, in the eurocommunist parties more and more controversial solutions have recently been put forward concerning the leading role of the party; they involve relations between the party and the state as well as between the party and society. To start with, a far-reaching separation between the party and the state is postulated. This concerns, in particular, the right of a Marxist-Leninist party to use the apparatus of the socialist state in order



to strengthen the rule of the working class and to carry out communist construction. The eurocommunist parties proclaim a thesis of possible deideologization of the state apparatus. In particular, it should not be guided by any "official philosophy." Each party, the Marxist-Leninist parties included, should not only renounce all efforts to prevail over the state apparatus, but should also avoid arming it with even those powers which had been already tested in the best possible way in its own activities. In the case of a Marxist-Leninist party, for instance, this would rule out the possibility of the state applying in its actions the principle of democratic centralism. Similarly, if only because the party--unlike the state--is a voluntary organization, the eurocommunist parties do not intend to try and rearrange the society in their own image. In the society, unlike in the Marxist-Leninist parties, the rules of pluralism would prevail.

The history of the international communist movement has already demonstrated more than once that the emergence of different ideas in some of its segments did not, as a rule, confine itself to pointing out the need to take into account those specific conditions they had been supposed to serve; it always led to posing questions of judgment: which one of the so divergent ideas was better, and why--since only one was the best--should it not be accepted by all? A similar situation has recently emerged in Western Europe.

In my introductory remarks, I pointed out that the colloquial term "euro-communism" is neither correct nor precise. For lack of a better one, not only widely accepted and used, but also approved in popular scholarly terminology, I have used it in my paper. It has been coined, and in a way imposed, by the bourgeois political literature. It is well known that it applies to certain parties in Western Europe. Their views do not constitute a new sociopolitical doctrine, nor do they create a coherent doctrinal and ideological system, opposed to Marxism-Leninism. Neither is it an organized bloc of political parties inside the international communist movement. Convinced that this paper might enrich the ongoing discussion and enlarge the scope of its usefulness, I have put forward some opinions on political pluralism, expressed in the documents of several communist parties in Western Europe. For us, they could have neither didactic nor critical meaning. Only reflection on a class analysis of the methods applied for researching some contemporary social phenomena could prove to be of any use.

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INTELLECTUAL DISSIDENTS EXPRESS VIEWS ON MARXISM

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17-18 Dec 83 pp 12-13

[Article by Jovan Radovanovic, comprising an account of the conference entitled "Marx and Socialism--Contradictions and Prospects," held in Novi Sad: "The Holy Stone and Its 'Use'"]

[Text] Does critical reassessment of Marx's thought constitute sacrilege? The only answer I can give to the concerned "custodians of the holy flame" is Jaures' thought: "Only by flowing toward the sea does the river remain faithful to its source," says Vladimir Goati.

When we speak about Marx and the present time, then we might first speak about Marxism as a theoretical field of conclusion, but the danger in the "use" of Marxism, which is a mechanical exposition, something like the possession of a holy stone, is that those who do this and say that they do this wonderfully also add that this is--creative Marxism. We are witnesses of this kind of "creative" application in the contemporary world, says Slobodan Inic.

Instead of authority, what we need is critical consciousness, instead of authoritarian Marxism, we need concrete historical analysis, instead of the kind of Marxism which is transformed into a secular theology and which is based exclusively on quotations, which finds its confirmation only in "magister dixit," what is more and more indispensable to us at this very time is our own concrete-historical thinking through of Marx, according to Ljubomir Tadic.

We must understand that Marx is no less a bourgeois thinker than Fichte, Hegel or indeed Aristotle. Until the world revolution in Marx's sense of the word takes place in fact, he is the eminent bourgeois thinker, and he is a great, important, critical, promising, but still a bourgeois thinker. After all, the question of whether he will cease to be a bourgeois thinker is not decided by his thought, but by possible historical practice, says Zarko Puhovski.

## Model of a Dialogue

It is good that we here in Yugoslavia long ago passed beyond the situation in which the critical approach to Marx and Lenin is a taboo topic. It is quite normal for questions to be put about the point which Marx's thought reached in the reassessment and analysis of society, since it is quite clear to us today that we will have to solve many problems with our own heads--the situation is altogether different today than it was in Marx's times, is the view of Predrag Vranicki.

Certainly Marx cannot be reduced solely to solving some area problem in politics, but rather the destiny of Marxism is decided in everyday life. Insofar as people become individually happy in societies which call themselves socialist, to that degree Marxism itself has been realized in historical practice, Petar Zivadinovic holds.

Even this brief panorama of lines of thought introduces us to the atmosphere which prevailed for 3 days (8-10 November) in the Petrovaradin Fortress during a discussion organized by the Institute for the International Working Class Movement of Belgrade on the topic "Marx and Socialism--Contradictions and Prospects." Having brought together on this occasion some 50 philosophers, sociologists, economists, political scientists, and jurists from the entire country, the organizers of the traditional discussion "Marx and the Present" attempted along with criticism of the most widely differing versions of Marxism to also offer--in a relatively wide-ranging discussion which, it is worth emphasizing, was characterized by intellectual tolerance for all the occasional fierceness of the polemics--reflections on the contemporary situation of socialism, about ways out of the crisis in which it finds itself at the moment both as a projection and also as a realization.

The atmosphere of the discussion, which some of the participants, a bit pretentiously perhaps, even referred to as a "model dialogue," was also characterized by a rather nostalgic recollection: 20 years ago, again in Novi Sad, almost the same people discussed the same topic, and it is now evident how much has changed since then. Whereas some have altered their views rather radically, others have held to the ones they held at that time. An interesting question which was not answered is this: Can it be said of the former that they have not been constant enough in their convictions, or have they yet been more open to new realizations, and have the latter, as men of firm convictions, perhaps been only the people unwilling to recognize the changes which have occurred in the meantime?

## Getting Out of the Circles

Although concord did not exist on the question of whether Marxism, in all the versions that exist today, can still offer valid answers to all the questions of the age, there was an almost striking unity in the anxiety about the fate of socialism, which, in spite of all its successes, seems not to have been able to avoid dramas and tragedies as well. Socialism still confronts dangers which could not only lead it astray, but could also halt its march in history. Creative analysis of the crisis of the contemporary world, which

has not spared either the capitalist systems, nor those which call themselves socialist, is thereby imposed as an imperative. No one denied that, on the contrary, but the disagreements broke out even over the question of how this is to be done so that Marx could not escape in these discussions, but the range of his acceptance, of the demands for revision, or of the almost total rejection was truly formidable. The temperature of the debate rose at certain points to an actual "calling of the roll" of those present to present their credentials as to whether they were Marxists or not, however hard the participants otherwise tried to maintain a certain academic level of the discussion....

When Dragutin Lekovic, following the statements by Svetozar Stojanovic, Ljubomir Tadic, Zagorka Golubovic, Laslo Sekelj, and Vojislav Seselj, called in dramatic tones for "some people" to declare whether they are Marxists or not, to state what positions they are speaking from, accusing them of a turn away from Marxism toward bourgeois liberalistic conceptions, and emphasizing that it was fortunate that they certainly would not be protagonists of the revolutionary changes under way, shouts were heard in the room to the effect that this was anathematization. He was joined in his demand the next day by Fuad Muhic, but, as he explicitly stressed, because of the "intellectual dignity" of the discussion, since otherwise it would range within the "closed circle of suspicions" which would be of no benefit to anyone.

In a far calmer tone Petar Zivadinovic criticized the views of Svetozar Stojanovic, specifically his criticisms of Marx for not having been vigorous or consistent enough to have removed from his theory all possibilities of its "instrumentalization for enslavement." Zivadinovic found that Stojanovic's views were analogous to the views preached some 5 or 6 years ago by militant French anti-Marxists, the so-called "new philosophers" (see the box), who placed an equals sign between Marx and the gulag, who took pains to prove that Stalin was actually Marx's direct heir.

"The touching predilection of certain of our Marxists for liberal bourgeois democracy and also their simultaneous teratological inclination toward all deviations of socialism is evident," Zivadinovic said (teratology is the science of deformities). "I must regretfully say that here in this discussion I have not heard enough arguments against the ideas of the 'new philosophers,' as I was able to do in closely following the discussion in 1977-1978 in the French newspapers and journals."

#### The Crisis Speaks

Stojanovic rejected these criticisms as a "fundamental misunderstanding." After all, he said, in no respect was he relating Stalinism to Marx, but was rather speaking about an ideologization of Marxism, about the possibility of finding a certain potential in Marx that led in the direction of "authoritarian communism," more precisely Leninism.

"I have been criticizing Marx as a great critic of ideology that in building his own theory he did not take sufficient steps to eliminate or at least diminish the possibility of abuse in the ideological sense, that he did not

reduce that danger in the cognitive (kognitivna), since it is clear that he could have done so in the practical interpretation," Stojanovic said.

In the 3-day discussion it was Stojanovic who was the author of the papers submitted whose "name was called" most often. Thus Zarko Papic criticized Stojanovic's reduction of socialism to statism, and especially for having introduced into the Marxist set of concepts some sort of "ruling" and "predominant" class. Finding no real theoretical foundation for that, Papic disputed Stojanovic's assertion that the "ruling" class actually governs the state, exercising monopoly control over the means of production, and that this applies equally in capitalism and also socialism. Stojanovic unjustifiably introduced the term "statist class," Papic feels, which, according to Stojanovic, is actually ruling, and that in the bourgeois societies the bourgeoisie is the "predominant" class, that is, not the ruling class, any more than is the working class in the socialist systems created to date.

In concluding this attempt, inevitably bobtailed, to convey a small part of the discussion and polemics, we will single out certain views expressed on the third day of the debate concerning the crisis of Yugoslav society.

Slobodan Inic: Instead of talking about the crisis, we have permitted the crisis to speak. The governance of society is too serious a matter to be left solely to politicians. There is not yet a theoretical model of the causes of the social crisis in Yugoslavia, and that means that there is no model of the way out of it either, related to the balance of political power.

Zoran Vidakovic: Yugoslavs can take strides forward only if they concern themselves fundamentally with the theory of socialism, which means that Yugoslav thought must be open to universal theoretical problems.

Dimitar Mircev: We criticize self-management, but we do not ask ourselves whether we have given it enough time to show itself, as though we are forgetting that this is an innovative project which takes a great deal of time and still more human endeavor.

#### Strategic Democratization

Predrag Simic: Self-management cannot function successfully in a crisis, intervention is imposed from outside, the state is set up as patron, so that one cannot even speak of self-management, but rather of worker codecisionmaking in which the state is the stronger partner. Self-management is impossible in the shadow of the state.

Svetozar Stojanovic: Self-management cannot be realized without a radical democratization of society.

Zoran Vidojevic: Here again it is shown that Marxism is not possible without revolutionary humanism, Marxism has to be defended against the bad practice which appeals to it.

Vladimir Goati: We must not be afraid of what is good in the communist movement; today that movement, especially Eurocommunism, is emphasizing the need to preserve the achievements of civilization, since they are a part of the perpetual struggle of the working class. And those achievements include direct democracy, that is, direct elections, multiple candidates. Democratization is the strategic way out of our present crisis. By democratization I mean a transfer of power to the people and to the rank and file (within the LC) and taking power away from all intermediaries.

[Box, p 13, top]

### Marx's Gravediggers

Maurice Clavel, the "uncle" of the new philosophers, said at the time of their fantastic success in the mass media that Marx, as the thinker of the revolution, conceived dialectically, structuralistically and phenomenologically, has been utterly superseded and eliminated if two dangerous absurdities in the interpretation of Marx are allowed to stand. The first is that Marxism has remained an exceptional instrument of analysis that has remained an irreplaceable method of elucidating social and economic factors; and the second that Marxism has remained an exceptional instrument for criticism of the status quo from the standpoint of the humanistic program.

Clavel wrote a 150-page book, Petar Zivadinovic went on to say, in which he attempted to refute with what he called "precise economic analysis" these two absurdities, as he called them, to show how the germ of the gulag was necessarily Marx's historical metaphysics. This analysis of Clavel's did not go much further than an attempt of yet another French critic of Marxism to refute Marx in 13 pages.

It is an illusion, Clavel feels, to go back to Marx's original texts, since deviations in theory and practice cannot be avoided, since the "poison is in the sources themselves." "All Marxism tends toward the gulag," Clavel says, "the gulag is born when Marxism is closest to itself, in its original principle. Glickman (another distinguished 'new philosopher') and I complement one another: whereas I derive the gulag from Marx, he climbs to Marx from the gulag."

Although I would not like to wrongly interpret his view, it still seems to me that when Svetozar Stojanovic says: "In the way Marx built his theory he opened up the possibility for Marxism to be bolshevized and Stalinized"--that that view contains the same methodological fallacy as in the view of a majority of the "new philosophers." After all, if Stojanovic explicitly says that his criticism of that process differs essentially from the criticism of the "new philosophers," I wonder whether there truly is an essential difference, and if there is a difference in form, is there a difference in content?

... It seems to me that the "new philosophers" are much more open in accusing Marx of being to blame for what happened with Stalin's reign of terror than Stojanovic is. He, nevertheless, leaves a certain escape route, but, I would say, that escape route is not good enough. And although his criticism of

Marx is closer to Glickman than to Clavel, I would say that some of these new Marxists whom Stojanovic mentions could rather be Marx's gravediggers in a way than to have risen above Marx or indeed above what came before Marx. After all, to be quite clear, how can anyone say that the possibility of the gulag or of Stalinization lay in Marx himself, in his original doctrine, without at the same time being an anti-Marxist? It seems to me that Marx himself might say of that interpretation what he did at one time say concerning a similar interpretation of his doctrine: "If that is Marxism, then I am not a Marxist."

[Box, p 13, bottom]

#### An Account With No Coverage

... I would like to subject to criticism the thesis concerning "institutional pluralism" as an alternative to our political system. These theses, Fuad Muhic said, have several forms: the theses concerning the bloc of parties of the left, the theses concerning the coalition of socialists, the theses concerning the mass social movement, the thesis of the anarchistic revolution, the thesis of the complete bourgeois multiparty revolution, the thesis of the complete bourgeois multiparty restoration, and so on.

Most of these theses are based on a negation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia--whether our party is denied any historical legitimacy or the desire is to impose upon it a partnership with certain "new" parties. The problem is not in the actual construction of these alternatives, since they are a product of individual opinion. The problem lies in the fact that our revolutionary history has not verified any of them. We do not today have any sort of sociological, political or any other indications that our working class seeks a way out of the augmented economic and social difficulties in any version of multiparty life or a multiparty system.

So, we are talking about an ideological construction of so-called free intellectuals of whom there are very few in our country with radical traits. Some of them are from the older generation and there are a few epigones from the middle-aged and young generations. They do not see that our working class is historically mature, that it itself possesses a developed critical force of judgment concerning the political system in which it lives and that it therefore does not need any sort of "new vanguard of leftwing intellectuals...."

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